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International efforts at the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are 
confronted by a paradox in their strategy for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM that has crippled 
their ability to locate and defeat the enemy and establish stability. In their narrowly 
focused pursuit of the strategy of attrition, coalition military forces have neglected the 
fundamental principle that guides small wars: that the protection of the population and 
the elimination of the influence of the insurgent forces are paramount to gathering the 
necessary intelligence to locate the threat. The disregard for the control of the population 
has eliminated the coalition’s primary source of intelligence directly impinging on its 
ability to locate or separate the insurgent from the population and trapping it in an 
operational quagmire.  Additionally, international aid efforts have focused on short-term 
relief rather than long-term reconstruction, establishing the foundation for continued 
dependence and instability rather than self-sufficiency.  The purpose of this thesis is not 
to limit or narrowly define the threat in Afghanistan as an insurgency, but to illustrate 
how the situation when framed in terms of an insurgency can be effectively managed and 
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CHAPTER I  
The United States faces a paradox in its strategy for the conduct of Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM that has crippled its ability to locate and defeat the enemy. In its 
narrowly focused pursuit of the search and destroy mission, the United States has 
neglected the fundamental principle that guides small wars: that the protection of the 
population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgent or guerrilla forces are 
paramount to gathering the necessary intelligence to locate the threat. The United States 
has failed to perceive the diminishing returns from the pursuit of a strategy of pure 
attrition.  The disregard for the control of the population by the United States has 
eliminated its primary source of intelligence directly impinging on its ability to locate or 
separate the insurgent from the population, thereby trapping the United States in an 
operational quagmire.  The purpose of this chapter is to establish the context for the 
current U.S. strategy by providing a brief background that highlights some of the major 
issues that impede U.S. efforts to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan.  In addition, this 




On September 11, 2001, 18 men armed with box cutters began a chain of events 
that would pit the small, third world nation of Afghanistan against a coalition of the most 
powerful nations on the planet.  Operation ENDURING FREEDOM began on 26 September 2001 
with the insertion of a team of CIA covert paramilitary officers into an area of 
Afghanistan just north of Kabul (Woodward, 2002, pp. 139-142).  Their mission was to 
establish initial contact with elements of a loose coalition of ethnic minority groups 
opposed to the Taliban regime known as the Northern Alliance in order to orchestrate the 
downfall of the Taliban government.  By 7 October, the U.S. had begun its air offensive 
against the Taliban, striking the targets of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar.  Following 
several delays due to inclement weather, U.S. Army Special Forces from the 5th Special 
Forces Group were inserted into Afghanistan and quickly established alliances with 
several key anti-Taliban movements integrating 21st century airpower with forces 
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employing medieval and early twentieth-century technology and tactics.  While U.S. air 
strikes continued upon key Taliban and al Qaeda infrastructure, the conglomeration of 
anti-Taliban movements known as the United Front (UF) accompanied by U.S. Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) made significant advances toward the crucial northern Taliban 
stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif.  On 27 October, thousands of students from Pakistani 
madrassas heeded the call of jihad from their Wahabbi Muslim mullahs and departed 
Pakistan to purge the holy land of the new crusade, nearly doubling the size of Taliban 
and al Qaeda forces.  However, by 30 October, the number of SOF on the ground had 
also doubled facilitating an escalation in the air campaign, which then spread from the 
northern border with Tajikistan to the southern Taliban stronghold of Kandahar.  In early 
November, U.S. and UF efforts began to gain momentum.  On 9 November U.S. Special 
Operations Forces in conjunction with the Tajik Northern Alliance forces led Mohammad 
Fahim seized the Taliban stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif while forces loyal to the Uzbek 
warlord Dostam captured the northern provinces of Jowzjan, Faryab and Samanagan, 
opening a second northern front at Takhur.  Simultaneously, other United Front forces 
pushed south of Kabul while forces loyal to the warlord Ismael Kahn made significant 
progress toward the western city of Herat driving the Taliban’s line of control further 
southward. On 10 November U.S. Special Forces, utilizing advanced satellite 
communications, facilitated the reversal of the alliances of local warlords with the 
Taliban enabling forces led by the UF (National Islamic Movement) warlord Dostam to 
capture the key northern city of Taloqan, effectively blocking the Taliban from the west, 
and driving their retreating forces eastward toward the city of Konduz.    
By 11 November, U.S. and UF forces had captured almost half of Afghanistan. 
With the fall of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan to the UF Shi’a warlord, Hizb-i Wahdat, 
the Taliban lost the only road that linked their forces in Kabul to those in the north. 
Within the next two days, both the cities of Herat and Kabul fell to United Front forces, 
sending shockwaves through the Taliban regime. Southern ethnic Pashtun tribal leaders, 
fearing encroachment of their traditional tribal lands by the ethnic minority dominated 
United Front, issued a statement warning the United Front to stay out of Kandahar, 
providing the impetus for several anti-Taliban Pashtun tribes to intensify their resistance 
against Taliban control.  On 14 November, the eastern city of Jalalabad fell to forces 
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loyal to the former provincial governor, Haji Qadir, blocking a major area of refuge for 
fleeing Taliban forces.  By 19 November U.S. and UF forces had consolidated their hold 
on the city of Kabul and captured the city of Konduz, trapping thousands of Taliban and 
al Qaeda fighters in the northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan.  On 25 November, 
an uprising in the fortress of Qala-i-Jhangi outside of Mazar-i-Sharif produced the first 
U.S. casualty of the war, CIA operative Mike Spann.  Within three days of Spann’s death 
forces loyal to Dostam had suppressed the revolt killing an estimated 500 to 600 foreign 
Taliban. On 26 November, forces loyal to the UF general Daoud accompanied by the 
forces of Dostam entered Konduz under light resistance following a two-week siege, 
abating previous fears of a massacre of foreign Taliban stemming from the United 
Fronts’ vow to murder all non-Afghan Taliban forces.  The following day, UN-backed 
talks between four delegates from each of Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups began in 
Bonn, Germany in order to lay the foundation for an interim government.  At the same 
time in Afghanistan a thousand U.S. Marines air landed outside of Kandahar and 
established Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino, quelling heightened ethnic tensions in 
the south resulting from continued fears of an ethnic minority incursion into traditional 
Pashtun lands.  By 28 November, the U.S. had begun its assault on the Taliban capital of 
Kandahar with an intensive bombing campaign supplemented by UF commanders relying 
upon local Pashtun forces.  Over the next two days during the talks at Bonn, increased 
tensions stemming from the UF delegation’s protests over the presence of a post-war 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul resulted in the UF delegate 
walking out of the meeting.  Despite the UF delegate’s absence the meetings continued.  
By 4 December, ethnic Pashtun fighters had captured a portion of the Kandahar airport 
while U.S. and local mujahideen forces had begun their initiative in the Tora Bora region 
to eliminate suspected al Qaeda bases.   
On 5 December, the Bonn delegation announced the election of a thirty-member, 
six-month interim administration headed by the ethnic Pashtun Harmid Karzai.  The 
newly created transitional government would last until such a time that the new regime 
could convene a formal loya jirga, the traditional Afghan meeting of tribal elders, to 
decide the new leadership of Afghanistan.  The formation of the transitional government 
sought to mitigate ethnic tensions by integrating members of all four of Afghanistan’s 
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major ethnic groups.  Despite this effort, ethnic tensions between the majority Pashtuns 
and Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities were again inflamed with the awarding of the 
cabinet’s top three positions --the ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs-- to 
ethnic minorities (Luscher, 2001).  Within two days of the conclusion of the delegation at 
Bonn, Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban regime, relinquished control of Kandahar and 
fled signaling the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.   
 
1. Tora Bora 
Following their fall from power, many Taliban and al Qaeda forces sought refuge 
in the former mujahideen cave complexes located in the White Mountains south of 
Jalalabad known as Tora Bora.  In response to rumors that Usama bin Laden had taken 
refuge in this area, U.S. forces began an assault on Tora Bora on 1 December with a 
massive bombing campaign utilizing B-52 bombers in preparation for a ground assault.  
Under the cover of intense bombing, an estimated 2,500 Afghan fighters accompanied by 
40 U.S. Special Forces began the ground assault on the Tora Bora region on 5 December 
(Donnelly, 2002).  By 11 December, al Qaeda forces had brokered a cease-fire to 
negotiate a surrender; however, U.S. Special Forces, infuriated at the halt of operations 
that produced little to no results, resumed the bombing campaign on 13 December.  By 
17 December, the operations at Tora Bora had ended with an empty victory for U.S. and 
Afghan forces. The U.S had learned that the Afghan militia practiced free-market loyalty 
and had allowed many Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, to possibly include bin Laden, to 
escape to Pakistan during the cease-fire.  Additionally, local Afghan village elders from 
three villages claimed that U.S. bombs had killed an estimated 150 Afghan civilians, 
enraging local villagers, potentially driving them to side with the fleeing Taliban and al 
Qaeda forces thus facilitating their escape from the region. (Ibid).  While the operation at 
Tora Bora had succeeded in driving many of the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda 
from Afghanistan, the operation allowed these forces to take refuge in the uncontrolled 
tribal region across the Pakistani border from where they have since launched numerous 
cross-border attacks on coalition and Afghan forces with impunity.   
During the week following the fall of Tora Bora, Harmid Karzai, was sworn in as 
the first official president of the new Transitional Afghan Administration (TAA).  One of 
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Karzai’s first actions was the controversial appointment of the Uzbek warlord, Dostam, to 
the position of Assistant Minister of Defense.  This was met with mixed response among 
the Afghan populace and international community. Dostam, who at one time had opposed 
the assassinated Northern Alliance leader and national hero Massoud, was accused of 
past human rights violations during a previous power struggle for Kabul following the 
withdrawal of the Soviets. The selection of Dostam was to be the first of many 
controversial appointments made by Karzai during his tenure as Afghan president that 
would lead many people to question the legitimacy of the newly formed government. 
 
2. 2002: Transformation 
By January 2002, large concentrations of Taliban and al Qaeda forces had 
dissipated resulting in sporadic, dispersed attacks on U.S. and coalition forces by smaller 
bands of guerrillas employing hit-and-run tactics.  On 18 January, the transitional 
president, Harmid Karzai, announced, “the cultivation, manufacturing, processing, 
impermissible use, smuggling and trafficking of opium poppy and all its derivatives” to 
be illegal, reasserting the previous ban on opium production imposed by the Taliban in 
2000 (Afghanistan’s Real War: Poppy and Poverty, 2002).  While Karzai’s move had 
placated the international community, it had created a dilemma that has struck at 
Afghanistan’s economic recovery at the grassroots level.  Following several years of 
drought, many Afghans had returned to the cultivation of the poppy plant due to its 
requirement for less water and its economic superiority over the production of traditional 
agricultural crops. The international community has attempted to alleviate this problem 
through crop substitution and subsidization, promising up to $500 per acre of poppy 
destroyed and the required seeds to substitute wheat as an alternative (Gall, 2003). 
However, regional warlords entrusted to enforce the central government’s ruling have 
kept much of this money and Afghan farmers, who stand to profit up to twelve times as 
much from the production of opium, have refused to switch to the less economical 
alternative (Ibid, 2003). Further, local and regional warlords have encouraged the 
continued production of opium within their areas of control for the revenue generated 
through taxation of the opium trade.  In addition, profits from the production of opium 
have been linked to a resurgence in the activity of the Taliban and other insurgent forces 
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that consider the drug trade a further extension of the jihad against the west.  In a report 
by the Washington Times highlighting the link between drugs and terrorism, Major 
General Franklin Hagenbeck, commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division in 
Afghanistan, stated, “[the] Taliban and its allies have regrouped in Pakistan and are 
recruiting fighters from madrassas in Quetta in a campaign funded by drug-trafficking,” 
(de Borchgrave, 2003, p. 15).  Poppy cultivation has created a dilemma for Afghanistan; 
while it provides the necessary resources for the insurgent and criminal elements who 
pull at the fabric of stability of the country from its periphery, it also represents the only 
economically viable cash crop for the majority of Afghan peasants following the 
economic hardship created by several years of drought (Internal Affairs, Afghanistan, 
2003). This problem will continue to plague Afghanistan and foster instability in the 
absence of a strong central government that can enforce its policies and a viable economy 
that can generate enough revenue for the government and create a sufficient number of 
well-paid job opportunities. 
On 21 January at an international meeting in Tokyo, representatives from several 
nations including the U.S, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and a delegate from the European Union, 
pledged an estimated 4.5 billion dollars over five years in international aid to support the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan (Margesson, 23 June 2003).  Despite this donation, the 
international aid fell short of the U.N. estimate of the ten billion dollars over five years 
that it would cost to rebuild Afghanistan (Ibid). This raised many questions as to how a 
government and a country without sufficient natural resources and an economic 
infrastructure could rebuild without the necessary resources. (Billions Pledged in Afghan 
Aid, 28 August 2003).  
a. Operation ANACONDA 
On 2 March 2002 U.S. commanders, in response to growing intelligence 
that Taliban and al Qaeda remnants had regrouped in the Shah-i-Khot region of eastern 
Afghanistan, launched Operation ANACONDA, the largest ground offensive in Afghanistan 
thus far.  Roughly 1,500 Afghans, U.S. and coalition Special Forces, and soldiers from 
the 101st Airborne Division were committed to a search-and-destroy mission under the 
cover of heavy U.S. bombing to root out the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda from 
their mountain sanctuary.  The operation ended on 18 March with U.S. commanders 
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claiming victory.  In reports that paralleled the body count inflation reminiscent of 
Vietnam, U.S. commanders estimated the operation had resulted in the deaths of 800 to 
1,000 Taliban and al Qaeda; however, sources on the ground could find no evidence to 
substantiate this claim (U.S. Declares Anaconda A Success, 2002).  Overall commander 
of the operation, Maj. General Hagenbeck, responded stating that, “few whole bodies had 
been found because many of those killed had been vaporized by the intense bombing by 
U.S. B-52[s].”(Ibid).  While the true figures resulting from Operation ANACONDA remain 
irrelevant to the overall success in Afghanistan, the intensity of the fighting and the size 
of the opposition in the operation revealed that the U.S. had severely underestimated the 
number and capability of the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda still in Afghanistan. 
On 25 March, coalition forces from the United States, Britain, and France 
began a program for the establishment of an official Afghan National Army (ANA).  The 
first phase of the program involved the demobilization of provincial militias (AMF) while 
the second involved the re-establishment of the Kabul Military Academy and the training 
of the first division of the ANA by coalition forces.  Karzai envisioned a 70,000-man, 
multi-ethnic army representative of the ethnic make-up of the country (Burnett, 2003).  
The ANA would provide security to each province with a dedicated division loyal to the 
central government.  However, the creation of the ANA had been plagued with problems 
since its inception. Desertion, insufficient equipment, and lack of adequate facilities had 
caused the training to fall critically behind schedule, producing only 5,000 out of the 
10,000 forces projected to be fully trained by September 2003 (Burnett, 28 September 
2003).  In a report, entitled Re-building the Afghan Army, Dr. Antonio Giustozzi of the 
Crisis States Program stated,  
Little of the money spent, at least by the Ministry of Defense, reaches 
down to the troops in terms of direct or indirect benefits, being more often 
than not pocketed by the commanders. The Ministry of Defense has been 
unable to pay any salary to the troops due to opposition of the Finance 
Minister, and guarantees only a (not always regular) supply of food. As a 
result, the military capabilities of the Afghan transitional army are 
abysmally poor. (Guistozzi, 2003, p. 13).   
The government appointments created a self-compounding dilemma in 
which the ANA, to receive qualified men from the militias, would be forced to honor the 
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ranks and positions appointed by the government, despite their organizational 
incompatibility. Dr. Antonio Giustozzi of the Crisis States Program noted, “By the end of 
2002 there were 2,500 officially recognized generals on the payroll of the Ministry of 
Defense.” (Guistozzi, 2003, p. 11).  In addition, political and ethnic bias had infiltrated 
the officer corps through the Minister of Defense, Marshal Fahim.  Fahim, an ethnic 
Tajik and member of Shura-i Nezar political organization, is responsible for the selection 
of officers for the new army. Of the 38 selected by Marshal Fahim in 2002, 37 were 
ethnic Tajiks, while out of the total 100 generals appointed in 2002, 90 belonged to the 
Shura-i Nezar (Ibid, pp. 20-21).  Perhaps the largest problem confronted by U.S. and 
coalition advisors was how to demobilize several hundred thousand members of 
provincial and warlord militias throughout the country of Afghanistan. The advisors 
determined that the new Afghan Army would accept those members of the militia 
between the ages of 22 and 28 who could provide their own weapon while the remaining 
militia forces would receive a monetary sum for their past service and be encouraged to 
become a provincial militia and police force (Guistozzi, 2003, p. 14). An estimated 
170,000 former militia were excluded from the ANA for various reasons (Ibid, p.14). The 
men who were not selected had known nothing but fighting for the majority of their lives, 
had no transferable skills, and no money, creating the opportunity for local warlords and 
powerbrokers to rebuild their personal armies and assume dominance over their regions, 
producing yet another centrifugal factor pulling legitimacy and control away from the 
central government. 
On 3 April, 350 supporters of the anti-Karzai regime warlord Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar were arrested in Kabul for plotting to conduct terrorist attacks against the 
Karzai regime, ISAF, and coalition forces throughout Afghanistan (Rogers, 31 August 
2003).  The raid seized explosives, bombs, and weapons and prompted U.S. assets using 
a Predator surveillance drone armed with Hellfire missiles to attempt to eliminate 
Hekmatyar in his stronghold located in the Konar River valley near the Pakistani border. 
Hekmatyar, the former Prime Minister of Afghanistan and leader of the Hizb-i-
Islami/Gulbuddin, or the Islamic Party, has been implicated in several attacks against the 
Karzai regime and coalition forces. He is considered one of the three major threats to 
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stability in Afghanistan along with Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, and Osama bin 
Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network.  
In early May the command of U.S. and coalition operations shifted from 
the divisional command of the 10th Mountain Division to that of the 18th Airborne Corps 
and its subordinate unit, the 82d Airborne Division under the command of Lieutenant 
General Daniel McNeill.  With this shift in command came sweeping changes and new 
conventional restrictions to operations that had been largely bottom-driven and SOF 
focused for eight months. Strict control measures were emplaced on the ability of SOF to 
associate with the local populace, while sweep and clear operations by culturally abrasive 
conventional forces resulted in enmity and the alienation of the indigenous population.  
The net result of these changes was to limit the quality and quantity of available 
intelligence, thereby impairing the ability of U.S. and coalition forces to find and destroy 
Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents.   
In early June, Afghanistan’s former king Mohammed Zahir Shah arrived 
in Afghanistan to decide the future of his former country in the first national loya jirga in 
nearly forty years.  The meeting resulted in the election of, transitional president Harmid 
Karzai, as the first official president of the newly liberated Afghanistan.  The new 
government would consist of twenty-nine cabinet positions dominated by the three key 
ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior.  The new loya jirga-elected 
government would serve until the first open elections in 2004, when it was hoped 
Afghanistan would have achieved a degree of stability and autonomy.  Despite the 
promise of stability and multi-ethnic unity, political tensions continued to mount as 
ethnic Pashtun majority dissatisfaction grew with the preponderance of the twenty-nine 
cabinet positions going to ethnic minority Tajiks despite the election of Karzai, an ethnic 
Pashtun, to the highest position in the country (Johnson, 27 Oct 2003). 
Early July marked an increase in U.S.-Afghan tensions as Operation FULL 
THROTTLE resulted in the deaths of an estimated forty-eight civilians at a wedding party 
near the village of Deh Rawod, producing the first anti-U.S. rally since the fall of the 
Taliban  (Internal Affairs, Afghanistan, 28 August 2003).  On 6 July, unknown attackers 
assassinated the newly elected moderate vice president, Abdul Haji Qadir, sparking 
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allegations of political conspiracy and furthering mistrust in the new Karzai regime.  In 
late July, Kabul police thwarted an assassination attempt on senior Afghan officials when 
a man described only as a “foreigner” by the Afghan intelligence service was found to be 
driving a car packed with explosives shortly after he was involved in a minor car 
accident.  It is unclear as to whether Karzai was the intended target of the attack. 
However, the incident marks another event in the string of attempts to eliminate members 
of the new Afghan regime (Afghans Avert Assassination Plot, 29 August 2003). 
In late August, Afghan Planning Minister, Mohamed Mohaqeq, alleged 
that massive amounts of international aid were being diverted through “well-connected 
people instead of the government” bypassing the financial management of his office 
(Afghan Minister Attacks Aid ‘Abuse’, 28 August 2003).  Mohaqeq claimed this 
diversion of funds resulted in the inability of the government to direct funding to where it 
was needed and over spending resulting in a further de-legitimization of the central 
government, limiting its ability to fund necessary programs, and furthering social 
grievances of the average Afghan.  Embezzlement is pandemic throughout the country 
and extends from the local police administrator who keeps his officers’ pay to the 
provincial governor who refuses to relinquish the money his province has generated in 
tax revenue to the central government.  This pervasive corruption has impeded the 
reconstruction effort and degraded the legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of 
the populace. Governmental corruption has produced a popular apathy in the national 
control of Afghanistan and a focus on immediate and local concerns. 
On 5 September, a single gunman dressed as a member of the Afghan 
National Army attempted to assassinate President Harmid Karzai and Kandahar governor 
Gul Agha Sherzai outside the provincial capital in Kandahar.  While the attack failed, it 
marked the fifth attempt at political assassination against members of the Karzai regime 
since February 2002, and is indicative of a trend of escalation in the use of terrorist 
tactics by those opposed to the rule of the new regime and the continued coalition 
presence in Afghanistan (Assassination Attempt in Afghanistan Latest of Several, 29 
August 2003).   
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Throughout the remainder of 2002 terrorist incidents against the new 
Afghan regime and coalition forces continued to rise moving from two incidents in 
January to 44 by the end of November (refer to Figure 1).  Actions ranged from overt 
assassination attempts against political leaders, to car bombs in Kabul and standoff rocket 
attacks on U.S. and coalition forces.  While these actions could be categorized as random 
acts of terror, they fit a larger pattern consistent with what U.S. doctrine on 
counterinsurgency refers to as actions characteristic of the latent and incipient stage of an 
insurgency (FM 90-8).  Despite this trend, U.S. strategy remained unchanged and 
continued to focus on conventional search and destroy operations, facilitating the 
resurgence and growth of underground insurgent forces. 
3. 2003: Insurgency 
In late January 2003, U.S. and coalition forces engaged the largest concentration 
of enemy forces they had encountered since the end of Operation ANACONDA.  The attack 
took place near the Pakistani border in the town of Spin Boldak and resulted in the deaths 
of eighteen individuals suspected as being part of the Hizb-i-Islami/Gulbiddin (HIG). As 
the winter ended, terrorist attacks again grew in frequency, as did the appearance of 
larger groups of what the U.S. and coalition forces were referring to as the Anti-Coalition 
Movement (ACM) and the HIG.  This increase in the frequency and the size of attacking 
groups was highly indicative of a shift in tactics from what U.S. doctrine labels a phase 
one latent and incipient insurgency to a phase two insurgency consisting of guerrilla 
warfare (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 1-7).  Despite the shift in operations by what U.S. leadership 
was now correctly identifying as insurgent forces, the U.S. mission continued using the 
same strategy in the one-size fits all world of conventional army strategy.  On 20 March 
U.S. forces launched Operation VALIANT STRIKE in response to increasing cross border 
attacks from Pakistan and specific signals intelligence (SIGINT) from the area southeast 
of Kandahar (U.S. Troops Raid Afghanistan in Hunt for Al Qaeda, 29 August 2003). 
Over 800 of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division participated in an operation “to clear and 
search villages, gather intelligence, search for weapons caches and seek out remaining al 
Qaeda and Taliban forces,”(Schult, 3 September 2003). Despite this intensive effort, no 
enemy forces were encountered. While the operation did not succeed in the capture or 
elimination of Taliban or al Qaeda forces, it did result in the seizure of one largest 
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weapon caches discovered in the region.  The cache, consisting of hundreds of rockets, 
mortar rounds, and rocket propelled grenades, was indicative of a larger force operating 
in the area. Despite the Army’s success in discovering this particular cache, there were 
most likely others in the area.  The Army departed the area without emplacing 
surveillance or security, allowing local militants to resume their activities albeit without 
one of their weapons caches.  While this is but one example of the Army’s plan for 
securing Afghanistan, this operation is indicative of the typical operations conducted 
throughout the country –sweep through an area, clear it, and then leave--allowing the 
insurgents to flow back into the area and, once again, exert their dominance. While U.S. 
forces continued their search, clear, and abandon tactics, Anti Coalition Movement 
(ACM), emboldened by the coalition forces’ inability to locate them, stepped up their 
attacks by confronting U.S. and Afghan forces openly in force-on-force engagements.  
The U.S. military responded by increasing close air support to its troops involved in 
village-clearing operations.  On 9 April, a USMC Harrier jet mistakenly dropped a one 
thousand pound bomb on a house killing eleven civilians near the town of Shkin (U.S. 
Bomb Kills Afghan Civilians, 30 August 2003).  Incidents such as this have fueled a 
growing resentment among the Afghan populace, pushing them further away from U.S. 
support and closer to the ACM in this zero sum game of political influence and control.  
1 May 2003 marked a turning point in the U.S. perception in the status of the war 
on terror.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, paralleling Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in his 1962 statement “we are winning the war,” announced that major 
combat in Afghanistan had ended. He stated, “[We] have concluded we're at a point 
where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and 
stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country today is permissive, 
it's secure.”(Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan, 11 August 2003).  Despite 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s assessment, attacks in Afghanistan continued throughout the 
summer, increasing in both the size of the attacking force and the frequency of attacks.  
On 17 August, the largest attack by ACM forces since the fall of the Taliban occurred 
when an estimated 400 Taliban drove across the Pakistani border into the Paktika 
Province and raided two police stations, killing twenty-two police and holding the station 
until dawn before fleeing back across the border to Pakistan (Afghan Rebels Attack 
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Police; 22 Killed, 2003, p. 15).  This attack and others that have occurred throughout the 
summer typify an insurgent show of force in an attempt to demonstrate the inability of 
the government to protect its population. The central government, unable to control the 
provincial warlords and tax the funds generated within their provinces, remains unable to 
pay its civil servants.  Many of the local Afghan police and border guards had gone 
months without pay, leaving them susceptible to bribery by ACM forces, furthering the 
perception of inefficacy in the Karzai regime and loosening government control (Dixon, 
2003, p. 1).  Perceptions of government corruption and inefficacy coupled with the 
dissynchroniztion of stated Islamic values and the environment have produced in 
Afghanistan what Chalmers Johnson (1982) refers to as “social disequilibrium” creating 
an area ripe for revolutionary political change  (p. 93).  In August 2003, the Bush 
Administration vowed to reassess the situation in Afghanistan and reaffirmed its 
commitment to the people of Afghanistan. However, the question remains: can the United 
States identify the situation in Afghanistan and develop a strategy that will pull the 
country from the brink of collapse? 
B. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. began Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with the intent of accomplishing six 
military outcomes: 
To make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring 
terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price.  To acquire intelligence to 
facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that 
harbors the terrorists. To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan 
that oppose the Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists that they support. 
To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely 
as a base of operation.  And to alter the military balance over time by 
denying to the Taliban the offensive systems that hamper the progress of 
the various opposition forces. And to provide humanitarian relief to 
Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban 
regime. (Rumsfeld, 7 October 2001).   
The Bush administration specifically sought to avoid the process of nation 
building utilizing U.S. combat forces in a country that had known nothing but war for the 
past thirty years (Woodward, 2003, p. 231).  However, the unexpected and sudden 
collapse of the Taliban regime coupled with the transition from overt, conventional 
warfare to a terrorist insurgency left the U.S. stuck to a proverbial “tar-baby,” and 
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responsible for the reconstruction of the country it had so quickly taken down.  Shocked 
by the celerity of the collapse of the Taliban regime and unable to perceive the evolution 
in strategy by Taliban and al Qaeda forces due to its perception of success in terms of 
conventional warfare, the U.S. declared a victory and changed its focus to the rebuilding 
of Afghanistan. Alfred von Clausewitz, in his, On War, states, “The first, the most far-
reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to 
establish…  the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor 
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic 
questions and most comprehensive.” (von Clausewitz, 1976, pp. 88-89). The failure of 
the U.S. to correctly identify the evolved threat facilitated the rapid growth of an 
underground insurgent movement.  Once again confronted with an insurgent threat, the 
U.S. military reacted by adopting a Vietnam-era strategy of search and destroy aimed at 
the elimination of what military leadership believed were the finite remnants of the 
Taliban and al Qaeda. U.S. military leadership, in failing to see the diminishing returns 
from their efforts, called for the deployment of several thousand more coalition troops to 
bolster conventional efforts to combat an increasingly unconventional enemy while 
attacks upon coalition and Afghan national infrastructure continued to rise (refer to 
Figure 2).  Revolution, insurgency, regime change, and all movements culminating in a 
change of power depend upon the effective control of the population for their success. 
David Galula (1964) in his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 
states, “In revolutionary warfare, strength is assessed by the extent of support from the 
population measured in terms of political organization at the grassroots.  The 
counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political 
organization issuing from, and firmly supported by the population.”  (p.79).  The U.S. has 
neglected this aim and instead has focused solely upon the destruction of enemy 
combatants as an end in itself.  While the Afghan government, unable to control its 
provincial warlords or generate sufficient funds to maintain an army, remains unable to 
extend its influence past Kabul.  The inability of the central government to provide 
security for its population at the local level coupled with the U.S. focus on the destruction 
of insurgents rather than on their source of power has resulted in an absence of effective 
control at the local level, facilitating the seizure of power by local warlords, insurgents 
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and drug traffickers.  Afghanistan faces a myriad of problems that impede its path to 
reconstruction.  Social, political, and economic complications have produced a populace 
receptive to revolutionary change.  The solution lies in the implementation of a 
synchronized plan of counterinsurgency and reconstruction aimed at establishing 
localized control over the population and a restructuring of the central authority thereby 
eliminating the influence of centripetal forces and projecting legitimacy and control from 
the center, creating stability from both the periphery and the core simultaneously.  This 
goal remains unobtainable until U.S. and Afghan leadership correctly perceive and 
combat the threat as an insurgent movement. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the situation in Afghanistan as a form of 
insurgency using a modification of the systems approach as developed by Nathan Leites 
and Charles Wolf in, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(refer to Figure 3).  Using this analysis, I will develop a framework for stabilization based 
on elements of successful counterinsurgency strategies taken from the examination of the 
situations in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines.  I selected the Leites and Wolf 
systemic approach over the “hearts and minds” theory because it provides fundamental 
insight into the key mechanisms that drive the destabilization and loss of governmental 
control.  The systemic approach views insurgency and other destabilizing movements as 
a “cost-push” process in which the costs and benefits of participation in the insurgent 
movement are weighed by a rational individual in relation to his or her local and 
immediate concerns. In contrast, the “hearts and minds” theory is described as a 
“demand-pull” process focused on the “preferences, attitudes, and sympathies of the 
population” in their perception of the need for change without regard for the costs 
incurred by that change (Leites and Wolf, 1970, pp. 28-29). Further, the systemic 
approach focuses on counterinsurgency as a continuous process that combats the 
conversion of inputs (resources) into outputs (actions) in a four-stage process (input-
denial, conversion mechanism interruption, attacking outputs, and strengthening the 
state).  Each stage provides fundamental insight into the mechanism for the generation 
and propagation of the insurgent movement and reveals the most fundamental elements 
of success and failure in the actions of both the government and the insurgent movement. 
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The first stage of the systemic approach of counterinsurgency (refer to Figure 3) 
is the denial of inputs or resources to the insurgent system.  The term “input” 
encompasses resources such as recruits, information, shelter, food, etc. that provide the 
core of the organization with the resources required to propagate the system and conduct 
operations.  The movement obtains resources through both endogenous (internal) and 
exogenous (external) sources, utilizing both the mechanisms of persuasion and coercion 
to obtain what it requires. Pre-existing conditions causing social divide (preconditions), a 
single traumatic event resulting in social upheaval (precipitating event), and/or the 
influence of a charismatic leader (political entrepreneur) contribute to the ability of the 
insurgent movement to mobilize the population in support of its efforts. Sir Robert 
Thompson (1966) in Defeating Communist Insurgency, states there are three types of 
individuals recruited by the guerrilla organization: the naturals, the converted, and the 
deceived (p.35).  Thompson describes the naturals as consisting of “many elements 
ranging from the idealist to the criminal” while the converted include “those who join 
because of government excesses or abuses of power,”(Ibid, p. 35).  Finally, he describes 
the deceived as elements from both of the prior categories as well as “those who joined 
the insurgent ranks for a legitimate reasons and subsequently found themselves 
committed to a communist cause, and youths abducted from their villages.” (Ibid, p. 35). 
Mao Tse-tung elaborates these sources stating, 
The [guerrilla] unit may originate in any one of the following ways: a.) 
From the masses of the people, b.) From regular army units temporarily 
detailed for this purpose, c.) From regular army units permanently 
detailed, d.)  From the combination of a regular army unit and a unit 
recruited from the people, e.) From the local militia, f.) From the ranks of 
the enemy, and g.) From former bandits and bandit groups, (Mao, 30 
August 2003).   
In addition to active participants, the insurgents rely upon the support of a portion 
of the populace to supply the movement with its required resources.  Thompson (1966) 
states that there are two types of supporters: those who are willing to help and those who 
are forced to help (p. 145).  Government forces must seek to deny the movement access 
to its sources of support and recruitment through the isolation of insurgent forces from 
the populace and the alleviation of social and political grievances that may provide the 
impetus for the willing participation of the population in the movement.  David Galula 
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(1964) states, “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for 
the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.” (pp. 75-76). He 
states that the role of the counterinsurgent in this stage is “To find the favorable minority, 
to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority.” (Ibid, p. 
77). The primary focus of this stage must be not only the separation of the movement 
from its popular base of support, but also the active recruitment of the will of the people 
to resist the insurgent, thereby denying the insurgent access to present and future 
resources.   
The next stage of the insurgent process is the conversion mechanism that 
produces action or outputs from the inputs procured in the first stage.  The mechanisms 
by which the movement achieves this aim are indoctrination, training camps, logistic 
support, and other parts of the insurgent organization that transform the resources 
obtained in the first stage into social action in the last.  In this stage, government forces 
must seek to reduce the movement’s productive efficiency.  Psychological operations 
play a large part in this stage and are required to generate distrust and fractiousness 
within the insurgent organization.  This is achieved through the dissemination of credible 
negative information regarding the movement’s leadership and attracting defectors 
through programs such as amnesty and the rewards for surrender program that proved 
highly effective in the Malay Emergency. Amnesty and surrender programs impinge on 
the guerrilla organization by “separating the hard-core guerrilla from the marginal or 
unwilling supporter, and sap the will for resistance prior to military operations.” (Cable, 
1986, p. 63). The result of these programs is to reduce the insurgents’ conversion 
efficiency by causing a shift of focus from operations to internal security, causing the 
organization to reallocate its resources from production and operations to protection, 
thereby diminishing its overall activity.    
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The third stage of the insurgent cycle is the output stage or activity of the 
insurgent organization.  Action serves a twofold purpose for the insurgents.  It serves to 
de-legitimize the government by demonstrating its inefficacy in its ability to provide 
protection and control over its population, and it serves as further recruitment for the 
insurgent movement, whether directly through active recruitment or impressment or 
through the advertisement of the insurgent cause that results from the attention generated 
by the actions of the movement.  In this respect, the version of the Leites and Wolf 
approach utilized in this thesis differs from that of the original.  An additional line is 
incorporated into the original Leites and Wolf model to account for actions by the 
movement that generate inputs from exogenous sources as well as from endogenous as 
can be seen in Afghanistan, where the insurgent movements have drawn funding, 
intelligence, and recruits from outside Afghanistan’s borders.  In this stage of the 
counterinsurgency effort, government forces directly engage the members of the 
insurgent movement in counterforce action.  While this stage relies primarily upon 
military action, it is highly dependent on accurate intelligence to differentiate between the 
insurgent and the populace to avoid the repercussions from friendly fire incidents that 
serve to alienate the populace and strengthen the insurgent cause. Galula (1964) 
highlights the importance of intelligence and the dilemma involved in procuring it in, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, stating, “Intelligence is the principle 
source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the population, but 
the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the 
insurgent’s power has been broken,” (p. 72). This dilemma describes the classic paradox 
of counterinsurgency in that to differentiate the insurgents from the population the 
government forces require intelligence from the population. However, the population will 
not provide the intelligence until the insurgents and their influence are eliminated. The 
solution to this dilemma lies in continued presence by government forces in an effected 
area for the purposes of providing security, building rapport, and gaining influence.  The 
benefits resulting from the occupation of a populated area by government forces are 
twofold: the presence off the government forces eliminates the coercive influence of the 
insurgents over the population, and the longer government forces remain in an area, the 
more familiar they become with the population and details of the area, facilitating the 
collection of intelligence.   
The final stage in the systemic approach to counterinsurgency involves the 
hardening of the state against insurgent action thereby enabling the population to absorb 
the outputs of the insurgent movement. Leites and Wolf (1970) describe this stage as 
“analogous to passive and active defense in strategic analysis.  Its passive-defensive 
aspects involve such measures as building village fortifications (‘hardening’), and 
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relocating villagers so that they are less accessible to [insurgents] R (evacuation).  Its 
active-defensive aspects involve creating or strengthening local paramilitary and police 
units with increased capacity to provide local defense against small unit actions by R” 
(pp. 36-37).  Government forces in this stage must seek to establish security and control 
over the population while fostering an image of legitimacy and trust in the state. The 
1962 Marine Corps Small Wars Manual states, “Every endeavor should be made to 
assure the civilian population of the friendliness of our forces.  No effort should be spared 
to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure their friendly cooperation.” 
(as cited in Cable, 1986, p. 164).   
In addition to the physical measures of security, the strengthening of the state 
implies the restoration of what Chalmers Johnson refers to as social synchronization. 
Johnson (1982) defines social synchronization as a social homeostatic equilibrium in 
which the value structure and the environment “change in synchronization with each 
other.” (p. 57). The government ensures synchronization by adapting its social and 
political policies to meet the requirements of the changing environment. When the 
government or the populace fail to adapt their roles or values to the current environment, 
change will occur, either to the system (government) or to the role of the population 
(social change).  It is this failure or inability to adapt that the insurgents exploit as their 
political cause.  The political and social exclusion of the ethnic Chinese in post World 
War II Malaya represent an example of this dissynchronization.  In this aspect of 
counterinsurgency, the government must seek to rob the insurgents of their political cause 
through political strengthening.  Political strengthening involves generating popular 
support through “political participation (at least at the local level), public works 
(irrigation ditches, dams, wells), and social reform (land reform, religious toleration, and 
access to schools). These actions are designed to preempt the insurgent’s cause.” 
(Krepinevich, 1986, p. 12). The British in Malaya robbed the insurgents of their political 
cause by integrating the ethnic Chinese into the social and political infrastructure of 
Malaya and by promising national independence following the termination of the 
Emergency.  In this respect, the strengthening of the state involves both physical and 
ideological steps aimed at denying the insurgent movement its base of support.  Galula 
(1964) states,  
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A victory in counterinsurgency is the destruction in a given area of the 
insurgent’s forces and his political organization plus the permanent 
isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon 
the population but maintained by and with the population. (p. 77).    
The systems approach provides valuable insight into the proper form of 
counterinsurgency by focusing on the supply side of the insurgency to cripple its 
operations. Counterinsurgency is viewed as a process that raises the costs of producing 
insurgent action by limiting the available resources and decreasing the costs its internal or 
external supporters are willing to pay.  In this respect the systems approach addresses the 
key aspects of what causes an insurgent or destabilizing movement to succeed or fail, and 
from this vantage, it becomes elementary to develop a strategy to wrest power from the 
insurgents that begins at the local level and results in the restoration of security, order, 
and control for the entire country. 
In summary, Chapter I has established the context for the application of current 
U.S. military strategy. It has detailed the background of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan 
from the events immediately following the insertion of U.S. combat forces to the present 
day. It has provided a preliminary analysis of the ongoing situation as well as an 
introduction to the Leites and Wolf systemic approach.  Chapter II will analyze the 
counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines using 
the Leites and Wolf systemic approach to isolate the key factors that led to success or 
failure in each situation. Chapter III will provide an in depth analysis of the problems 
confronting Afghanistan based on in-country research and extensive interviews with 
Afghans and U.S. military personnel at all levels of the chain of command.  Chapter IV 
will examine current U.S. policy in Afghanistan, and compare it to events observed while 
in country. It will assess the effectiveness of that policy in dealing with the specific issues 
addressed in Chapter III.  Chapter V will compile these elements to generate a framework 
for a successful counterinsurgency and stabilization strategy for Afghanistan and will 






While every insurgency remains a unique phenomenon, comprised of specific 
circumstances and a distinctive setting that facilitate the genesis and propagation of each 
insurgent movement, some factors and themes remain common between all internal 
struggles for control.  The purpose of this chapter is to distill these common factors of 
success and failure from the analysis of three cases of counterinsurgency to produce a 
tailored strategy for counterinsurgency and stabilization applicable to the situation in 
Afghanistan. Each case was chosen for the specific insight it provides on what 
contributes or detracts from a successful counterinsurgency effort. Elements of success 
and failure will be derived through implementation of the Leites and Wolf systemic 
approach.  These elements will then be analyzed to determine which are applicable to the 
specific problems facing Afghanistan that will be addressed in Chapter III. Each case 
study will include a brief background to establish the context in which specific tactics 
were employed, followed by an analysis of the specific elements of each 
counterinsurgency strategy, and concludes with a brief findings section to detail the 
overall conclusions drawn from each case. 
 
A. MALAYA 
Malaya represents the textbook example of a counterinsurgency strategy.  The 
effort featured a combination of civil-military efforts under a unified command while 
focusing on the separation of the insurgents from their base of support.  While many 
scholars contend that this achievement was made possible by the insurgent’s lack of 
external support coupled with the fact that the insurgency was split along ethnic lines 
facilitating the separation of Chinese insurgents from the native Malayans and immigrant 
Indians, the example still contains valuable tactics, techniques, and strategies that can 
translate success from one case to another. The Malayan emergency had its foundations 
in a 1920’s anti-colonial movement inspired by the Russian revolution.  From the 
beginning, the movement was almost entirely drawn from the Malayan ethnic Chinese 
minority.  The movement took shape in 1925 and was touted as “the overseas branch of 
the Chinese Communist Party” (Komer, 1972, p. 1).  In 1930, the party realigned itself as 
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the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and established a parallel labor union, the Malayan 
General Labor Union.   Throughout the period 1936-1937, the party led a successful 
series of labor union strikes creating what was labeled the “most serious crisis to date in 
the colony’s history” (Komer, 1972, p. 1).  Following deeper incursions of China by 
Japanese forces, the ethnic Chinese MCP became decisively anti-Japanese in focus and 
by 1940 began to openly support Britain in its aid to China.  Opposition of the Japanese 
produced a rallying effect within the ethnic Chinese community, driving the membership 
of the MCP to an estimated 50, 000  (Komer, 1972, p. 2).  
In 1941, the Japanese invaded Malaya as part of their quest for dominance in 
Southeast Asia.  In support of the anti-Japanese effort, the MCP received both arms and 
training from the British following the apprehensive approval of the Governor of Malaya.  
In 1942, the MCP formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) with the 
support of the British.  By 1944, the British were conducting frequent airdrops of 
weapons and supplies into MPAJA camps in support of anti-Japanese operations.  
However, much of these arms and equipment were hidden for post-war use.   
The war in Malaya ended on 5 September 1945 with the arrival of the British fleet 
in Singapore.  Upon their arrival, the British discovered that the MPAJA had established 
de facto control over many areas.  In a brilliant move, the British decided to award the 
guerrillas with official military status, placing them under military command, providing 
them with housing and uniforms, and paying them for their service in the war.  In an 
equally strategic next move, the British began negotiations for disarmament and the 
disbandment of the MPAJA units, contending that the negotiated terms offered a better 
option than a return to guerrilla conflict.  In a superficial move of compliance, the 
MPAJA turned in much of its old weaponry and officially disbanded.  Despite 
appearances, the members of the MCP had kept the best weaponry received from the 
British during the war and stood up several communist front organizations.  
In 1945, the MCP, once again set its sights on labor unions in their effort to topple 
the Malayan government.  By 1948, the MCP had gained control of 117 of 289 registered 
labor unions and was in the position to economically cripple the country (Ibid, p. 5).  In 
addition to its efforts at labor agitation, the MCP began its campaign of terror.  Between 
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1945 and 1947, there were 191 abductions and murders by insurgents, and within the first 
six months of 1948, this rate nearly quadrupled (Thompson, 1966, p. 27).  On 19 June 
1948, the Federation of Malaya declared a “State of Emergency”  (Komer, p. 6).  R.W. 
Komer (1972) in the Rand study, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization 
of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, describes the pre-conditions that laid the 
foundation for the insurgency,  
Neither the government nor the economy had yet recovered from the harsh 
effects of wartime occupation.  The political future of Malaya was 
uncertain, the administrative structure was still undermanned, the security 
forces were weak and understrength.  Crime and banditry were rife, and 
some rural areas still under virtual MCP control.  Equally important, the 
insurgents still had a popular base among Malaya’s large and 
unassimilated ethnic Chinese minority (some 38 percent of its 
population)… [who] were not even represented in Malaya’s exclusively 
Malayan political structure. (p. 6).   
Additionally, the Malayan economy was in shambles.  Its two chief sources of 
revenue: rubber and tin had been severely impacted by the war.  The post war economic 
depression produced widespread food shortages and unemployment resulting in the 
creation of nearly half a million ethnic Chinese squatters who lived in the federal land on 
the fringes of the extensive jungle and grew their own food for survival.  The seclusion of 
the Chinese squatters coupled with their ability to produce their own food facilitated the 
support and growth of the insurgent organization.  To support of their effort, the 
guerrillas formed Min Yuen (People’s Movement) as the link between the guerrillas and 
the population.  Min Yuen operated through coercion and extortion of the Chinese 
community to gain the supplies, recruits, and information in support of the MCP’s efforts.  
Komer (1972) states that, “eventually these support groups became larger than the 
guerrilla force itself… [and] had to be drained to stiffen up the former [guerrillas] so that 
the guerrillas might survive,” (p. 8).   
Initially, the insurgents hoped to collapse Malaya’s economy through disruption 
of its key rubber and tin industries by slashing rubber trees, sabotaging mine equipment, 
and murdering planters and mine managers (Nagl, 2002, p. 64).  When this technique 
proved ineffective, the MCP adopted a strategy more in line with Mao and “attempted to 
gain control of selected ‘liberated’ areas by destroying the local government structure 
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village by village through terrorism and attacks on local police posts. The people in these 
areas would then be used to flesh out an organized guerrilla army, which in the final 
phase would move out of the liberated areas to take over progressively the whole 
country”  (Komer, 1972, p.9).   
Following reduced efficiency in operations and receiving support, the MCP came 
to the realization the use of indiscriminate terrorist tactics against their base of support 
(the ethnic Chinese population) was providing diminishing returns and focused on 
selective targeting.   In 1951, the movement reached its high point with the assassination 
of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, resulting in an overwhelming 
UK/Government of Malaya (GOM) response of effective military action.  By 1955, 
following the implementation of numerous policies aimed at the severing of the 
insurgent-population link, the MCP leader Chin Peng realized his hope of toppling the 
GOM was futile and sought peace.  However, Peng’s adamant demand for the legal 
recognition of the MCP by the GOM resulted in a collapse of negotiations. In 1960, 
following a sharp decline in guerrilla activity, the Emergency was declared officially 
over.  
The decline of the insurgent movement in Malaya was the result of a combined 
British civil-military effort that focused on the separation of the insurgent from its 
popular base of support.  The British system, referred to as the Briggs system, underwent 
several revisions before its final form under the guidance of Sir Gerald Templer.  
However, before discussing this system it is necessary to highlight the aspects of Malaya 
that facilitated the implementation of this plan.  Komer (1972) lists five key elements that 
contributed to the success and facilitated the implementation of the British system of 
counterinsurgency, without which, the insurgency would not have been successful 
(pp.12-13).   
The first of these factors was the long history of the British in Malaya.  The 
British had intimate knowledge of the country’s culture, its geography, and the inner 
workings of its administration, many of whom the British had trained.  This knowledge 
and experience enabled the British to exert considerable influence and control over the 
GOM for the implementation of their plans.  The second factor that facilitated the British 
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plan was the existence of a viable administrative structure.  Despite being severely 
undermanned, the GOM was fairly well organized and jointly staffed with British and 
Malay permanent career officers, resulting in a great deal of institutional memory which 
the British were able to exploit in the formation and implementation of their plans.   The 
third factor and potentially the most important, was the loyalty of the ethnic Malays to the 
GOM.  Ethnic Malays composed 49 percent of the Malay population and firmly 
supported the GOM as was evident from the high enlistment rates in the security forces 
during the Emergency (Ibid, p. 13).  In addition, Komer states that much anti-Chinese 
sentiment existed within the ethnic Malays, which further detracted from the insurgents’ 
ability to gain support from the majority of the population.  The fourth factor was an 
ingenious political move that robbed the insurgents of their political cause. Following 
World War II, the British had planned to grant Malaya its independence as part of its de-
colonization efforts. However, increased tensions resulting from the ethnic Malays’ fear 
of political domination by the enfranchisement of ethnic minority groups (constituting 51 
percent of the population) forced a return to the past system, but throughout the 
Emergency, the British continued to publicize the inevitable independence of Malaya.  
The final factor that contributed to British success was the role of economic constraints.  
Following WW II, Britain was nearly bankrupt and Malaya was facing an economic 
depression with high unemployment and food shortages.  In 1950, the start of the Korean 
War caused a boom in the rubber industry (one of Malaya’s chief exports), relieving 
unemployment and enabling the British to rely on indigenous sources to fund its efforts in 
Malaya. In addition to Komer’s five factors, the MCP’s lack of radios forced them to rely 
almost entirely upon couriers for communication, preventing the MCP from attaining the 
celerity of response that the British effort had attained through its highly efficient 
organization.  
These factors provided a stable foundation on which the British could implement 
their plan to oust the guerrillas from their jungle refuge and break their hold over the 
populace, thereby returning stability and control to Malaya.  The British plan was based 
on the programs devised by the British Director of Operations for Malaya, Sir Harold 
Briggs.  The elements of the Briggs plan sought to achieve four goals: (a) the separation 
of the guerrillas from the population; (b) to formalize and strengthen the 
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counterinsurgency management system; (c) to strengthen intelligence collection; and (d) 
to deploy security forces on a territorial basis  (Ibid, p. 19).  The Briggs plan was not the 
panacea to the problems in Malaya and underwent some revision under the British 
Minister of Colonies, Oliver Littleton, in 1952.  Littleton made six recommendations that 
completed the Briggs plan and facilitated the eventual demise of the MCP under the 
implementation of High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer.  These six recommendations 
consisted of “(a) unified command of civil and military forces;  (b) reorganization and 
training of the police;  (c) increased educational effort, especially in the primary school, 
to help win the war of ideas;  (e) an enlarged Home Guard, to include more Chinese; and 
(f) review of the Civil Service to insure that the best men were recruited.” (Komer, 1972, 
p. 20).  Additionally, Littleton’s changes included an enhancement of the security forces, 
a resettlement of the ethnic Chinese squatters accompanied by focused population and 
food controls to eliminate the insurgents’ base of support, and numerous incentives to the 
population to assist in their avoidance of the insurgents. Overall, the combined 
British/GOM counterinsurgency effort proved highly effective due to its focus on the 
population rather than on the insurgent forces.  While the specific preconditions outlined 
above favored the British and facilitated the implementation of their plan, the tactics and 
techniques employed by the British represent the fundamentals of a successful 
counterinsurgency effort.    
1. Analysis 
The final evolution of the Briggs plan represented a comprehensive and unified strategy 
that addressed the social, political, and economic disequilibria of post World War II 
Malaya.  While there exists a great deal of overlap in the categorization of the programs 
under the Briggs plan due to their multi-faceted and mutually-reinforcing nature, I will 
categorize each technique by the primary effect of each program on the insurgents and 
their organization.   
a. Input Denial 
In this stage, the counterinsurgent seeks to deny the insurgent movement 
the crucial resources it needs to sustain and propagate its movement.  Komer (1972) lists 
six mutually reinforcing programs that separated the insurgents from their popular base: 
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(1) registration, travel control, curfews, ID card checks; (2) resettlement of 
the great bulk of the squatter population in protected new villages; (3) 
pervasive food and drug controls in ‘black’ areas to deny guerrillas access 
to food supplies; (4) accelerated social and economic development; (5) 
steady movement towards self-government and independence; and (6) 
public information and psywar programs designed to keep the population 
fully informed of what was under way. (p. 53). 
Of the six programs mentioned by Komer, the resettlement, food and drug 
control, and population control programs represent the core tactics of the input denial 
effort.  However, information operations were crucial to the implementation of each of 
these programs.  Public information programs served as a vital supplement to 
counterinsurgency techniques and tactics that otherwise served as a severe infringement 
on the rights of the population. Information was spread through leaflets, personal 
appearances of high-ranking defectors, government films, aircraft and jeep-mounted 
loudspeakers, playlets, and through the vernacular press (Nagl, 2002, p. 94). The 
campaign provided publicity for the government’s successes and a rationale for its 
tactics.  Additionally, the extensive information campaign robbed the insurgents of their 
anti-colonial political cause by publicizing British goal of national independence. The 
campaign targeted both the insurgents and the population and was highly successful in 
demonstrating the success of government programs and encouraging the surrender of 
insurgent forces. 
The resettlement program proved highly effective in separating the 
insurgents from the population by relocating the Chinese squatters and their possessions 
from the jungle fringe and providing permanent security, thereby eliminating the access 
of the insurgents to their base of support.  Sir Robert Thompson (1966) lists three main 
objects of the resettlement program: (1) the protection of the population, (2) to unite the 
people and involve them in positive action on the side of the government, and (3) 
development in the social, economic, and political fields (pp. 124-125). The program was 
extensively planned and prepared in advance and controlled by strong central 
management, ensuring that implementation did not occur before all aspects of the plan 
had been thoroughly prepared.  Resettlement was conducted as a military operation that 
relied upon surprise and haste to prevent guerrilla interference.  People were moved as 
short a distance as possible and immediately compensated for anything that could not be 
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moved.  In addition, the government awarded the peasants titles to the land on which they 
were resettled --something they had not possessed in the “squatter communities” which 
were little more than illegal occupation of Malayan public lands. The new communities 
were led by resettlement officers, many of whom were educated young Chinese, who 
served as liaisons to the government and ensured that the program ran smoothly 
following its implementation.  The communities represented a secure area, free from the 
control and influence of the insurgents and their agents.  Thompson states,  
In each village there was a police post and the police officer in charge of 
that post, in accordance with either his instructions or the needs of the 
situation could call on perhaps ten Home Guards one night and five the 
next or even none at all, out of a total of fifty in the village. This flexible 
use of the volunteers enabled a much larger portion of the population to be 
involved without preventing them earning a living. It also enabled all the 
necessary tasks to be done, including, if required, the call-up of the total 
number for special operations. (pp. 142-143). 
In addition, local security was reinforced with a regional response force 
that was utilized to counter large-scale insurgent reprisals. Another feature of the 
resettlements was the improved security measures such as wire and gates supplemented 
with watchtowers and floodlights that enabled the police to enforce a curfew and strict 
entry and exit controls at each village. The resettlement program not only provided its 
inhabitants with security and law enforcement, but also provided better public services 
and educational facilities and served to integrate many of the ethnic Chinese communities 
into the governmental infrastructure of Malaya thereby providing immediate and tangible 
advantages as well as some long term benefits over their past situation.  Finally, the 
British integrated the resettlement program with an extensive information operations 
program that provided the rationale for resettlement and focused resentment towards the 
MCP, claiming the insurgency as the impetus for the program’s implementation.  The 
resettlement program was a large success for two reasons:  it removed the population 
from the influence and control of the insurgents thereby cutting the insurgents sources of 
supply, recruits, and information; and it provided immediate improvements and benefits 
in the squatters’ way of life. 
Population controls took the form of registration and ID cards, movement 
controls, and curfews supplemented by frequent police identity checks.  The 
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administration implemented these programs to facilitate the identification and separation 
of the guerrillas from the population.  Each person over the age of twelve was registered 
and issued an ID card.  Government forces checked the cards upon entry and exit to 
villages and during frequent random ID checks to prevent the infiltration of the resettled 
areas by the insurgents. To prevent theft of the ID cards, security forces would collect the 
villagers’ cards before they left for the fields during the day and would reissue them upon 
the villagers’ return. In addition, the government integrated this program with the food 
and drug control/denial program to prevent the unauthorized procurement of food or 
medicine by the guerrillas.  Dusk-to-dawn curfews were imposed outside of the hamlets 
and movement was forbidden in areas where there was no habitation or cultivation. While 
the British implemented the registration and ID card programs uniformly at the national 
level, the remaining programs were utilized as a flexible response to localized threats. 
British and GOM forces implemented the food and drug control programs 
on a regional basis in areas labeled by the government as “black” or insurgent controlled.  
The basic premise behind this program was to deny the guerrillas the ability to exploit the 
populace for food and medicine thereby providing incentive for surrender.  Actions such 
as strict accountability of food inventory, rationing, limited sales, central cooking, 
destruction of excess food stocks, and spot checks of villagers combined to interdict the 
guerrillas’ ability to procure food.  The program succeeded in forcing the insurgents to 
devote resources to survival thus, impairing their ability to continue operations. While the 
guerrillas inhabited the dense jungle regions of Malaya, the food that was attainable from 
either the land proved inadequate to meet their needs.  Additionally, government forces 
easily discovered and destroyed guerrilla food plots in the jungle and mitigated the use of 
aborigines as a surrogate for the Chinese squatters by applying a similar strategy of 
denial.  The food and drug control program was supplemented by an extensive 
information operations program implemented at each village affected by the program.  
Government forces employed a “carrot and stick” approach to this campaign.  
Government forces informed the affected population in advance as to their required 
actions, that the guerrilla presence caused the imposition of these controls, and that 
cooperation with the government forces would result in the removal of the controls.  The 
programs proved highly effective in forcing the guerrillas to expose themselves to 
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government patrols and eventually surrender.  In summary, the British input denial 
programs were effective in cutting the link between the guerrillas and their popular base 
of support; however, these tactics, techniques, and procedures applied only to 
endogenous sources of support whereas in a larger scenario additional programs would be 
needed to counter exogenous sources as well.   
 
b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction 
Leites and Wolf (1970) state that the goal of this stage is to “reduce the 
productivity of R’s [the insurgent] resources, as well as to force R to divert resources 
from producing offensive operations to more defensive, protective activities.” (p. 79).  
The British accomplished this task through an effective psychological operations program 
aimed at confronting the guerrilla with “military pressures and civil inducements” (Ibid, 
p. 80).  Komer (1972) states, “The primary objective of the GOM psychological warfare 
was to increase the surrender rate,” while the “Secondary GOM aims were to increase the 
tensions between the MLRA’s leaders and its rank and file, and those between the MLRA 
and the MinYuen, its covert supporters in the villages.” (p. 71).  The British achieved 
these aims through its ingenious amnesty and rewards for surrender program that offered 
a substantial reward for either the capture or surrender of a MCP member based on that 
member’s rank in the organization.  This program was implemented using airdropped 
leaflets and aircraft broadcasting by SEPs (captured insurgents) to encourage surrender.  
John Nagl (2002), in Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, states 
“SEPs, in turn, often led army and Special Branch patrols on raids against their own 
recent comrades in Communist base camps, thus earning greater rewards.” (p. 92).  
Komer (1972) states, “Checks, controls, and inquisitions multiplied; sentries watched 
sentries; watchers watched everyone.” (p. 75).  The success of this program resulted from 
the diversion of resources from operations to increased internal security –in effect the 
program tied up the MCP’s manpower with the duplication of effort minimizing its 
available manpower for operations. In addition to the psychological warfare campaign, 
the food control program and the destruction of MCP crops in the jungle also served the 
dual purpose of denying the insurgents valuable resources and forcing the guerrillas to 
focus many of their remaining resources on survival and not operations.  
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c. Counterforce 
The purpose of this stage is to eliminate the insurgent’s activity through 
the destruction or capture of their forces.  The British and GOM accomplished this task 
through a combined effort of the police and the military.  In August of 1948, the British 
employed the highly effective “Ferret Force” to conduct long duration deep penetrations 
of the dense Malayan jungles to locate and destroy guerrilla encampments. The force, 
composed of small teams of British, Gurkha, and Malay soldiers trained in jungle 
warfare, would locate guerrilla camps and then direct security forces to their location to 
destroy them.  Despite the program’s success, it was terminated within a few months of 
its inception by War Department traditionalists in favor of conventional tactics (Cable, 
1986, p. 77). 
In 1949, the police developed jungle squads, which later became the 
Police Field Force, to conduct jungle patrolling and ambushes.  This force conducted up 
to one third of the entire counter-guerrilla operations and proved highly effective due to 
their regional affiliation and familiarity. (Komer, 1972, p. 39).  The key facet of the 
overall military participation in the Emergency was that it served as a component of the 
overall plan not the focus of it.  Military operations were coordinated and received 
direction from State and District War Executive Committees in response to intelligence 
and were guided the principle of minimal force.  The military operated in small units, 
conducting systematic patrols and ambushes deep into the jungle.  Soldiers were trained 
in patrolling, jungle craft, and marksmanship and remained in the country for multiple 
tours of duty resulting in “a high degree of coherence and operational competence 
predicated upon prolonged experience in the country.” (Cable, 1986, p. 90).  The 
resettlement and food control programs relied heavily on the military for support military 
demonstrating that the British effort was a combined endeavor focused on the overall 
plan and not singularly on the destruction of the insurgent forces.  Artillery and combat 
airpower were kept to a minimum to minimize civilian casualties; however, aerial 
resupply, casualty evacuation, and troop insertion proved indispensable to the highly 
responsive and flexible operations conducted by ground forces operating in the dense, 
remote jungles of Malaya.  
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d. Strengthening the State 
Leites and Wolf (1972) describe this aspect of counterinsurgency as 
seeking to “increase its [the state’s] capacity and that of the population to withstand or 
absorb R’s [the insurgent’s] actions.” (p. 82).  The actions taken in this aspect are 
comparable to both active and passive defensive measures; however Leites and Wolf 
state that the “basic requirement for increasing absorptive capacity for R’s output is to 
strengthen A [the state] itself: its capacity to be informed, undertake programs, control, 
protect, punish, and act and react vigorously, quickly, and intelligently.” (Ibid, p. 83).  
The British achieved the strengthening of the GOM and its populace through an 
improved organizational structure and an enhanced intelligence collection network as 
well as the creation of a home guard and Special Constables that facilitated the self-
defense of the population, freeing government forces to further pursue the insurgents.   
Under the Briggs plan, a unique command structure was developed to 
manage the counterinsurgency effort that provided both flexibility and response to a 
highly evolving situation.  Briggs developed the war executive committees that served as 
“operational nerve centers controlling and coordinating all facets of C-I 
(counterinsurgency) operations at the state and local level.” (Komer, 1970, p. 27).  Each 
state and district had its own executive committee known respectively as State War 
Executive Committees (SWECs) and District War Executive Committees (DWECs).  
These committees were “action bodies, composed of commanders and executives, not 
staff officers.” (Ibid, p. 28). Each committee was headed by a civilian chairman who also 
served as the primary advisor to the local sultan.  The committee was composed of the 
senior civil servant, the senior soldier, and the senior police officer for the district or 
state.  Additionally, the primary members were supplemented by a group of specialists 
consisting of the Special Branch Chief (Intelligence), the senior Home Guard officer, 
propaganda, and food control officers. Cable (1986) states, “no intelligence product, 
regardless of substantial merit, has any utility unless it can be exploited quickly, 
vigorously, appropriately, and without interorganization jurisdictional disputes.” (p. 84).  
The committees mitigated this problem through the unification of the command of all 
counterinsurgency operations (both civil and military) within their area of control 
allowing actions to be coordinated instantly by the primary commanders in response to 
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the latest intelligence.  In a final step of the unification of effort, General Sir Gerald 
Templer, combined the positions of High Commissioner and Director of Operations 
thereby unifying the civil and military authority at the top as well as the bottom creating a 
system of centralized authority but highly decentralized and responsive execution.  The 
crowning achievement in this aspect of the counterinsurgency effort was the creation of 
the police Special Branch. This organization was responsible for all aspects of 
intelligence gathering, so much so that military intelligence was subordinated to this 
agency.  The rationale behind this organization was to capitalize on the regional specialty 
and intimate knowledge of each area of the police that was acquired through daily contact 
with the civilian populace.  All raw intelligence regardless of source was funneled 
through the Special Branch creating a central and single organization responsible for the 
collection, processing, and dissemination of all intelligence, eliminating duplication of 
effort and conflicting interpretations of the same intelligence.  
The Home Guard program was designed to free the military and police 
forces from static defensive duties and to facilitate the self-defense of the newly formed 
resettlement villages.  The government dispatched mobile instructor teams to conduct 
training and the gradual replacement of the military and police force with the Home 
Guard.  Each village Home Guard was provided with uniforms and organized into 12-
man units; however, only one in ten men was provided with a weapon to prevent arms 
from falling into the hands of the MCP.   The program proved so successful that by the 
end of 1959 the program was discontinued due to the lack of insurgent activity and the 
improved conditions permeating Malaya.   
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In addition to the Home Guard, a special paramilitary unit was created to 
relieve the police of their industrial security role in the protection of tin mines and rubber 
plantations.  This program later evolved into two separate forces: the Area Security Units 
who were responsible for enforcing the food control program, and the Police Special 
Squads which were responsible for conducting area reconnaissance for the Police Special 
Branch.  The final aspect of strengthening the state pertains to the organization of the 
country along each region’s status with respect to governmental control.  The 
establishment of black (insurgent-controlled) and white (government-controlled) areas 
was an organizational technique designed to apply a systematic approach to clearing each 
region based on its specific threat level.  This system represented a carrot-and-stick 
approach in that compliance with the mandates of the program resulted in the removal of 
restrictions.  Additionally, the program avoided causing undue hardship and resentment 
in those areas that had cooperated with the GOM and were free of insurgent influence. 
The system worked to generate a network of secure areas in an ever-expanding process 
that robbed the guerrillas of their popular base of support and eliminated their room for 
maneuver.  
e. Failures 
In addition to highlighting the tactics and techniques that proved effective, 
it is instructive to analyze those strategies that did not.  The first errant program of the 
British was part of the 1949 Emergency Regulation that imposed the death penalty for 
consorting with terrorists.  The British quickly repealed this regulation when it was 
realized that it was difficult for the Chinese to avoid interaction with the insurgents when 
government protection was insufficient.  Another technique that proved ineffective was 
the imposition of collective punishment on an uncooperative village or town. The 
government abandoned this technique based on the realization that the measure served to 
alienate those members of the community who were cooperative, thereby diminishing 
their sources of available intelligence. Finally, the use of large-scale forces of battalion to 
brigade size to conduct jungle sweeps was abandoned for the use of systematic small unit 
patrols following diminishing returns on the heavy investment of manpower.   Overall, 
the combined British/GOM effort represented a highly efficient system of 
counterinsurgency.  While many of the programs have multiple categorizations within the 
Leites and Wolf framework, the focus on the population and its separation from the 
insurgents remained a key feature of all aspects of the British/GOM effort resulting in its 
overall success.   
f. Findings 
The primary feature of the Malayan counterinsurgency endeavor was the 
highly effective resettlement program that accomplished two aspects of the Leites and 
Wolf systemic approach simultaneously.  The resettlement program cut off the insurgents 
from their base of support while strengthening the state and its population from further 
influence by the insurgent movement. The program was effective because it provided 
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both immediate and long-term benefits to the population.  The program provided those 
resettled titles to their land, which the ethnic Chinese squatters did not possess while 
residing in the federal land that fringed the jungle, and the resettlement villages provided 
the Chinese with a sense of political efficacy and representation by a member of their 
own ethnic group.  Despite the effectiveness of the resettlement program, its success 
would have been negligible without the remaining programs instituted by the British.  
The unified civil-military approach created a single effort and minimized 
interorganizational squabbling and redundancy of effort. The formation of state and 
district War Executive Committees facilitated immediate response to the latest 
intelligence through the integration of operational commanders, civil administrators, and 
intelligence officers.  The utilization of police forces with regional knowledge and 
experience provided accurate and efficient intelligence reporting.  The designation of 
black and white zones prevented the alienation of the compliant populace while focusing 
pressure on the insurgent forces.  Population controls facilitated the separation of the 
insurgents and their supporting organizations from the populace without the use of 
frequent and recurring searches. Finally, the information operations program that 
supplemented each of the tactics that affected the population provided the rationale for 
the program in advance, offered incentives for compliance, and focused the resentment of 
the population for the program toward the insurgents, facilitating the program’s overall 
success. However, the primary factor that contributed the most to the success of the 
British/GOM counterinsurgency effort was its focus on the population as opposed to the 
insurgent forces as an end.   
 
B. VIETNAM 
The Vietnam case study was chosen because it illustrates two key points about a 
failed counterinsurgency effort: how institutionalized concepts can blind an organization 
to the nature of a threat, and how the transfer and misapplication of viable 
counterinsurgency techniques from one situation to another can produce failure. The U.S. 
effort in Vietnam focused on countering a partisan war in an insurgent conflict through 
conventional counterforce techniques while ignoring the growing influence of the 
insurgent movement over the population, thereby losing the country from within while 
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defending its exterior.  Its failure not only existed in the misperception of the threat, but 
also in the misapplication of several appropriate techniques. Despite superficial 
references to counterinsurgency throughout the conflict, the period following 1965 
followed a conventional strategy of attrition; therefore, in the interest of maintaining 
focus on the relevant counterinsurgency techniques employed in Vietnam, only the period 
1945-1965 will be examined in detail.  
The American involvement in Vietnam began shortly after the failure of the 
French to re-establish control over its colony of French Indochina following World War 
II.  The insurgent movement grew out of the strong anti-colonial sentiment of the 
indigenous Vietnamese population spurred by the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh and 
his aspirations for a united Vietnam.  Following the withdrawal of Japanese forces at the 
close of World War II, the Vietminh had consolidated power throughout Vietnam.  On 2 
September 1945, following the signing of the Japanese surrender marking the end of 
World War II, the leader of the Vietminh, Ho Chi Minh, issued the Vietnamese 
Declaration of Independence forming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and 
naming himself president. (The Vietnam War, 4 September 2003).  Minh had hoped that 
by modeling the Vietnamese declaration after the U.S. document that his fledgling nation 
would achieve international recognition beginning with the United States; however, this 
was not to be the case.  At the 1945 Potsdam Conference the Allies decided to split the 
country under the temporary control of the British and Chinese until the arrival of the 
French who would then resume control of the country.  In October, 35,000 French troops 
arrived to assume control of the southern half of Vietnam and by February had 
supplanted both British and Chinese control (The Vietnam War, 4 September 2003).  
Throughout 1946, Minh worked tirelessly to negotiate for the reunification and 
independence of Vietnam, but despite his efforts, in June the French High Commissioner 
declared the creation of the Republic of Chochina under a separatist French government 
in South Vietnam (Ibid).  The French began systematically clearing South Vietnam of the 
Vietminh influence and in November 1946, French forces seized Hanoi and bombed 
Haiphong harbor killing an estimated 6,000 people (Higgins, 1989, p. 31).  Following the 
massacre, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh retreated into the dense jungles of Vietnam.  In 
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December of 1946, the Vietminh launched their first large-scale attack against the French 
colonial powers signaling the start of the First Indochina War. 
In 1949, the French installed Prince Bao Dai as the head of state of South 
Vietnam and established the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) as a counter to Minh’s 
appeals for unification.  In October, the communist forces of Mao Ze-Dong defeated the 
nationalist forces of Chaing Kai-shek sparking the policy of the containment of 
communism in the White House.  Following the communist consolidation of power in 
China, both China and the Soviet Union officially recognized the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and began sending weapons and advisors to North Vietnam.  In a parallel move, 
the U.S. and Britain recognized the rule of Bao Dai in South Vietnam and by July of 
1950, the U.S. had begun sending military aid to the French. However, in June of 1950, 
following the incursion of communist North Korean troops into South Korea, the 
deployment of U.S. ground forces to the region diverted much of the focus from 
Vietnam.  
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By 1953, the Korean War had ended with an armistice that divided Korea at the 
38th parallel.  During this period, the U.S. had continued to supply the French with arms, 
equipment, and advisors including the creation of the Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG) in 1950.  In March of 1954, North Vietnamese forces began an assault 
on the French position at Dien Bien Phu air base.  The French, outnumbered nearly five-
to-one, sent a desperate appeal to Washington for assistance (The Vietnam War, 2003).  
President Eisenhower considered several different options, but in the end decided to take 
no action. On 7 May 1954, nearly 10,000 French soldiers surrendered to the North 
Vietnamese forces under General Giap, marking the end of the First Indochina War 
(Ibid).  Following the end of the war, France withdrew completely from Vietnam.  In 
May of 1954, the Geneva Convention on Indochina convened to discuss a solution for 
Vietnam.  The Convention divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel, awarding the North to 
Ho Chi Minh and the South to Bao Dai under the stipulation that free elections for the 
unification of Vietnam would be held within two years (The Vietnam War, 2003).  
Fearing a victory by Ho Chi Minh and his communist regime, neither the U.S. nor South 
Vietnam signed the treaty.  Following the convention, Dai appointed Ngo Ding Diem as 
his prime minister.   
Diem, a devout Roman Catholic, encouraged the resettlement of Catholics in the 
North to South Vietnam during the 300 days allowed under the treaty for the North and 
South to reposition their people and forces.  During this time nearly one million people 
crossed the border, however, 10,000 Vietminh remained in South Vietnam by order of 
Hanoi (The Vietnam War, 4 September 2003).   
In January 1955, the U.S. began providing direct aid to the government of South 
Vietnam in the form of military equipment and training, while in a parallel move; the 
Soviet Union approved military aid for the North in July. On 23 October 1955, Diem 
defeated Bao Dai in a U.S-backed referendum and declared himself president of the 
Republic of South Vietnam (Ibid). Diem began his reign of South Vietnam by filling his 
top cabinet positions with friends and family to include his younger brother, Ngo Dinh 
Nhu, who became Diem’s principle advisor.  In addition to Diem’s nepotism, he resettled 
many of his fellow Catholics who fled from North Vietnam into the central highlands of 
South Vietnam, angering the native Montagnards.  Additionally, Diem supplanted rural 
village officials elected by their local constituency with his loyal followers, alienating 
much of the rural populace and providing a political opening for a rural-based 
insurgency.  In response to the perception of growing resentment among the rural 
populace Diem began a purge of suspected Vietminh, now known as Viet Cong, 
throughout the South.  Diem’s campaign led to the arrest, detention, and re-education of 
over 20,000 suspected Viet Cong (Ibid).  Diem’s campaign would last until 1957 and 
prompt the North Vietnamese to expand their efforts on the Ho Chi Minh trail (Higgins, 
1989, p. 36).  In addition to his growing paranoia regarding the threat from the North, 
Diem’s mistrust extended to the political and military realms.  Having survived a past 
military coup, Diem deeply mistrusted the military and appointed military leaders based 
on their loyalty rather than their military competency. As an additional reassurance, Diem 
assigned the control of both the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps to loyal 
provincial chiefs, to ensure the existence of a rival military force not under military 
control.  
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In July of 1956, Diem under the aegis of the United States refused to conduct the 
referendum for the reunification of Vietnam imposed under the Geneva Convention.   In 
response to Diem’s move, the Soviet Union proposed the permanent division of Vietnam 
into the North and South along the 17th parallel.  The U.S. refused this proposal fearing 
that the recognition of communist North Vietnam would contribute to the legitimization 
of communists movements elsewhere.  Diem’s paranoia diverted more of his funding an 
attention to matters of security than to the social welfare of his country generating 
resentment throughout rural Vietnam.  Communist guerrillas, left behind from 
regroupment, capitalized on Diem’s neglect and gained popular support through promises 
of land reform and a higher standard of living. Land reform had been a particularly 
sensitive issue among the Vietnamese populace following regroupment.  Diem had 
initiated a land grant program, giving free land to Catholics displaced from North 
Vietnam following the division of the country.  A privileged minority controlled the 
majority of the land in the South as absentee landlords, while the majority of the 
population paid rent. Diem’s move created further divide among the populace, as well as 
fueled anti-Diem sentiment throughout the rural population. 
In 1958, the Viet Cong began preparation for a people’s war of liberation with the 
creation of a command structure and 37 companies in the Mekong River Delta (The 
Vietnam War, 2003).  In March of 1959, Ho Chi Minh declared a “People’s War to unite 
all of Vietnam” beginning the Second Indochina War. Minh validated his declaration in 
July with the deployment of 4,000 Viet Cong guerrillas into South Vietnam (Ibid).  
During the last four months of 1959, the Viet Cong assassinated over 110 local 
government leaders throughout the countryside (Nagl, 2002, p.121). John Nagl (2002), in 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, states the intent of these attacks 
was to fill the political vacuum in the countryside left open by the ineffectiveness of local 
militias and RF/PF forces, who were ineffective because of misplaced focus on 
conventional warfare of the ARVN instilled by the U.S. Army.” (p. 121). By 1960, the 
population had grown weary of Diem’s corrupt and inefficient nepotistic government. 
Responding to the growing public resentment of Diem’s regime, several distinguished 
nationalists petitioned Diem for reform.  Diem reacted by shutting down several 
opposition newspapers and arresting journalists and intellectuals.  
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Diem’s corruption and implementation of violent reactionary tactics had come to 
characterize two aspects of social disequilibrium in what Chalmers Johnson (1982) refers 
to in his theory of revolutionary change as “power deflation” and a “loss of authority” 
(pp. 93-94).  Johnson states that power deflation occurs “during a period of change 
[when] the integration of a system depends increasingly on the deployment of force.” 
Additionally, Johnson defines the loss of authority as a situation in which society’s 
legitimate leaders are “unable to develop policies that will maintain the confidence of 
nondeviant actors in the system…  When this happens the use of force by the elite is no 
longer considered legitimate.  A revolution will not occur as long as the leaders can still 
use the army successfully to coerce social interaction; but the power deflation will 
increase, producing a police state.” (Ibid, p.94).  Diem maintained his rule through his 
overt use of force and his reliance on divisive factors in civil-military relations to 
eliminate the rise of an overt alternative base of power. The populace had increasingly 
perceived his use power as abusive and self-serving, but had yet to take action.   
In November 1960, Diem foiled a coup by disgruntled South Vietnamese Army 
officers and began a countrywide purge of all suspected enemies of the state.  Diem’s 
purge resulted in the arrest of 50, 000 individuals, spurring thousands to flee to North 
Vietnam (The Vietnam War, 2003).  In December 1960, the North Vietnamese effort 
transitioned to phase two of its operations in South Vietnam with the creation of the 
People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), and its support organization, the National 
Liberation Front (NLF) (Ibid). 
In early 1961 Soviet Premier, Nikita Krushev, pledged his support for “wars of 
national liberation throughout the world,” encouraging the North Vietnamese to intensify 
their efforts in South Vietnam (The Vietnam War, 2003).  Newly elected President John 
F. Kennedy retorted by stating, “…We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any 
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to insure the survival and the success of 
liberty,” and sent 400 Special Forces in the role of “special advisors” to aid in the training 
of the South Vietnamese Army (Ibid). The ongoing rhetoric between the two 
superpowers continued to lay the groundwork for a partisan war that would soon take 
place in South Vietnam.  
On 16 September of 1961, in response to American requests for assistance in 
fighting the Viet Cong, the British sent the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to South 
Vietnam (Nagl, 2002, p. 130). BRIAM was composed of five British colonial civil 
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servants and policemen led by Sir Robert Thompson (Ibid, p. 130). Thompson, who 
served as the Minister of Defense in Malaya following the Emergency, advocated the use 
of population control strategies in favor of the U.S. military’s reliance on search and 
destroy tactics and overwhelming firepower (Ibid, p. 130). Despite Thompson’s extensive 
credential in counterinsurgency, his vision of a parallel program of resettlement failed 
due to Vietnamese corruption and poor implementation.  Following the failure of the 
Strategic Hamlets program, Thompson, who remained unable to inspire U.S. 
counterinsurgency thought, closed the BRIAM mission in March of 1965 (Ibid, p131).  
In November 1961, the Green Berets’ expanded their training to include the 
members of indigenous tribal Vietnamese known as the Montagnards who inhabited the 
central highlands of South Vietnam.  The resulting collaboration produced the 
paramilitary Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). The groups conducted operations 
to prevent the further infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into the south. 
While the program was initially based on classical counterinsurgency principles and 
demonstrated great success, it would later fall into ruin through hasty implementation and 
poor execution under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) following 
Operation SWITCHBACK (Krepinevich, 1986, p.71).  
In the fall of 1961, the North Vietnamese increased the tempo of their operations, 
launching several successful attacks on South Vietnamese troops prompting Diem to 
request further military assistance from the United States.  Kennedy responded by 
sending U.S. helicopter units and additional military advisors to transport and direct 
South Vietnamese troops in battle, involving U.S. forces in combat operations for the first 
time. In early February, the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV) was created 
to replace MAAG as the command structure for U.S. advisory efforts in Vietnam. The 
initial concept behind the creation of MACV was “to assist and support the RVN in 
defeating the communist insurgency.” (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 64).  Despite his complete 
lack of experience with counterinsurgency, the Army selected General Harkins, an armor 
officer, to run MACV.  Harkins held to his belief that MACV’s mission was to “kill VC 
pure and simple” thereby condemning counterinsurgency to the limited tactics of search 
and destroy (Ibid, p. 64).  
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In January 1962, President Kennedy authorized the use of defoliant known as 
agent orange, to counter the VC’s use of the thick jungle cover for concealment and 
access to the rural population’s food supply.  While senior Army field commanders 
touted the program, code named RANCH HAND, as a success, it served to alienate the people 
it was designed to protect.  The airborne dispersal of defoliant would frequently drift unto 
the crops of the indigenous population and destroy their harvest.  Despite this adverse 
effect, the program continued until 1970.  
On 27 February 1962, Diem’s reign, again, came under attack as two renegade 
South Vietnamese pilots bombed the presidential palace using two World War II U.S. 
fighters. Both Diem and his brother escaped unharmed. In March, Diem began the 
strategic hamlets program based on the advice of Sir Richard Thompson, who played a 
major role in the British success in Malaya.  The program was designed to parallel 
Malaya’s resettlement program by removing and isolating the peasants from the guerrilla 
influence by focusing on the “security and stability of the populated rural areas” rather 
than on the destruction of VC forces (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 67).  While the program was 
sound in design, it was poor in implementation. The program, which was run by Diem’s 
brother, was fraught with corruption and the falsification of data focused on the 
exploitation of the peasants it was designed to help.  Additionally, the program failed to 
account for Vietnamese traditions that bound each family to their ancestral land resulting 
in further resentment over the forced move.  In the end, the program failed due to massive 
corruption, inadequate preparation that left many villages incomplete before occupation, 
and the absence of unity of command and effort that left gaps in the security of each area 
enabling the VC to operate and thrive in the uncontrolled areas. Eventually, the VC 
infiltrated many of these hamlets, prompting Diem to order the bombing of these 
suspected havens.  The bombing, which was conducted by both U.S. and South 
Vietnamese bombers, produced numerous civilian casualties, generating further 
resentment and hostility towards the Diem regime and the United States.   
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By May of 1962, the VC had shifted into phase three of their operations and 
began to organize and operate in battalion-sized units throughout central Vietnam.  
Despite the shift in strategy by the VC indicative of their success, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara visited South Vietnam and announced, “we are winning the war” (The 
Vietnam War, 2003). In May of 1963, Diem removed several Buddhists from key 
government positions, replacing them with Catholics, sparking riots throughout South 
Vietnam resulting in the deaths of one woman and eight children when South Vietnamese 
police and Army troops open fire to subdue the crowds (The Vietnam War, 2003).  
Buddhist demonstrations spread throughout the South. Diem responded by imposing 
martial law and dispatching South Vietnamese Special Forces to pacify several southern 
Buddhist sanctuaries.  Diem’s actions produced widespread anti-Diem demonstrations 
throughout the south. Kennedy’s advisors warned him to dissociate himself from Diem 
and talks began in the administration on forcing Diem to reform.   
On 4 July 1963, the CIA office in Saigon received information from a Buddhist 
South Vietnamese General regarding the potential overthrow of Diem.  On 2 November 
1963, government forces assassinated Diem and his brother, Nhu, resulting in a power 
vacuum that produced a series of unstable military and civilian governments (The 
Vietnam War, 2003). Years of oppression, religious discrimination, and corruption under 
the Diem regime had created social disequilibrium within South Vietnam, enabling the 
Viet Cong to increase their hold on the rural population.  South Vietnam was now on the 
brink of caving in and totally reliant on the U.S. for support.  In November, President 
Johnson vowed that he “will not lose Vietnam” and by the end of the year had raised the 
number of troops in Vietnam to over 16,000 (The Vietnam War, 2003). 
In early 1964, a bloodless military coup by General Nguyen Khanh resulted in the 
removal from power of General Duong Van Minh.  Minh was allowed to remain a 
figurehead within the Vietnamese government; however, General Khanh retained the true 
power. In March, the U.S. began a secret bombing campaign of the Ho Chi Minh trail 
inside of Laos, in an effort to interdict the perceived external source of the South 
Vietnamese insurgency; however, the campaign had little effect on the ability of the Viet 
Cong to operate within the South (The Vietnam War, 2003). 
In August of 1964, the U.S. destroyer, U.S.S. Maddox, was attacked by three 
North Vietnamese patrol boats while supporting a South Vietnamese raid on two North 
Vietnamese bases in the Gulf of Tonkin.  While no injuries or fatalities resulted from the 
attack, the Johnson Administration issued a stern warning to Hanoi that further 
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“unprovoked” attacks would result in “grave consequences” (The Vietnam War, 2003).  
Following questionable reports of a similar incident in the Gulf, Johnson launched a 
limited bombing raid against the North, resulting in the shoot down of two U.S. planes 
and the capture of the first U.S. prisoner of war. In response to the Gulf of Tonkin 
incidents, Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, granting the president the 
authority to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the 
United States and to prevent further aggression” without the formal declaration of war on 
North Vietnam (Vietnam online, 2003).  
On 21 August, students and Buddhist militants in Saigon staged a series of 
protests against the militaristic rule of Kahn.  General Khanh, in a superficial move of 
appeasement, responded by forming a triumvirate composed of Khanh, General Minh, 
and General Khiem. Despite Khanh’s response, the streets of Saigon descended into mob 
violence and rioting.  In mid-September, two South Vietnamese Generals attempted an 
unsuccessful coup aimed at the overthrow of General Khanh, signaling continued 
instability in the government and widening the political gap for the insurgent cause (Ibid). 
In October 1964, China tested its first atomic bomb and massed troops along its 
border with North Vietnam.  The advent of Chinese nuclear capability combined with its 
perceived involvement in North Vietnam would generate a degree of restraint in the 
responses of U.S. decision makers to the perceived actions of the North.  In November, 
the Viet Cong launched their first attack against U.S. forces at Bien Hoa Air Base 
utilizing mortars armed with U.S. mortar rounds.  Despite the fact that numerous VC 
attacks had resulted in the capture of U.S. arms and equipment, U.S. leadership perceived 
the use of U.S. ammunition as further evidence of exogenous communist support. The 
perception of further involvement by communist forces resulted in the continuation of a 
“tit-for-tat” deterrence strategy by U.S. policy makers implemented against the North 
because in the words of General Westmoreland, “the United States knew of no Viet Cong 
targets within South Vietnam, ‘the attack of which would constitute appropriate 
reprisal.’” (Cable, 1986, p. 241).   
In December of 1964, an estimated 10,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
regulars infiltrated into the central highlands of South Vietnam, combining their numbers 
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with the Viet Cong to form battalion-sized elements (The Vietnam War, 2003).  On 20 
December, in yet another military coup, General Kahn and several younger Army officers 
dissolved the triumvirate, ousting General Minh and several other senior military officials 
from the Vietnamese government and seized control. By 27 January of 1965, Khanh had 
seized full control of the government.  
In late January 1965, in a joint memorandum to the President, National Security 
Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, concluded that 
“America’s limited involvement in Vietnam is not succeeding, and that the U.S. has 
reached a ‘fork in the road’ and must soon escalate or withdraw.”(Ibid).   In early 
February, the Viet Cong attacked the American base at Pleiku, killing eight and 
wounding 126 Americans and destroying ten aircraft, prompting Johnson to retaliate by 
bombing the North Vietnamese army camp near Dong Hoi as part of the “tit-for-tat” 
strategy of deterrence favored by White House decision makers (Ibid).   During a visit to 
Hanoi in February, the Soviet Prime Minister promised to aid North Vietnam against 
American aggression and within weeks Soviet Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) began 
arriving in Hanoi.  On February 18, South Vietnamese political instability continued as 
another military coup resulted in the replacement of General Khanh with a civilian, Dr. 
Phan Huy Quat (Ibid).   
45 
In late February, General Westmoreland requested two battalions of Marines to 
defend the air base at Da Nang.  While Johnson initially approved the request, he was 
cautioned by the U.S. ambassador in Vietnam who warned that the United States is about 
to repeat the same mistakes of the French by deploying large numbers of forces into a 
region where one could not differentiate between the population and the enemy.  On 2 
March 1965, the U.S. began Operation ROLLING THUNDER with the intent of increasing the 
pressure on Hanoi to stop the infiltration of troops and materiel into the South (The 
Vietnam War, 2003).  In addition, Operation BARREL ROLL began as an armed 
reconnaissance mission along the Laotian border to directly interdict supplies moving 
along the Ho Chi Minh trail.  North Vietnamese work crews repair the damage each night 
producing only a minor setback in the movement of materiel from the North.  Continued 
bombing in the South resulted in the creation of an estimated 3 million refugees resulting 
from the inadvertent destruction of villages, while in the North the destruction of 
factories resulted in the decentralization of North Vietnamese industry, minimizing their 
vulnerability to further U.S. attacks (Ibid).   
On 8 March 1965, 3,500 Marines landed on China Beach, marking the arrival of 
the first conventional U.S. forces deployed to Vietnam to conduct combat operations 
(The Vietnam War, 2003). The Marines, originally tasked to provide security for 
airfields, would soon be engaged in full-scale offensive combat operations. At the end of 
March, the Viet Cong directed their use of terrorist tactics towards the United States with 
the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. By the end of 1965, Viet Cong terrorism had 
reached a pinnacle with 1,895 people assassinated and 12,778 kidnapped in an effort to 
further the political and social destabilization f the South (Nagl, 2002, p. 136). In mid 
May, the U.S. conducted its first bombing pause in Operation ROLLING THUNDER to facilitate 
negotiation with Hanoi.  The North Vietnamese exploited the pause, using the time to 
repair air defenses and send more troops and equipment to South Vietnam. By May an 
additional 3,500 troops from the 173d Airborne Brigade arrived in Vietnam to conduct 
offensive airmobile operations against the VC in the South (The Vietnam War, 2003).  As 
the United States gradually built up its combat forces in the South, the North Vietnamese 
stepped up operations against the South and U.S. forces.  From 11 to 13 May the Viet 
Cong conducted operations in the Phuoc Long Province and in south central Vietnam, 
overrunning South Vietnamese troops and attacking a U.S. Special Forces firebase.  By 
19 May, the Johnson Administration, realizing the futility of the pause in bombing, 
resumed operations; however, six more pauses would occur during the conduct of 
Operation ROLLING THUNDER that allowed Hanoi to retain the strategic as well as the tactical 
initiative (Ibid). On 18 June, Nguyen Cao Ky seized control of the South Vietnamese 
government in the tenth change of power in the twenty months since the assassination of 
Diem.  Near the end of July, President Johnson announced the deployment of 44 
battalions to Vietnam for combat operations.  Johnson’s decision raised the total number 
of U.S. forces in Vietnam to 125,000, and began the transition to large-scale conventional 
operations by U.S. forces (The Vietnam War, 2003). 
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In August 1965, the U.S. Marines implemented an effective approach to 
counterinsurgency operations known as Combined Action Platoons (CAPs).  The CAPs 
provided continual security to the villages in which they resided. The permanent presence 
of the Marines generated rapport with the local villages and facilitated the unimpeded 
flow of intelligence by removing the influence of the insurgents. The CAPs proved highly 
effective in the ability to deny the area to the VC for continued operations and resourcing 
by relying on small unit operations to conduct nighttime patrolling and ambushes around 
the villages. Additionally, the CAPs trained local paramilitary forces (PFs) to gradually 
assume greater responsibility for their villages thereby freeing the Marines to spread the 
program to another village.  Despite the success of the individual CAP villages, the 
program failed due to continuing Army pressure to conduct more offensive operations 
and the failure of the Marine leadership to “provide an interlocking network of units that 
would conform to the ‘oil spot’ principle.” (Krepinevich, 1986, p.173).  
In August, the Marines began Operation Starlight, the first major U.S. ground 
offensive in a The operation consisted of a preemptive strike against the VC outside of 
Chu Lai airfield that resulted in the deaths of 163 of a suspected 1,500 VC and provided a 
large boost of morale for U.S. forces. In mid November, members of the 1st Cavalry 
Division (Airmobile) engaged in the first battle between U.S. forces and North 
Vietnamese regulars at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley.  The battle resulted in the NVA 
retreating into the jungle following the loss of over 1,200 soldiers.  Following the 
engagement, General Westmoreland stated, “the ability of the Americans to meet and 
defeat the best troops the enemy could put on the field was once more demonstrated 
beyond any possible doubt, as was the validity of the Army’s airmobile concept.”  
(Krepinevich, 1982, p. 169). The American victory served to validate the Army’s attrition 
strategy, leading the Army to the conclusion that “Standard operations were working; 
therefore, no alternative strategies need be explored,” signaling an end to U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy (Krepinevich, 1982, p. 169).   
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The United States’ involvement in Vietnam would continue until 1975 ending 
with the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975.  Throughout the 
remaining years from 1965 until the fall of Saigon, U.S. military and political leadership 
would continue to apply a strategy of attrition composed of conventional search and 
destroy operations on the ground coupled with massive bombing campaigns.  The 
strategy focused upon counterforce and input denial operations directed the 
overwhelming firepower of the U.S. military on the insurgent forces and the perceived 
exogenous source of insurgent resources leaving the population vulnerable to the 
influence of the insurgents.  The U.S. strategy of attrition produced a military victory but 
political defeat in a conflict in which the U.S. never lost a battle, but lost the war.  In the 
words of Henry Kissinger, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political 
one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion.  
In the process, we lost sight of one of the most critical maxims of guerrilla warfare: the 
guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”  
(Kissinger, 1969, p. 214).  The failure of the U.S. to properly identify the type of threat it 
opposed in Vietnam coupled with the cognitive dissonance of U.S. leadership to the 
inefficacy of its strategy of attrition resulted in the political loss of South Vietnam to the 
insurgent forces of the North.   
 
1. Analysis 
The insurgency in Vietnam initially began in response to French colonialism prior 
to World War II.  However, following the withdrawal of the French, the corrupt practices 
of the Diem regime continued to sow the seeds of discontent among the Vietnamese 
populace.  Diem’s nepotism and preference towards his fellow Catholics combined with 
his inflammatory policies and interference in the traditional political structure of rural 
Vietnamese villages resulted in the alienation and resentment of the primarily Buddhist 
Vietnamese population. In addition, Diem’s mismanagement of the South Vietnamese 
armed forces combined with his apathy towards the conduct of counterinsurgency efforts 
allowed the insurgent movement to establish a strong foothold in the rural areas of the 
South.  
The political vacuum created in the wake of Diem’s assassination produced a 
series of civil and military governments of equivalent instability expanding the political 
and strategic space of the Viet Cong. The U.S. military’s focus on conventional 
operations led to the creation of a South Vietnamese Army trained for large-scale 
operations against an external aggressor that was incapable of dealing with an internal 
threat, thereby solidifying the VC’s hold over the countryside. U.S. military 
organizational and conceptual rigidity combined with cognitive dissonance prevented the 
adaptation of U.S strategy to counter the threat despite the tactical successes of fledgling 
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counterinsurgency programs. U.S. military and political cognitive dissonance extended to 
two areas: the inability to perceive failure or ineffective techniques, and the refusal to 
accept the success of programs that lay outside the strategy of attrition.  The Battle of Ap 
Bac, in which the U.S. claimed victory despite ARVN forces’ failure to defeat the Viet 
Cong in spite of their inferiority in numbers, firepower, and mobility, highlights the 
Army’s denial or inability to perceive the ineffectiveness of its techniques. Additionally, 
such programs as the CIDG or the U.S. Marines CAP programs which demonstrated a 
great deal of success, were either hastily driven into failure or bastardized to become 
more offensive oriented, breaking their link with the populace and condemning them to 
failure.   
The U.S. perception of counterinsurgency as a purely defensive measure further 
hardened opposition to counterinsurgency concepts in an Army dominated by Jominian 
offensive, attrition-based strategy.  In addition, the United States’ focus on the North as 
the source of the conflict prevented U.S. leadership from correctly identifying the internal 
nature of the war despite intelligence reports showing that “80-90 percent of the VC were 
locally recruited, and their weapons coming from stocks captured from government 
forces.”(Krepinevich, 1986, p. 60). Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Kennedy 
Admistration’s Special Group (Counterinsurgency) in a November 1961 report stated, “It 
is clear to me that the time has come in our relations to [sic] Southeast Asia when we 
must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in the North.” (Ibid, 
p. 62).  
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The U.S. focus on the attrition of VC forces through large-scale sweep and clear 
operations created a degree of predictability in the military’s response to VC presence. 
The Viet Cong exploited this predictability by luring U.S. and ARVN forces to remote 
engagements leaving the population unprotected.  In an April 1967 report by the Systems 
Analysis section in the Office of Secretary of Defense, it was noted that, “fully 90 percent 
of all incidents in any given quarter were occurring in the 10 percent of the country that 
held over 80 percent of the population.” (Ibid, p.188). Additionally, a U.S. Armed 
Combat Operations Vietnam (ARCOV) report in May of 1967 showed that 88 percent of 
all engagements were initiated by the Viet Cong, enabling the VC to dictate when and 
where U.S. forces would be employed (Ibid, p. 188). Based on these statistics, Andrew 
Krepinevich (1986) concludes, “the insurgents would stick to their strategy of protracted 
conflict: drawing U.S. units away from the populated areas to allow continued access to 
their logistical base (the population),” (p. 178). In addition, Viet Cong would utilize the 
U.S. military’s liberal use of overwhelming and indiscriminate firepower as a weapon to 
alienate populace from U.S. and ARVN forces through an ingenious plan designed to 
generate friendly fire incidents. General Khuyen of the ARVN noted, “Hatred was our 
enemy’s major instrument to turn the people against us…  Communist guerrillas usually 
drew retaliatory fire from our gunships and artillery by sniping at our aircraft, convoys, or 
outposts. More often than not, it was the local people who were exposed to our fire 
because by the time it came, the guerrillas had fled or taken shelter underground.” (as 
cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 199).    Inevitably, the U.S. military focus on a strategy of 
attrition against a seemingly endless supply of insurgent forces coupled with the political 
and social instability resulting from the lack of a stable central government, allowed the 
VC to gain control of the populace, thereby winning the war. The misperception of the 
source of the threat in parallel with a focus on counterforce operations allowed the 
insurgents to continue their resourcing, production, and operations unimpeded by the 
efforts of the U.S. military.  
One of the most notable features of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam 
was the absence of a comprehensive strategy of true counterinsurgency.  Instead, U.S. 
military and political leadership chose to focus on the interdiction of men and equipment 
from a perceived exogenous source and the destruction of guerrilla forces leaving the 
population susceptible to insurgent influence. In light of this fact, I will focus the analysis 
on the counterinsurgency techniques applied at the operational and tactical levels, many 
of which were highly effective before they were corrupted by the Army’s focus on the 
offensive.   
a. Input Denial 
Input denial in the grand strategy of the Army in Vietnam centered on 
border security and the interdiction of supplies from the North. However, several smaller 
programs proved highly effective in the ability to deny the Viet Cong access to its 
primary source of men, food, and equipment (the population). Most notably, the Marine 
CAP and GOLDEN FLEECE programs, and the U.S. Army Special Forces CIDG program 
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proved highly effective before being corrupted by the Army’s grand strategy of attrition. 
The primary thrust of the Government of Vietnam’s (GVN) attempt at counterinsurgency 
was the Strategic Hamlets Program.  The concept behind the strategic hamlet program, 
named Operation SUNRISE, directly paralleled that of the resettlement program in Malay; 
however, due to its failure it will be discussed in the section on ineffective strategies. 
The Marine CAP Program established a direct correlation between the 
amount of time spent occupying a village and the degree of security attained in that 
village. The basic concept of the program was to provide security and eliminate the 
insurgents’ influence on the population through the permanent occupation of a village.  
Marine units conducted systematic nighttime patrolling and ambushes while minimizing 
the use of firepower by employing small, well-disciplined units.  In addition, the Marines 
relied on the same roads used by the villagers stating, “It was important that the roads be 
kept open for the people to use as well as for ourselves.” (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, 
p. 173).  The Marines made extensive use of the villages’ paramilitary Popular Forces 
(PFs), gradually allowing them to assume a greater role in the security of the village, 
thereby freeing the Marines from static defensive operations and allowing them to 
conduct more extensive patrolling near the village.  In addition to its success in village 
security, the CAP program contributed to the economic development of the region, “Road 
traffic in the area has picked up noticeably, and hamlet markets now attract buyers and 
sellers from as far off as two kilometers, it may not sound like much, but is a lot with 
what the safe travel radius was six months ago.” (as cited in Nagl, 2002, p.158). Finally, 
the CAP program contributed to the protection of the Marine unit itself, having “achieved 
a casualty rate lower than that found in units operating in search-and-destroy missions.” 
(Krepinevich, 1986, p.174). The only weaknesses of the program resulted from the 
language barrier between the Marines and the Vietnamese villagers, and the failure of the 
Marine leadership to integrate the program into an expanding network of security and 
control.   
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Operation GOLDEN FLEECE was another Marine program designed to deny the 
Viet Cong a source of supply that achieved a great deal of success.  The program 
centered on providing security and patrols to Vietnamese agricultural fields during 
harvest time “so that the farmers could harvest, store, and eventually sell their crop free 
from VC taxation.” (Ibid, p. 174).  Despite VC attempts to interdict the harvest, U.S. 
Marines augmented by local paramilitary PFs continued to confound their efforts.  
General Walt, commander of the Marines under the Commander, U.S. Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam, stated, “each catty of rice not going into Viet Cong bins 
meant that another catty had to be grown in North Vietnam and brought over the 
hundreds of miles of mountain trail by human bearers.” (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 
174). Despite the effectiveness of both programs, their success was never capitalized 
upon by the Army due to their diversion of effort from the pursuit of the main body of 
insurgent forces.  
The Army’s Civilian Irregular Defense group (CIDG) was a program 
described as “straight out of classical counterinsurgency doctrine” (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 
70).  The program directly focused on creating a self-reliant populace that could provide 
for their own defense as well as conduct local patrols to destroy the VC. Krepinevich 
(1986) states,  
The Green Berets worked hand in hand with the people to fortify their 
village; they constructed shelters, and an early warning system and closely 
regulated the movement of people in and out of the area. A dispensary was 
built, and local volunteers were armed and trained to help protect the 
village from attack by guerrillas.  A small group of men from the village 
were designated as a ‘strike force.’ (p. 70).  
The strike force described by Krepinevich served as a permanent military 
force that served as a quick reaction force for other villages in the area, as well as 
patrolling and setting ambushes and training the defense forces of other villages.  Village 
defenders were issued only small arms and a tactical radio of limited range to alert the 
response force and prevent the capture of military arms and equipment by the VC.  
Krepinevich (1986) states, “Once a cluster of villages had been prepared and defended, 
the perimeter, the Special Forces pushed the perimeter further out, embracing more 
villages in a slowly expanding ‘oil spot’” (p. 70). The program proved highly effective by 
employing indigenous people on territory with which they were familiar. However, on 15 
August 1963, Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett, deputy chief of staff for operations 
instructed MACV that “We prefer to see Special Forces personnel used in conjunction 
with active and offensive operations, as opposed to support of static training activities,” 
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thus condemning the CIDG program to failure. (as cited in Nagl, 2002, p. 129). The 
return of the program from the CIA to the Army  --dubbed Operation SWITCHBACK--
integrated the strike force with regular ARVN units, using it as a mobile strike forces 
away from their home ground, while the Special Forces were moved to more offensive 
operations and replaced with the less effective Vietnamese Special Forces.  The net effect 
of this move was the alienation of the population and the eventual collapse of the 
program. 
 
b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction 
Leites and Wolf describe this stage of counterinsurgency in terms of 
tactics and techniques aimed at the reduction of the insurgents’ production efficiency.  
Several techniques were applied to the situation in Vietnam with varying degrees of 
success; however, the overall focus remained on the counterforce aspect of the campaign. 
Operation GOLDEN FLEECE remains the most effective strategy applied to combat the 
production efficiency of VC units in this aspect of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency 
efforts. The operation focused on denying VC access to the peasants’ crops and the 
revenue generated by their taxation, thereby forcing the VC to devote additional 
resources to producing food and generating funds to resource their operations.   
In addition to Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, the military conducted Operation 
RANCH HAND, to deny the enemy access to the population’s food supply and his use of the 
dense jungle foliage for cover and concealment.  The operation consisted of the aerial 
spraying of a defoliant known as Agent Orange.  While the Army viewed this program as 
successful in “denying the enemy local supplies of food” it had the adverse effect of 
alienating the populace its was implemented to protect, and will be detailed further in the 
section on ineffective tactics. (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 211). One of the most efficient ways 
to reduce the efficiency of the insurgents’ productive capability is to target their 
infrastructure.  However, to target the insurgents’ infrastructure, government forces must 
be able to separate the members of the guerrilla movement from the populace.  This 
cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the population in the identification of the 
guerrilla agents and sympathizers.  The population will not provide this information 
while under the influence of the insurgent members. In order to gain this intelligence it is 
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necessary for the government forces to ensure the safety and security of the population 
from the influence and retribution of the insurgent forces.  The best method to achieve 
this is through clear and hold operations such as the Marine CAP or the Army’s CIDG 
program.  However, this sense of security cannot be attained using search and clear 
operations in which the forces depart the area following the engagement of members of 
the guerrilla movement.  Therefore, the Army, following the search and clear paradigm, 
was unable to isolate the insurgent infrastructure and reduce its productive capacity.  
The traditional counterinsurgency role of combating the insurgent 
infrastructure belongs to the local police. Their familiarity with the populace and regional 
expertise lend themselves to the identification and separation of the insurgent agents and 
sympathizers from the populace. Additionally, the police provide security from insurgent 
coercion and reprisal thereby facilitating a greater degree of cooperation and intelligence 
from the populace. However, the national police in Vietnam proved both corrupt and 
ineffective.  The police force faced several shortcomings that impaired its effectiveness.  
The police received little support or cooperation from the military, due to the belief of 
military commanders that the defeat of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) was a police 
problem. The police units were given a low priority for men and materiel, and their pay 
was low, hampering their ability to recruit quality men. Additionally, Krepinevich (1986) 
concludes, “Pervasive corruption of the police force, resulted in the GVN’s failure to root 
out the insurgent’s infrastructure.” (p. 228).  The failure of the police force to eliminate 
the VCI coupled with the Government of Vietnam’s (GVN’s) lack of focus on its internal 
problems facilitated the growth of the Viet Cong organization and eventually led to the 
political victory of the VC over South Vietnam.  
 
c. Counterforce 
Both the U.S. and South Vietnamese military focus on the attrition of Viet 
Cong forces through a policy of large-unit search and destroy operations augmented by 
overwhelming firepower proved highly ineffective in impairing the operating capability 
of the Viet Cong.  The inability of both the U.S. military and the ARVN to secure the 
initiative from the Viet Cong was a direct consequence of the lack of focus by both forces 
on the population as a source of vital intelligence on the location and operations of the 
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Viet Cong.  The use of artillery and other heavy weapons to saturate an area prior to 
conducting ground assaults eliminated any vestige of surprise enabling the Viet Cong to 
escape any follow up operations.   However, several small programs such as the Marine 
CAP and the Army’s CIDG program demonstrated a great deal of success in conducting 
counterforce operations.  In both cases, small units conducted nighttime systematic 
patrolling and ambushes to counter VC patrols near the areas they had secured.  Both 
programs demonstrated great deal of success: the CIDG forces had an almost unbroken 
record of success against the VC and the only one CAP settlement was ever overrun. 
(Krepinevich, 1986, p. 175). 
 
d. Strengthening the State 
Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “The basic requirement for increasing the 
absorbtive capacity for R’s [the insurgents’] output is to strengthen A [the state] itself: its 
capacity to be informed, undertake programs, control, protect, punish, and act and react 
vigorously, quickly, and intelligently.” (p.83). The U.S. military and the GVN 
implemented several techniques aimed at increasing the ability of the state to absorb the 
insurgents’ actions; however, none of these techniques met with much success due to 
poor execution and corruption within the Diem regime. While resettlement programs 
such as the strategic hamlet program represent a fundamental aspect of strengthening the 
state, the complete failure of the program in Vietnam will relegate its discussion to the 
section devoted to counterinsurgency programs that failed.   
Another key aspect of strengthening the state is the ability of the 
government forces to collect intelligence.  Intelligence is the essential element that allows 
the state to locate and assume the initiative over the insurgents.  Intelligence collection is 
fundamentally linked to the security of the population.  The lack of focus on the security 
and control of the population by both the U.S. military and the ARVN impeded the 
exploitation of a vital resource for the gathering of crucial intelligence.  Additionally, the 
short tour lengths of U.S. military personnel combined with a lack of cultural familiarity 
stemming from cultural hubris, and a lack of focus on counterinsurgency in favor of 
locating conventional main enemy units, resulted in a lack of operational intelligence that 
enabled the Viet Cong to maintain the initiative. As was seen in the Malayan Emergency, 
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police units can serve as an excellent source of intelligence gathering due to their regional 
expertise and familiarity with the population.  However, police were only stationed in 
towns with a population greater than 15,000 (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 25). The lack of 
adequate police in Vietnam served as a detriment to both physical security and 
intelligence collection. In addition to the role of the police, paramilitary groups function 
as an essential component of traditional counterinsurgency efforts.   
Paramilitary groups serve as an economy of force measure by freeing the 
military to conduct other operations in support of the counterinsurgency effort.  However, 
both paramilitary initiatives conducted by the GVN, the Civil Guard (CG) and the Self 
Defense Corps (SDC), “were poorly trained and equipped, miserably led, and incapable 
of coping with insurgents; they could scarcely defend themselves, much lees the 
peasantry.  Indeed, they proved to be an asset to the insurgents in two respects: they 
served as a source of weapons; and their brutality, petty thievery, and disorderliness 
induced innumerable villagers to join in open revolt against the GVN.” (as cited in Nagl, 
2002, p. 121).  The final aspects of the Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort of 
strengthening the state that will be analyzed are political and social reform. Diem’s 
corruption and overt bias towards his fellow Catholics led to his predisposition and 
nepotism in political appointments, unfair land distribution, and interference in the 
traditional leadership of rural Vietnamese villages.  Diem had passed a land reform 
ordinance in 1956; however, by 1962 less than one third of the rural populace had 
benefited from these reforms. (Higgins, 2001, p. 68). Diem’s corruption resulted in the 
alienation and resentment of the rural populace, facilitating the influence and recruitment 
of the rural Vietnamese population by the Viet Cong.  Additionally, actions such as 
defoliation efforts and friendly fire incidents by the U.S. military served to further 
strengthen the bonds between the VC and the population. Inevitably, the instability and 
corruption of the GVN combined with inflammatory actions of both the U.S. military and 
the GVN resulted in a political victory for Viet Cong among the rural populace of South 
Vietnam. 
e. Failures 
This section will highlight three failed programs that were intended to 
satisfy an aspect of the counterinsurgency effort. Despite this intent, each of these 
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programs proved ineffective due to poor implementation, corruption, or an inaccurate 
focus. While these programs in no way account for the entire failure of the Vietnam 
campaign, they do represent crucial elements in the overall inability of the United States 
and the GVN to defeat the Viet Cong. The resettlement program began in early 1962 
under the name Operation SUNRISE.  Diem implemented this program on the advice of Sir 
Robert Thompson who served as the Minister of Defense in Malaya following the close 
of the emergency. The program paralleled the concept employed successfully by the 
British during the Malayan Emergency; however, despite the foundation of success 
created by the Malayan model, the Vietnamese program would soon fail.  The failure of 
the program is attributable to four main issues: the infiltration of the program by Viet 
Cong, the inappropriate placement of the new hamlets, the corruption and lack of unity of 
effort in the leadership of the program, and the failure to account for the peasants’ 
ancestral ties to the land. The infiltration of the hamlets by Viet Cong insurgents was 
facilitated by the unpreparedness of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps and the 
failure to complete the physical security measures and much of the construction of the 
hamlets prior to their occupation. These shortfalls combined with the lack of a 
supplemental ID card program and inadequate entry and exit controls allowed the 
insurgents to infiltrate the settlements and regain their influence and control over the 
population.  The corruption and lack of unity of effort fostered by Diem’s bother Nhu in 
his leadership of the program alienated the population by withholding money that was 
promised as an incentive to resettle and violated the oil spot principle by creating new 
hamlets in a random manner in highly VC infested areas. Major James Higgins (2001) in, 
The Misapplication of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Model to the Strategic Hamlet 
Program, states, 
Bureaucrats not only generated false statistic and reports, they overlooked 
significant sources of peasant discontent that were undermining the 
program’s legitimacy. Many peasants were not paid for this labor in the 
construction of the strategic hamlets. Also, Diem’s government allocated 
1,000-2,000 piasters for relocated peasants to build a new home when the 
actual cost was approximately 20,000 piasters. In many cases, local 
officials withheld this money. They did so either for their own profit or to 
pay the money in installments, as a means of encouraging the peasants to 
stay in the new hamlet. (p. 75)   
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Additionally, Nhu believed that maintaining the momentum of the 
program was more important than the details of its implementation.  Slipshod 
construction left many hamlets unprepared and many physical security measures 
unfinished prior to the resettlement.  Despite the recommendations of British advisor Sir 
Robert Thompson, the program began in a heavily VC-infested area north of Saigon that 
was close to their primary base areas (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 67).  Additionally, many 
hamlets were constructed in a random manner that was inconsistent with the “oil spot” 
principle limiting the ability to capitalize on the few successes of the program.  Finally, 
the lack of concern given to the peasants’ ties to the land where their ancestors were 
buried generated further resentment over the forced resettlement.  Despite the 
administrative and operational problems involved in the program, forced resettlement 
remains an extreme measure that requires advanced planning and unity of effort to ensure 
the security of the population from the influence of then insurgent forces.  In this respect 
the strategic hamlet program failed, compounding the resentment of the populace towards 
the GVN.   
The U.S. conventional military effort of input denial focused upon the 
prevention of the movement of men and materiel from the North along the Ho Chi Minh 
trail while ignoring the use of the population as a source of recruiting and supply by the 
insurgents operating in the South.  Several operations were conducted to interdict this 
flow of resources. Operation BARREL ROLL consisted of armed reconnaissance of the Ho 
Chi Minh trail inside of Laos and the Special Forces base at Khe San was established to 
interdict the flow of resources down the trail. Despite these efforts, the flow of men and 
materiel continued to supply the insurgents from both within South Vietnam as well as 
from without.  Bomb damage was repaired overnight by female work crews and despite 
the existence of the base at Khe San over 35,000 North Vietnamese soldiers would 
infiltrate into the South by the end of 1965 (The Vietnam War, 2003).  Both U.S. and 
GVN efforts in this respect would prove futile, as supplies from the North continued to 
flow the links between the VC and the population continued to flourish. 
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The defoliation program, dubbed Operation RANCH HAND, began in 1962 
with the dual purpose of strengthening the state by denying the VC cover and 
concealment, and input denial by preventing the VC from gaining access to the rural 
population’s crops.  The program resulted in the alienation and resentment of the rural 
populace due to the drifting of the defoliants over Vietnamese farmlands. A RAND 
Corporation report noted, “ the civilian population seems to carry very nearly the full 
burden of the results of the crop destruction program; it is estimated that over 500 
civilians experience crop loss for every ton of rice denied the VC.” (as cited in 
Krepinevich, 1986, p. 212).  Additionally, in a report by a South Vietnamese official, the 
rural population’s grievances were met with an ultimatum by U.S. and GVN forces, “The 
attitude of some of our local officials was not calculated to win the hearts and minds of 
the people.  Some of them would tell their people that if they wanted to be spared the 
effects of defoliation, they either had to rid themselves of the enemy, or had to leave their 
homes to settle in government controlled areas.  How could these people chase the enemy 
from their areas?” (as cited in Krepinevich, 1986, p. 213).  Despite the adverse affects of 
the program on the population and its limited effects on the insurgents, U.S. military 
leadership continued the program until 1970.   
The majority of programs implemented in Vietnam failed due to a lack of 
focus on the population as the source of insurgent strength.  Instead, U.S. leadership 
focused on the Jominian aim of attrition in the destruction of enemy forces. The lack of 
focus on the population denied the military access to a vital source of intelligence that 
would have facilitated the seizure of the initiative from the Viet Cong.  The Viet Cong, 
by retaining the initiative, was able to dictate the time and place of their engagements 
with U.S. and ARVN forces, enabling them to lure military forces away from the 
populace, leaving the people susceptible to VC influence.  The VC’s undisputed access to 
the population enabled them to win a political victory against a military opponent; thus 
winning the war. 
f. Findings 
The programs that focused on the population and its protection from 
insurgent influence through the cohabitation of troops with the populace, that utilized the 
populace as a form of paramilitary, exploiting their regional knowledge and expertise, 
and focused on active aggressive defense using small-unit systematic patrolling and 
ambushes produced the best results.  Programs such as the Marine CAPs and the Army’s 
CIDG have unlimited transferability due to their flexibility in implementation and the 
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production of security and rapport with the civilian populace; thus, facilitating the 
separation of the insurgents and the gathering of intelligence. However, these programs 
require integration into a larger strategy that capitalizes upon success in following with 
the “oil spot” principle. Despite the grand concept of pacification and the emphasis on 
counterinsurgency pushed by the Kennedy Administration, the U.S. military refused to 
explore counterinsurgency as a valid strategy. Instead their conceptual hubris in the 
superiority of American technological and military might resulted in a cognitive 
dissonance that prevented U.S. leadership from perceiving the inefficacy of their strategy 
of attrition, costing the United States the war.  
 
C. THE PHILIPPINES 
The Hukbalahap Insurrection was selected as a case study because it emphasizes 
the role of military, social, political, and economic reforms in a successful 
counterinsurgency strategy. The case demonstrates the primacy of civil action over 
military offensive power in the ability to win the loyalty and support of the population.  
In addition, this case provides an excellent example of these reforms under a unified 
effort could reverse the damage incurred by policies that had taken the country to the 
brink of collapse. The Philippine case represents another example of a textbook 
counterinsurgency in which the tactics and techniques applied have potential 
transferability to the situation in Afghanistan. The Huk insurrection has its foundations in 
the economic, social, and political disparity and anti-colonial sentiment that existed since 
the time of the Spanish colonial rule in the late 1500’s.  Conditions of social and political 
inequity based on near-feudal landlord-tenant relationships resulted in several peasant 
uprisings that persisted through the Spanish-American War.  
Following the United States’ annexation of the Philippines, social grievances 
persisted despite U.S. attempts at alleviation through land reform.  Widespread corruption 
within the Filipino government prevented the equitable distribution of land and served 
only to increase the holdings of the wealthy few and further aggravate an already tense 
social situation.  In response to worsening social and economic conditions, Crisanto 
Evangelista and several other Filipino socialists formed the National Peasant’s Union 
(KPMP) in Nueva Ecija Province in May of 1924 (Greenberg, 1987 sect. 8).  The 
60 
movement gained widespread support and utilized this momentum to infiltrate several 
labor unions and gain control of the Philippine Labor Congress.  On 26 August 1930, 
Evangelista formed the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and established five 
guiding principles for the movement: to mobilize for complete national independence; to 
establish communism for the masses; to defend the masses against capitalist exploitation; 
to overthrow American imperialism in the Philippines; and to overthrow capitalism (Ibid, 
sect. 9).   
In August of 1932, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled the PKP to be an illegal 
organization and charged its leaders with instigating several riots in the Philippine capital 
of Manila (Ibid, sect. 9).  Evangelista and several of his lieutenants were arrested, driving 
the remainder of the PKP underground.  The movement continued to fight for peasants’ 
rights by implementing a strategy of terrorism against landlords in the Luzon Province.  
This campaign of terrorism spurred the government to adopt several minor land reform 
initiatives that limited the amount of harvest a landlord could demand from his tenants.  
However, these reforms proved to be token gestures of appeasement that were largely 
ignored by both the landlords and the government itself.   
In 1934, the United States sought to address the issue of Filipinos independence 
with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act.  The act promised to grant the Philippines 
full independence by 4 July 1946 and established the Philippine Commonwealth that 
would govern the islands until that date (Ibid, sect. 5).  Despite this initiative, violent 
communist-sponsored demonstrations continued in Manila, spurring President Quezon in 
1938 to release the PKP leadership.  Three members of the PKP leadership, Evangelista, 
Taruc, and de Los Reyes, were released on the condition that they pledge their loyalty to 
the Philippine government.  However, upon their release, Evangelista merged the 
Philippine Socialist Party and the PKP to form the PKP coalition and continued to spread 
the communist doctrine (Ibid, sect. 10).   
The Japanese invaded the Philippines in December of 1941 resulting in a 
temporary truce between Evangelista and President Quezon.  During this time 
Evangelista offered the support of the PKP to defend the island against the invaders, 
however, Quezon’s distrust of Evangelista and his organization resulted in the refusal of 
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the offer.  Following Quezon’s rejection, Evangelista and his followers fled to the 
mountains of Luzon and established a base of operations on Mount Arayat.  Evangelista 
sought to build a nationalist force to oppose the Japanese occupation.  From Mount 
Arayat, he and his followers launched numerous harassing attacks against the Japanese 
and succeeded in gaining arms, ammunition, and followers for his movement.  Harsh and 
brutal reprisals by the Japanese secret police on the peasantry of Luzon resulted in 
driving many of the Filipino peasants to Evangelista’s movement.  On 29 March 1942, 
during a meeting of regional resistance groups, Evangelista united the remaining Filipino 
socialist groups with the PKP to form the Hukabalahap or Anti-Japanese Army 
(Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 79).  Luis Taruc, a CCP leader, was chosen to be the first Huk 
Commander (Ibid, p. 80).  
The Huks relied upon ambushes of Japanese patrols, police deserters, and 
battlefields to gain vital arms and ammunition. In addition to difficulties in arming his 
forces, Taruc was confronted with a lagging source of recruits.  The Huks faced direct 
competition with the U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) guerrilla units that 
capitalized on the same popular discontent with Japanese treatment to procure additional 
forces in the Luzon Province.  In May of 1942, Huk representatives contacted USAFFE 
forces to negotiate for arms and equipment from the USAFFE forces (Greenberg, 1987, 
sect. 17).  The negotiations failed due to the USAFFE representatives’ inability to 
subordinate the members of the Huk movement to the control of USAFFE leadership. 
During the latter part of 1942 and early 1943, the Japanese launched two major anti-Huk 
offensives in the area surrounding Mount Arayat.  While the second assault resulted in 
the capture of 100 Huk prisoners and several members of the Headquarters staff, the Huk 
organization continued to grow, relying upon recruits from the local villages subjected to 
harsh treatment by the Japanese in their search for Huk supporters (Ibid, sect. 20).  By 
March of 1943, the Huk movement had over 10,000 active supporters (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 
87).   
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In addition to anti-Japanese operations, Taruc developed two key pieces of 
infrastructure that facilitated the growth and development of the Huk movement.   “Stalin 
University” was created with the assistance of Red Chinese instructors on the slopes of 
the Sierra Madres Mountains as a crucial conversion mechanism to facilitate the training 
and indoctrination of newly acquired forces (Lansdale, 1972, p. 7).  Perhaps the most 
crucial element of infrastructure generated by the Huk movement was the creation of the 
paramilitary Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). The BUDC served a variety of 
purposes to aid the Huks in recruitment, intelligence, and logistics.  The Huks formed the 
BUDCs under the auspices of protecting the population, providing law and order, 
fostering anti-Japanese sentiment, and denying the Japanese access to food and supplies, 
but the movement served the much larger purpose of winning the support of the 
population to the Huk cause (Greenberg, 1987, sects. 21-22).  The BUDCs gained the 
support of the population through civil action programs designed to improve the life of 
the local villager.  Programs such as education, sanitation, agriculture, and security 
directly addressed the local and immediate concerns of the populace, while the Huk 
indoctrination program and elections of local leaders ensured the population’s continued 
support. The program’s establishment of a parallel government and firm foothold in the 
popular base legitimized the Huk movement and solidified their influence over the 
population, which would prove later to be a large impediment to Philippine efforts to 
purge the islands of the Huk influence.   
Following the U.S. invasion of the Philippines in October of 1944, the Huks 
began to intensify their efforts to secure the countryside in the wake of the Japanese 
retreat.  Huk units reoccupied towns, declaring liberation, filling the political vacuum in 
the hope of attaining post-war dominance in the independent Philippine government 
promised under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.  In April of 1945, Taruc and the Huks joined 
the PKP to form the Democratic Alliance in the hope of creating a legitimate political 
party to exploit their popular support in the post-war government (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 
27).  However, enmity and distrust fostered by conflicts with the USAFFE during the 
Japanese occupation prevented the legitimization of the Huk movement due to opposition 
by General MacArthur and the new Philippine government. 
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Following the war, the Philippines were devastated.  The economy had collapsed, 
unemployment was rampant, food production was at a standstill, and the export industry 
had buckled under the intense wartime pressures.  President Quezon had died in exile in 
the United States in October 1944 and was replaced by Sergio Osmena.  Osmena, who 
had served as Quezon’s vice-president, assumed control of the Philippine Commonwealth 
on 27 February 1945 (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 28).  To offset many of the post-war 
hardships faced by the Filipinos, the United States passed several acts of legislation 
aimed at relieving some of the economic burden on the Philippines.  In October, the 
Tydings bill gave $520 million in emergency economic aid to the Philippines and 
established several programs aimed at the economic recovery of the post-war islands 
(Ibid, sect. 29). Within a year over 200 million tons of food and aid had been shipped to 
Manila to relieve the shortages caused by the collapse of Philippine agriculture 
production (Ibid, sect. 32). In addition, the United States donated military equipment and 
heavy machinery to speed the recovery and stabilization of the Philippines.  However, 
much of this aid fell prey to black marketeering and governmental corruption once it 
reached the Philippine shores. 
Following liberation from the Japanese, MacArthur ordered the Huks disbanded 
and dispersed, denying them both official recognition and veteran’s benefits. The U.S. 
forces regarded the Huks as nothing more than armed civilians.  In mid-February1946, 
U.S. troops arrested Taruc, Alejandro, and several other members of the Huk 
headquarters, generating a wave of resentment among the populace who viewed the Huks 
as national liberators (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 33).   Following several mass 
demonstrations in central Luzon, U.S. and Philippine government officials released both 
Taruc and Alejandro, hoping that they would convince the Huks to surrender their arms.  
However, upon their release, Taruc resumed the leadership of the Huks vowing to 
continue his fight against the government and the United States. In April, Taruc was 
arrested, again, shortly after his initial release (Ibid, sect. 33).   
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The restoration of control by the Philippine government was further impeded by 
the administrative structures and local governments set up by the Huk BUDCs during the 
Japanese occupation. Huk elected officials and administrative structures had become 
legitimized over time due to their efficient operation in comparison to the corrupt and 
inefficient administration of the central government. President Osmena declared these 
local governments invalid and replaced them with his own appointees. Both the 
Philippine and U.S. governments had failed to perceive the Huks and their popular base 
of support as a legitimate threat to stability and control in the Philippines.  The perception 
of the Huks as a common group of bandits severely underestimated the capability of the 
movement given the trying social and economic conditions prevalent in the Philippines at 
that time. Little was done to address the concerns of the people while government forces 
continued to employ their repressive tactics, serving to strengthen the influence and hold 
over the population by the Huks.  
In 1946, the U.S. Congress passed two resolutions that further damaged U.S.-
Philippine relations and added additional momentum to the Huk’s political cause.  In 
February, Congress passed legislation initially denying the Filipino military veteran’s 
benefits (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 35).  In addition the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, 
designed to aid in the Philippine economic recovery, froze pre-war economic trading 
patterns, fixed the Philippine peso to the U.S. dollar, and instituted a 28 year extension 
for duty-free trade between the U.S. and the Philippines, giving the U.S. hegemony over 
the country (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 35). The Huks capitalized on the popular perception 
of U.S. neo-colonialism to further organize support for their movement, and following 
several large uprisings in Manila, secured the release of Taruc and Alejandro (Ibid, sect. 
38). Taruc resumed command of military operations while Jose Lava managed the 
political campaign in preparation for the upcoming elections. 
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On 4 July 1946, the United States granted the Philippines its independence, 
establishing the Republic of the Philippines. Within four months of independence, the 
Philippines held their first election.  Taruc and Alejandro were released from prison in 
September and had formed the Democratic Alliance to capitalize on the Huk movement’s 
popular support in the upcoming elections. The ruling Philippine Nationalist Party was 
split between two contenders: President Osmena and Manuel Roxas.  The chief 
difference between the two candidates was the issue of how to handle the Huks.  Osmena 
favored negotiation while Roxas sought extermination, vowing to eliminate the Huks 
within sixty days if elected (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 189).  Adding to the controversy was 
Roxas’ past collaboration with the Japanese occupation forces. Roxas had been 
imprisoned by the U.S. military for collaboration with the Japanese following their retreat 
from the Philippines (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 38).  Although he was released by President 
Osmena and General MacArthur based on evidence that he only collaborated to minimize 
the violence directed against the Filipinos, the stigma of collaboration still remained and 
was heavily exploited by Huk propagandists.  Osmena secured the presidential 
nomination for the Nationalist Party, prompting Roxas to form the Liberal Party, which 
nominated him as their presidential candidate.  Fearing that a three-way split for the 
presidency would result in a victory for Roxas, the Huks decided to back Osmena.  The 
elections of 1946 were marred by campaigns of terror and intimidation between the 
supporters of Roxas and those of the Huk that trapped the peasantry in between. Despite 
the opposition of the Huks, Roxas won the election, and in early 1947 he set about to 
fulfill his promise of eliminating the Huks. In spite of the U.S. and Philippine 
governments’ categorization of the Huks as mere organized bandits, the Democratic 
Alliance won six seats in the Philippine legislature, including one seat that was to be held 
by Taruc (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 150).   
Roxas’ first move against the Huks was to deny them their seats in the Congress 
(Ibid, p. 150).  This move was quickly followed by a nationwide campaign to eliminate 
all Huks and their supporters referred to by Roxas as his “mailed fist” policy.  Roxas 
dispatched the Philippine Military Police Command and the local paramilitary Civil 
Guards to sweep the countryside in search of the Huks.  The sweeps resulted in the mass 
alienation of the populace as government forces employed terror and intimidation to gain 
the information and supplies they needed to pursue their mission. In a letter from the 
National Peasant’s Union (PKM) to President Roxas, the PKM stated, “ In two months 
alone, MPs and civilian guards had killed over five hundred peasants and peasant leaders.  
Three times that number had been imprisoned, tortured, or were missing.”(as cited in 
Kirkvliet, 1987, p. 151). In addition, the Civil Guards, who were more loyal to the local 
municipality and landowners than the government were described as “local gangsters, 
goons, people of bad reputations” who used their position to “take out personal grudges 
against innocent people by pointing them out as HMB or HMB sympathizers whether 
they were or not… using terror tactics which local PC could not stop even if they had 
wanted to.” (As cited in Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 196). Taruc capitalized on these oppressive 
techniques and issues such as agrarian reform, governmental reform, and self-defense 
(against government forces) to gain the support of the populace for the Huk movement. 
However, Greenberg (1987) suggests that the central issue to most Filipinos was that of 
land tenure, “The one overriding factor that seemed to be central for Huk supporters and 
converts was the issue of land tenure. They wanted to own the land they had worked for 
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generations.” However, Luis Taruc stated, “Land redistribution and ending tenancy were 
not central for most people [in the rebellion]. People just wanted small changes—a bigger 
share of the crop so they and their families could live easier.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 171). 
Taruc’s statement highlights a fundamental truth concerning the population in an 
insurgency—that many social grievances stem from local and immediate concerns and 
must be addressed by the government at that level to build a popular base of support, 
thereby defeating the insurgents locally before they can be attacked as a movement 
During the first half of 1946, the Huks continued operations against government 
forces, winning several engagements against the Philippine military and capturing the 
town of Nueva Ecija.  With each victory against the oppressive government forces, the 
Huk movement gained momentum with the populace as government forces, unable to 
locate the Huks, took out their frustrations on the population. In June of 1946 during an 
HMB meeting in Candaba, Pampanga, Taruc decided to focus on the defensive rather 
than on an offensive and proactive strategy, “We decided that if assaults on the people 
continued we would reassemble on a purely defensive basis, avoid encounters and fight 
only when cornered and attacked, or when the people were being persecuted to the point 
where they would ask protection from the squadrons.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 172).  
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Following the brief period of inactivity by the Huks, President Roxas declared the 
situation solved in January of 1947.  Roxas’ declaration was met by a resurgence in Huk 
activity.  In response to a successful Huk raid on the military garrison at Laur, Nueva 
Ecija, Roxas ordered the military to conduct an assault on the Huk stronghold at Mount 
Arayat. Operation ARAYAT involved two thousand government forces and lasted two 
weeks, but resulted in the capture of only twenty-one Huks and a small amount of 
weapons and supplies (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 58).  The majority of the Huks had escaped 
due to the extensive Huk intelligence network that had permeated the military and 
government forces.  In mid 1947, Taruc laid out his five “minimum terms for peace” 
during an interview with a journalist. He demanded immediate enforcement of the bill of 
rights; amnesty for all actions occurring in the last five months and the release all 
political prisoners; replacement of “fascist-minded” police and government officials in 
central Luzon; restoration of the six Democratic Alliance congressmen elected in 1946; 
and institution of President Roxas’ land reform program beginning with the 70-30 crop 
distribution law leading toward the eventual abolition of land tenancy. (Kirkvliet, 1977, 
p. 171). Taruc established these conditions as part of his political offensive of which 
HMB operations served as “a military defense in order to protect ourselves while doing 
political organizing.” (Ibid, p. 172). 
In November of 1947, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint United 
States Military Assistance Group-Philippines (JUSMAG) to oversee its military 
assistance programs and promote Philippine development as a subordinate element under 
the control of the Commander-in Chief Far East (CINCFE) (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 98). 
JUSMAG would later play a pivotal role in assisting the reform and reconstruction of the 
Philippine government. 
In April of 1948, Roxas died unexpectedly of a heart attack (Greenberg, 1987, 
sect. 59).  Upon assumption of the office of President, Roxas’ replacement, Elpido 
Quirino, declared a temporary truce with the Huks to facilitate negotiations for the 
surrender of Huk weapons (Ibid, sect. 60). The negotiations collapsed in August after 
numerous violations of the cease-fire by both sides.  Throughout 1948, tensions had been 
building between the political wing (Politburo) of the Huk movement led by Jose Lava 
and the military wing led by Taruc. Lava sought to pursue the Russian model of class 
struggle by focusing on urban areas to incite a class struggle resulting in a communist 
overthrow of the government.  Taruc sought the Maoist approach by expanding the rural 
base of the insurrection throughout the countryside in a protracted war.  While this rift in 
the movement did not produce fission, it did influence the effectiveness of operations.  In 
November1948, Taruc renamed his forces the People’s Liberation Army (HMB) and 
began a new series of raids on government forces (Ibid, sect. 61).  
In April of 1949, the Huk commander Alexander Viernes, using information 
gained through a captured government radio, set an ambush for the wife of former 
President Quezon, Senora Aurora Quezon (Greenberg, 187, sect. 61).  While the ambush 
succeeded in killing Senora Quezon, her daughter, and several government officials, it 
was one of the greatest mistakes made by the Huks in their campaign to win the support 
of the population.   Filipinos had viewed both President Quezon and his wife as symbols 
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of Philippine nationalism and resistance.  While Taruc claimed that the operation had 
been conducted without HMB approval, the damage to the popular support of the Huks 
had been done (Ibid, sects. 61-62). 
In 1949, general elections were held for the office of the president.  Jose Laurel, 
who had served as president under the Japanese occupation represented the Nationalist 
Party while President Quirino maintained the nomination from the Liberal Party.  The 
1949 elections were, again, fraught with violence, electoral fraud, and corruption. 
Filipino villager Tomas Basa recalls the elections as “the most vicious campaign I can 
remember. It was so bloody. Quirino’s men would even kill people who had only spoken 
against him or in favor of Laurel.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 205). During the election, both 
sides conducted voter fraud and ballot stuffing, however, in the end Quirino emerged 
victorious. The Huks exploited the violence and fraud surrounding the election to further 
de legitimize the new administration under Quirino.  Perceiving the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the government in the populace, Jose Lava, leader of the Philippine 
Communist Party (PKP) declared a “revolution situation” and decided to advance the 
timetable for the overthrow of the Philippine government stating, “Our military strategic 
offensive must be relatively short and speedily victorious. It must in other words, have an 
insurrectionary character.”  (Ibid, pp. 219-220). Numerous internal conflicts stemming 
from the PKP’s perception of the HMB as “too undisciplined” and “untrained in military 
and political matters” resulting from incidents of criminal exploitation of the populace by 
the HMB had deepened the rift between the PKP and the HMB. Further, ideological 
divides between the two organizations regarding the Marxist-Leninist class struggle goals 
of the PKP and the Maoist insurgency strategy pursued by Taruc and the HMB generated 
further tension.  Despite interorganizational differences, the HMB increased their attacks 
on the Filipino military and infrastructure. Raids, ambushes, murders, and kidnappings 
increased throughout the Philippines, sparking a military response from Quirino.  
President Quirino ordered the military and the Police Constabulary not to return to 
garrison until they had killed or captured all the Huks responsible for the assassination of 
Senora Quezon (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 61). By the close of the operation, government 
forces had captured two Huk camps (to include Stalin University); killed 146 Huks, 
including Viernes; and destroyed an entire regional command (Ibid, sect.74).  Despite 
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this victory, subsequent military operations returned to the ineffective sweeps that 
produced the alienation and resentment of the population.  
In April of 1950, government oppression continued as army forces massacred 100 
men, women, and children in Bacalor in retaliation for the death of one of their officers 
(Ibid, sect. 75). Later that month government violence continued as fifty farmers in 
Laguna were summarily executed as suspected Huks (Ibid, sect. 75).  Government 
corruption and violence were rampant. Soldiers utilized checkpoints to extort money 
from travelers and coercion and torture to obtain information and supplies from the 
populace.  The Philippine military and police constabulary lacked both direction and 
purpose as part of an overall strategy. Their continued use of violence had driven the 
population to the Huks, weakening the very state they were entrusted to defend. 
In April of 1950 Ramon Magsaysay, Chairman of the Philippine Armed Forces 
Committee, journeyed to Washington D.C. to seek emergency financial aid for the 
Philippine government.  Magsaysay’s trip secured $10 million to pay the Philippine 
military and fund a reward for information program to defeat the insurgency (Greenberg, 
1987, sect. 80). It was during this trip that Magsaysay met Air Force LTC Edward 
Lansdale, who later became Magsaysay’s personal advisor under JUSMAG. Upon his 
return in September of 1950, Magsaysay was appointed as the new Secretary of 
Philippine National Defense (Ibid, sect. 81). Magsaysay conducted sweeping reforms of 
the Philippine military and Police Constabulary that altered the course of the insurgency 
through the reunion of the populace with the government. Magsaysay sought to utilize the 
military and the police as vital instruments in his plan of civic action and reform.   
His first move was to remove the ineffective leadership of both the military Chief 
of Staff and the Chief of the Police Constabulary as well as eliminate those implicated in 
graft and corruption.  Magsaysay would frequently venture into the field to conduct spot 
inspections of government forces.  His forays enabled him to form a bond with the men 
of the military and the police as well as with the populace. Within his first twenty days, 
Magsaysay increased the average soldier’s pay from 30 centavos to a full peso enabling 
him to purchase rather than steal his meal from the local peasants (Ibid, sect. 84).  In 
addition, Magsaysay equipped each patrol leader with a camera to document enemy 
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casualties enabling the government to accurately track the identities and verify the 
combat statistics involved with each military operation (Ibid, sect. 84).  Magsaysay 
eliminated the military oppression of the populace through a bold move that empowered 
the population to report corruption and abuse directly to his staff. In addition, Army JAG 
officers were appointed to civilians free of charge to address legal issues between 
peasants and landlords. Magsaysay also changed the manner in which the military 
operated. He aligned the Police Constabulary under the military for the duration of the 
Huk conflict and instructed them that their role was to protect and assist the populace.   
In late December, Magsaysay reorganized the army into four regional Military 
Area Commands (MAC), placing a Battalion Combat Team (BCT) in each region (Cable, 
1986, p. 54).  Magsaysay formed the BCTs to “gain public trust and cooperation, engage 
in defensive operations to protect the population against acts of terror or raids, generate 
exploitable combat information for limited offensive operations and encourage the 
development of local self-defense volunteer formations.” (Ibid, p. 55).  In addition, Civil 
Affairs officers who were experienced in psychological operations were attached to the 
BCTs to reverse the previous perception of government oppression.  Military operations 
were supplemented by medical, engineering, and transportation projects to reinforce the 
perception of change.  Magsaysay’s efforts worked to restore the link between the 
government and the populace through security and civic action to free the populace from 
the influence of the insurgents and demonstrate the capability of the government to better 
their lives.  While these programs targeted the population, Magsaysay implemented 
others that targeted the membership of the insurgent movement. 
In October of 1950, in response to information received by Philippine Army 
Intelligence, government officials launched a series of raids against Politburo members in 
Manila.  The Huks retaliated by launching a campaign of violence that culminated in the 
massacre of the entire population of the town of Agalo despite the absence of or 
affiliation with government troops (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 128).  The massacre resulted 
in widespread discontent throughout Luzon, diminishing the Huk hold over the 
population. 
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In December 1950, Magsaysay began the Economic Development Corps 
(EDCOR) as a means to introduce economic stability and induce surrender in the Huk 
movement. The program targeted “soft-core” Huks who surrendered or were captured 
and were not wanted for criminal activities.  The program resettled the former Huks, 
awarded them title to a parcel of land, educated them on how to farm, and indoctrinated 
them to become productive members of society.  Further, the program provided those 
resettled with free transportation, schooling, medical care, electricity, and water and 
provided avenues for the purchase of seed and fertilizer on credit from EDCOR under 
Magsaysay’s supervision (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 89).  As a final condition, peasants 
signed an agreement to repay the government for the start-up costs and promised not to 
sell or sub-divide the land thereby avoiding the land tenancy issue.  The program was a 
major success and by November 1951 had to be expanded to include a second EDCOR 
site (Ibid, sect. 90). The EDCOR program robbed the Huk insurgency of its primary 
ideological cause by addressing their promise of “Land for the Landless.”  Magsaysay’s 
reforms continued to rebuild the bond between the government and the populace through 
social action programs designed to eliminate the perception of corruption and inefficacy 
of the government.  In the zero sum game of political control, as the government regained 
its image of legitimacy, the Huks gradually lost their hold over the populace, thereby 
reducing their ability to operate, and signaling their inevitable demise.  
In 1949, Magsaysay had promised the Filipino population an honest election and 
in November 1951, he held true to his word.  Magsaysay utilized the Army reserve and 
ROTC cadets to ensure the safety and orderliness of the polls while JUSMAG assigned 
25 of its officers as poll watchers to eliminate voter fraud and intimidation. Magsaysay’s 
efforts resulted in an orderly election in which four million Filipinos voted (Greenberg, 
1987, sect. 131).  Magsaysay’s success in both his efforts against the Huks and the ability 
to produce an orderly election had began the restoration of public confidence in the 
government as well as bolstered their perception of the ability of Magsaysay to 
effectively lead the Philippines.  
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From early spring into the fall of 1952, government forces conducted offensive 
operations against Huk units resulting in the capture of a Huk regional command.  The 
success of AFP operations in 1952 prompted the Huks to call for a truce prior to 
Christmas. The truce broke down shortly after New Year’s Day, but the Huks had gained 
a vital tactical pause, which they exploited to recover from the continuous advance of 
successful government operations. 
In February of 1953, Magsaysay resigned his position as Secretary of Defense and 
began preparation for his Presidential campaign.  His platform addressed the issues 
pertinent to the people –corruption, neglect, poverty, and land reform.  Magsaysay visited 
over 1,100 barrios, taking his message to the people and on 10 November, he was elected 
president over the incumbent Quirino by the largest margin in Philippine history 
(Greenberg, 1987, sect. 137).  Magsaysay instituted numerous reforms in the in the latter 
part of 1953 and early 1954.  His administration distributed a quarter of a million hectares 
of public land to over 3,000 farmers, 400 kilometers of new road were constructed while 
over 500 kilometers of old road were repaired (Ibid, sect, 138).  The Philippine Congress 
passed the Elementary Education Act of 1953 providing for seven years of free, but 
compulsory education. In addition, the Liberty Wells Association dug wells in villages 
throughout Luzon (Ibid, sect. 138).  Magsaysay’s civic action programs and reforms had 
addressed the needs of the population eliminating the political influence of the Huks over 
the population while his security initiatives had broken the ties between the Huks and the 
rural population and dwindled their numbers from both within and without through 
surrender programs and several highly effective offensive campaigns. 
73 
By 1954, the Huks numbered less than 2,000 active members and Magsaysay’s 
security and civic action programs had severed their ties to the population eliminating 
their ability to recruit and gather additional supplies Greenberg, 1987, sect.139).  In 
February, the Army began the largest anti-Huk operation to date to clear the remaining 
members of the organization from the area near Mount Arayat.  Operation THUNDER-
LIGHTNING lasted for 211 days and involved over 5,000 men (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 139).  
The operation resulted in the deaths of forty-three, the capture of eighty-eight, and the 
surrender of fifty-four Huks in addition to the ninety-nine production bases and 500 
enemy huts destroyed (Ibid, sect 139). On 17 May 1954, Louis Taruc, leader of the HMB, 
surrendered to government forces. Starting a cascading effect within the Huk leadership. 
Despite the mass surrender, government forces continued operations to sweep up the 
remaining elements of the Huks.  By 1955, it is estimated that less than 1,000 Huks 
remained at large (Ibid, sect. 140).  The Huk movement had disintegrated into nothing 
more than roving bands of bandits fighting to survive—the insurrection was over. 
   
1. Analysis 
The conflict in the Philippines began with the rise of Philippine nationalism 
following the Spanish-American War and the social and economic disparity stemming 
from corrupt government practices concerning land tenure. The local peasants, desiring to 
shirk the perceived yoke of colonialism were attracted to political movements aimed at 
social and economic reform regardless of the communist inclinations of the movements. 
The onset of World War II and the subsequent Japanese invasion swelled the ranks of the 
Huk, while the Huk nationalistic stance in opposition to the invaders provided legitimacy 
to their movement.   
Following the end of the Second World War, the resumption of U.S. control 
brought a resurgence of anti-colonial sentiment.  Despite numerous attempts by the 
United States to remedy the underlying situation, the corrupt practices of the Philippine 
government in its administration of aid programs continued to foster resentment and 
alienation within the population.  The oppressive tactics employed by the government in 
its initial attempts to eliminate the insurgents further reinforced their ties to the 
population.  With the Philippine government on the verge of collapse, the appointment of 
Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense began a reversal of governmental oppression 
through a series of reforms and civic action.   
Magsaysay’s programs redirected the efforts of the government from a strategy of 
attrition aimed at the insurgent forces to a plan focused on reforging the ties between the 
government and the population. Magsaysay’s success highlights the fundamental nature 
of gaining and securing the support and control of the population as an end in conflicts 
for internal control.  In contrast, the past efforts of the Philippine government to achieve 
victory solely through the destruction of enemy forces proved futile as well as 
detrimental to the overall success of the conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to address the 
underlying social, economic, and political foundations of the grievance that supplies an 
insurgent movement with the cause that links it to the popular base from which it draws 
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its existence. In addition, to the overarching conditions generating the ideological aspect 
of the insurgent movement, it is of fundamental importance to secure the loyalty and 
cooperation of the populace at the local level.  This is achieved through security and civic 
action designed to address local and immediate concerns, producing tangible benefits and 
resolution to current difficulties, generating the popular perception of efficacy and 
legitimacy in the government. This point is evident when viewed from the perspective of 
the guerrilla which can be drawn from this statement by Louis Taruc concerning the issue 
of land reform, “Land redistribution and ending tenancy were not central for most people 
[in the rebellion]. People just wanted small changes—a bigger share of the crop so they 
and their families could live easier.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 171).  
Magsaysay made extensive use of local programs to engender the support of the 
population as is evident from this statement by a major peasant leader in the Huk 
movement, “All the reforms that were promised and partially implemented, even though 
small and showcase in nature were encouraging for the people. Many people believed the 
government; they believed Magsaysay.” (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 238). Therefore, Magsaysay 
in his successful resolution of the insurrection relied upon local action and reform to 
generate a popular base of support for his programs, which he then capitalized on to 
institute national reforms following his election as President of the Philippines. 
 
a. Input Denial 
When Ramon Magsaysay assumed the office of Secretary of Defense 
under President Quirino in 1950, the Huk had already thoroughly infiltrated the rural 
population of the Luzon Province and established an infrastructure to facilitate the 
gathering of resources and recruits. The Huks relied the social and political programs 
created under the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) to provide the vital link between 
their maneuver units and the population.  The corrupt and oppressive tactics of the 
Philippine government and their forces served to reinforce the Huk influence over the 
population.  The Huk influence had become so pervasive that many villages were 
governed by parallel Huk administrations. To effectively sever the insurgent influence 
from the population Magsaysay adopted a two-part program which involved a public 
relations campaign (or white psychological operations) and the active defense of the 
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population.  Both of these measures were realized through the various reforms 
Magsaysay conducted within the military.   The primary facet of Magsaysay’s input 
denial strategy was the creation of the Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs).  These units 
were regionally-assigned augmented battalions formed to “gain the public trust and 
cooperation, engage in defensive activities to protect the population against acts of terror 
or raids, generate exploitable combat information for limited offensive operations, and 
encourage the development of local self-defense volunteer formations.” (Cable, 1986, p. 
55). Each BCT was accompanied by a Civil Affairs Team that provided medical, 
engineering, and transportation resources for civil projects to reinforce the reawakening 
of trust in the government.  In addition, Magsaysay employed “white” psychological 
operations to erase the past perception of government oppression and corruption.  Civil 
Affairs officers were dispatched to each village to explain the procedures by which a 
citizen could seek compensation from the government for damage inflicted by the Army 
or take legal action against a member of the armed forces for a past transgression.   
The Philippine input denial strategy proved extremely effective by 
providing a permanent defense force integrated with civil actions programs to ensure the 
betterment of life for the villagers while incorporating a psychological operations 
program that demonstrated the resolve of the government to redress past wrongdoings 
and resolve existing social grievances. The plan was successful because it eliminated the 
physical presence of the guerrillas while severing the guerrilla’s influence by mitigating 
their cause through programs that addressed the local and immediate concerns of the 
population in a “demand-pull” process. 
 
b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction 
The primary conversion mechanism employed by the Huk insurgents was 
Stalin University.  Stalin University was a large camp located on the Sierra Madres 
Mountains used for the training and indoctrination of new recruits by Chinese Red Army 
instructors.  While Stalin University was not directly targeted by the Philippine 
government other programs served to interrupt and confound the conversion process. The 
central feature of the Philippine counter conversion mechanism was the Economic 
Development Corps (EDCOR).   
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EDCOR was a resettlement program designed to induce surrender in a 
segment of the insurgent forces by robbing the movement of its “land for the landless” 
cause. Larry Cable (1986) states, “The goal of the program was twofold: separate the 
hard-core guerrilla from the marginal or unwilling supporter, and sap the will for 
resistance prior to military operations.” (p. 63). The lure of the program lay in its ability 
to address the central social issue of rural discontent –land tenure, and in its ability to 
provide amnesty and a better life than that offered as a guerrilla or a tenant farmer living 
in Luzon. The program offered surrendered Huks the title to land and the chance at a 
better life through numerous civic action programs integrated into the EDCOR project.  
The resettlement areas provided access to free education, transportation, medical care, 
electricity, and water.  In addition, the government granted loans for start-up items such 
as seed, farm animals, and other initial supplies on the condition that the loans be repaid 
and the land not be subdivided. The initial EDCOR site was located on the island of 
Mindinao, which insured that newly surrendered Huks would be free from the 
repercussions from their former comrades. The program proved so successful that in less 
than a year a second EDCOR site had to be constructed.  Magsaysay capitalized on this 
success by using the testimony of former Huk EDCOR residents as propaganda to 
disseminate the advantages of the program and induce further surrender in the Huk 
movement. By 1955, it was estimated that 1,500 Huks had surrendered to take advantage 
of the EDCOR project (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 91).  
In order to target those members of the Huk movement not susceptible to 
the lures of the EDCOR project, the Philippine military made extensive use of “black” 
psychological operations on the insurgents.  When government forces discovered a Huk 
weapons and ammunition cache, rather than destroy it, select weapons and ammunition 
were replaced with exploding duplicates.  This had the effect of either causing the Huk to 
abandon their previous weapons stores (some of which were unaltered) or risking the 
lives of their soldiers.  In another psychological operation known as the “eye of God,” 
light aircraft would circle above a battle and a crew member utilizing a bullhorn would 
call out the names of certain Huks involved in the battle, thanking them for the 
intelligence  that  led  government  forces  to  their comrades (Lansdale, 1972, pp. 74-75). 
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Numerous other psychological operations were conducted against the Huks and their 
supporters, undermining intraorganizational trust thereby reducing operational 
effectiveness. 
Another aspect of the Philippine counter conversion strategy was crop 
destruction.  Government forces used aerial reconnaissance to spot agricultural fields at 
Huk production bases, however, crops were not destroyed until just before they were 
ready for harvest in an effort to maximize the loss of time and effort expended by the 
Huks.  Magsaysay’s success in this aspect of counterinsurgency lay in his ability to 
address the local and immediate concerns of the populace as well as the underlying 
grievance of land tenure to offer a better life for the Huks insurgents in a “demand-pull” 
process. Jose Lava, leader of the PKP stated,  
When Magsaysay started making reforms in the Philippine army and in 
the government generally it had an impact not only on the movement’s 
mass support but on the armed [Huk] soldiers as well.  Many left because 
repression was ending, and they were not ideologically committed enough 
to stay in the movement, especially as things grew worse for the Huks. 
(Kerkvliet, 1977, p. 238).  
In addition, the role of psychological operations proved essential in 
undermining the Huk’s ability to fight by attacking the roots of the organization through 
the elimination of the conditions creating its political purpose and causing the Huks to 
question the loyalty of their own troops as well as the functionality of their equipment.  
The overall purpose achieved by these efforts was to divert Huk resources away from 
operations and make them more vulnerable to counterforce techniques.  
 
c. Counterforce 
Following the military reorganization and reforms instituted by 
Magsaysay in 1950, the military focus shifted from large conventional sweeps to small-
unit operations involving long-term, deep jungle patrols. However, large-scale sweeps 
were not eliminated, they were employed as the situation dictated, but with a fundamental 
difference.  Large sweeps such as the operation conducted in the Zambales Province, left 
behind  several platoon-sized elements to continue the search and prevent the Huks from 
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returning to reclaim the area.  This practice was the fundamental difference that 
differentiated success with a clear and hold strategy from failure with sweep and clear 
tactics.   
Possibly one of the most effective counterforce strategies employed by the 
Philippine military was the Force X concept.  Force X was a combination of special 
operations counterforce tactics combined with psychological operations to maximize the 
damage inflicted and intelligence gained on the Huk organization.  While the Force X 
concept was originally employed prior to Magsaysay’s control it was abandoned shortly 
after its inception. However, the Force X concept was revived and employed extensively 
under the Magsaysay administration following 1951.  The concept behind Force X was to 
disguise an element of the BCT as a Huk squadron and infiltrate the Huk base camp areas 
to gather intelligence and disrupt operations. The men received training in Huk customs 
and courtesies from captured Huk guerrillas, dressed as Huks, and carried Huk weapons. 
The men were then set loose to roam Huk controlled territory until they encountered a 
Huk unit, at which time they would return with the unit to its base camp, gather 
intelligence, and then destroy the camp and capture its leaders.  The operations proved so 
successful that following several uses of the concept two Huk units, mistaking each other 
for Force X, attacked each other, resulting in numerous casualties (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 
72).  In addition, Force X was responsible for sabotaging enemy arms caches and 
capturing members of the Huk infrastructure in support of the overall psyops campaign.   
 
d. Strengthening the State 
The Philippine strategy to strengthen the state involved numerous 
simultaneous strategies employed to both provide physical security and engender the 
loyalty of the population. The first aspect of the Philippine strategy encompasses the wide 
array of reforms aimed at securing the loyalty of the populace to the national government.  
Magsaysay’s first reforms began during his tenure as the Philippine Secretary of Defense.  
He initiated his campaign of reform by removing those elements of corruption that 
fostered a negative image of the government from his organization.  He reduced 
governmental oppression by the military and Police Constabulary by raising the daily 
wage of the average soldier to enable them to pay for food and supplies rather than 
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demand it from the villagers.  Magsaysay refocused the army on the defense of the 
population rather than on the search and destroy operations of the “iron fist” policy.  In 
addition, he empowered the population with the ability to redress past and present 
instances of oppression through legal recourse administered by military lawyers under the 
supervision of Magsaysay’s staff. Military reforms were accompanied by civic action 
programs to further engender popular support while “white” psyops and image building 
were conducted to focus the population on the progress achieved and the legitimacy of 
the government. Projects such as cash credit for peasants, barrio health clinics, irrigation 
canals, and new bridges were implemented to generate the perception of progress and the 
betterment of living conditions under Magsaysay’s guidance (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 239). To 
supplement his image building campaign, Magsaysay would frequently visit the 
population and military posts to ensure his plans were implemented as he desired.  
Magsaysay’s frequent forays to the local villages fostered the perception of government 
concern in the plight of the population and assisted Magsaysay in winning the election of 
1953.   
Another technique employed by Magsaysay to foster the perception of 
legitimacy and control in the government was that of electoral reform and security. 
During both the 1951 and 1953 elections, Magsaysay utilized the military, ROTC cadets, 
and members of JUSMAG to perform poll watching and security to eliminate voter fraud, 
corruption, coercion, and violence. Benedict J. Kirkvliet (1977) in The Huk Rebellion 
quotes PKP leadership in their observations that the “peaceful, clean election [of 1951] 
had caused people to doubt “the immediate need of armed struggle… That is why the 
moment they sense any reason not to lose faith and confidence in elections, they adhere 
to it immediately” (p. 238).  By the 1953 election, electoral fraud and violence had been 
eliminated, enabling over 4 million Filipinos to cast their votes.  Following his election to 
the office of Philippine President, Magsaysay instituted several reforms to mitigate the 
Huks political cause of “land for the landless.”  Magsaysay’s EDCOR project, agrarian 
courts which provided peasants with legal representation at government expense, and 
legislation to limit the amount of rent a landlord could charge his tenets served to diffuse 
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past concerns over the land tenure issue.  In addition, Magsaysay’s administration 
distributed over a quarter of a million hectares of public land to 3,000 farmers 
(Greenberg, 1987, sect. 138). 
The final aspect of the Philippine effort to strengthen the state that will be covered in this 
section is the improvements in intelligence collection implemented under the military 
reforms of Magsaysay. The most important aspect of this reform was the focus on 
continuity.  Each battalion was responsible for producing a file that contained 
information on the people, intelligence networks, and Huk activities in their area of 
operation.  Additionally, a camera was issued to each patrol to document Huk casualties 
in an effort to maximize the accuracy of information and statistics collected on the Huk 
movement.  While battalions rotated in and out of each area over time, the rotation of the 
intelligence section was staggered to ensure continuity of intelligence which was based 
on the information contained in the file created by the initial battalion.  Although these 
tactics, techniques, and procedures contributed to the overall effort of defeating the Huk 
insurrection, they occurred after a series of failed attempts to defeat the insurgency by 
directly attacking its military component. 
 
e. Failures 
Two of the most significant failures of the pre-Magsaysay regime were the 
inability identify social grievances and initiate reform and the use of the Philippine armed 
forces under the “iron fist” policy of President Manuel Roxas.  Corruption and repression 
were rampant under both the Roxas and Quirino regimes and would have resulted in the 
inevitable collapse from within of the Philippine government were it not for the efforts of 
Ramon Magsaysay.  Both Roxas and Quirino were unable to perceive the plight of the 
average peasant in rural central Luzon due to their interest in maintaining the status quo 
and apathy towards those not in their social class. Roxas’ inability to perceive the source 
of the insurgency led to his adoption of the “iron fist” policy to destroy the Huk 
movement. This policy, which was described by Philippine Representative Felixberto 
Serrano as “a policy of madness” motivated “by a spirit of revenge,” served to further 
aggravate an already tense situation between government forces and the population 
(Kirkvliet, 1977, p.194). The iron fist policy began in August 1946 with the deployment 
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of Police Constabulary troops utilizing heavy artillery, armored cars, tanks, and airplanes 
to attack insurgents armed with only rifles in the Luzon province (Kirkvliet, 1977, p. 
189). The series of operations resulted in the destruction of several villages and deaths of 
numerous civilians.  In support of these operations, Roxas imposed martial law on the 
population, resulting in the imposition of movement controls on the local villagers.  Local 
government officials exploited this situation by charging recurring fees for the issuance 
of movement passes, some of which required renewal on a weekly basis. In addition to 
the corrupt practices of governmental officials and an increasing number of friendly fire 
incidents, government forces engaged in oppressive tactics to gain information and 
resources from the local population.  Under the Roxas administration’s policy, troops 
were forced to live off the land, which led to further exploitation of the villagers to attain 
food and equipment.  Magsaysay alleviated this problem through a military reform in 
which the average soldier’s pay was raised from 30 Centavos to a full peso a day 
allowing the troops to purchase food from the villagers as well as stimulate the local 
economy (Greenberg, 1987, sect. 84).  Finally, the use of large conventional sweep 
operations under the iron fist policy produced little results and served to further weaken 
the ties between the Constabulary and the local population in their efforts to procure 
intelligence on the location of Huk units and sympathizers.  Military reforms instituted 
under Magsaysay served to eliminate these abusive tactics by eliminating corruption 
through frequent inspections by Magsaysay, increased military pay, and a shift in focus 
from offensive operations focused on the guerrillas to defensive operations focused on 
defending the population. 
 
f. Findings 
The Philippine case demonstrates the primacy of the role of the population 
in defeating the insurgency.  Social, military, political, and economic reforms proved 
crucial to the resolution of the conflict.  By identifying the underlying cause of the 
insurrection and instituting reforms and by eliminating the local and immediate concerns 
of the populace through social action, Magsaysay’s government undermined the political 
cause of the insurgency and re-established the legitimacy of the central government.  
Magsaysay’s military reforms prevented government oppression by refocusing military 
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operations on the defense of the local populace rather than the destruction of enemy 
forces.  The shift in focus resulted in an increased rapport between the population and the 
military facilitating the collection of intelligence thereby increasing the military’s ability 
to locate and destroy the insurgent forces. Therefore, two lessons can be taken from the 
Philippine case.  First, the underlying cause of the insurgency must be identified and 
resolved through reform (if possible) beginning at the local level, and second, the initial 
focus of the military must be on the defense of the population to inhibit the insurgent 
forces’ ability to gather resources and expand their operations   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The conclusion drawn from these cases is clear:  the end state of any conflict must 
be to attain the control and allegiance of the population instead of the defeat of the 
military component of the opposition. This is accomplished through three basic tasks. 
The first task is to identify the primary social grievance of the population that provides 
the movement with its cause and to institute reforms at the local level to address these 
issues. This robs the insurgency of its ability to politically mobilize the population for its 
cause, thereby limiting its ability to gather resources and expand.  The second task is to 
focus on the defense of the population by providing security on a static basis in contested 
areas to separate the insurgents from the population.  Larry Cable (1986) states that this is 
necessary “to convince the peasants that their most basic need, to be secure and safe in 
their own persons, homes and fields was best met by the government forces and the 
peasants’ best course of action was to cooperate with the security personnel in achieving 
this goal.” (p. 63).  The permanent security created by static defensive forces provides 
physical security as well as freedom from the coercion of the insurgent movement. In 
addition, daily contact between government forces creates rapport with the civilian 
populace enabling the government to obtain accurate intelligence and more easily locate 
and destroy the insurgent forces. The final aspect of this strategy is to exploit the 
intelligence gained from the civilian populace to locate and destroy the insurgent forces.   
All three cases have demonstrated that the most effective counterforce technique 
is to employ small, tactical units that rely on systematic patrolling and ambushes to 
destroy the guerrillas.  In addition, it is necessary to supplement these techniques with 
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civic action programs, population control measures, and an effective psyops campaign 
consisting of both image building operations focused on the populace amnesty programs 
to induce surrender among the insurgent forces. In conclusion, the primary focus of any 
conflict for the internal control of a nation from a group of politically motivated 




CHAPTER   III 
Afghanistan faces a myriad of problems that stem from underlying factors such as 
ethnic and tribal divides as well as those created by a history of disunity and recurring 
war.  However, the overarching commonality further eroding present-day political unity 
originates from historical political norms buttressed by an acephalous religion and its 
guidelines that have facilitated the exploitation of Islam.  Insurgents and terrorists have 
exploited Islam as a vehicle for the unification and mobilization of various ethnic and 
tribal groups under the call of jihad to prevent the consolidation of authority in a 
central secular political institution.  
The threat to stability in Afghanistan cannot be perceived in terms of a single 
insurgency, but rather as a variety of centrifugal factors pulling legitimacy from the 
central government. Numerous groups and factions contend for power in a variety of 
diverse settings that confound categorization.  Each threat manifests itself in its own 
regional context, capitalizing on that region’s weaknesses and separation from the central 
government. Widespread poverty coupled with the mismanagement of aid organizations 
has fostered a revival in the opium trade, providing warlords and insurgents with a 
renewable source of capital and stifling the development of a legitimate economic 
infrastructure.  In addition, the central government faces multiple difficulties that mirror 
those confronted at the provincial level. Internal ethnic and political divides, corruption, 
and lack of efficacy stemming from an inability to gather adequate funding and resources 
tear at the government from within, diminishing its ability to unite and heal a country that 
everyday totters on the brink of collapse. Further, external factions have spread the call 
for opposition to a central authority in Afghanistan throughout the Muslim world, casting 
Afghanistan as the new crusade of Western imperialism and dominance in the land of the 
crescent moon.  
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the impediments to unification and 
stabilization confronting coalition and Afghan leadership, and, in doing so, establish the 
context surrounding U.S. counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies. I will examine 
regional and local issues as well as those within the central government to illustrate how 
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they coalesce to detract from stabilization and unification to create an environment 
conducive to insurgency.  Further, I will demonstrate how both Islam and poppy 
production serve as unifying factors and an underlying support infrastructure that 
facilitates the spread of insurgent movements and detracts from the legitimacy and 
control of the central government, condemning Afghanistan to repeat the mistakes of its 
past.   
 
A. ETHNIC DIVIDES 
Two of the oldest factors underlying disunity in Afghan society are those of 
ethnic and tribal divides.  Afghanistan is a fragmented country composed of six major 
ethnic groups, speaking three languages and composed of numerous tribes (Afghanistan: 
A Country Study, 2001, p. 212).  Pashtuns, the largest group, comprise 40 percent of the 
population while Tajiks comprise 25.3 percent; Hazaras, 18 percent; Uzbeks, 6.3 percent; 
Turkmen, 2.5 percent; the Quizilbash 1.0 percent; and other, at 6.9 percent (Ibid, p. 104).  
Despite attempts at ethnic integration in the government, fissures continue to form along 
ethnic and tribal lines. Warlord militias, divided by ethnic bids for local dominance such 
as the conflict between ethnic Uzbek Gen. Abdurrashid Dostum and his Tajik rival, Gen. 
Attah Mohammad continue to plague stability in the north (Herman, 2003, p. 15). 
Political divides between Tajiks and majority Pashtuns continue to impair government 
efficacy resulting from Pashtun perceptions of ethnic marginalization and 
disenfranchisement in a government dominated by ethnic Tajiks appointed during the 
2002 loya jirga (Johnson, 27 October 2003). The Afghan National Army, once believed 
to be a model for ethnic integration and a symbol of Afghanistan’s future, has become 
mired in allegations of the ethnic bias of the Tajik Minister of Defense, Fahim Kahn in 
his appointments of senior ranking officers (Guistozzi, A., 2003, pp. 20-21).  Finally, 
intra-Pashtun dissention over the exclusion of former Afghan king Mohammed Zahir 
Shah from a role in the new administration has eroded Karzai’s support within his own 
ethnic group (Johnson, 27 October 2003).  
While coalition forces have attempted to maintain separation from internal ethnic 
divides in Afghanistan, tribes and militias have sought to exploit the coalition’s zeal for 
the destruction of Taliban and al Qaeda forces to manipulate the military to serve as an a 
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tool to eliminate their opposition. Ethnic and tribal leaders frequently claim their 
opposition to be members of the Taliban or al Qaeda and substantiate these claims by 
firing on coalition forces from the vicinity of their enemies’ compounds to initiate 
hostilities. Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a leading pro-Western moderate in President 
Hamid Karzai's administration, said, “There are always complaints that, particularly the 
interpreters with the coalition forces, sometimes give false information to the coalition 
forces. Sometimes they try to implicate some of their enemies and some of the people 
they don't like.” (Watson, 2003, p. 1). While there is no record of how often this tactic 
has been attempted or has succeeded, members of 3rd Special Forces Group contend that 
the technique was widely used. Additionally, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 
and Non-Governmental Aid Organizations (NGOs) rely on local ethnic militias for 
security, potentially interjecting coalition forces into ethnic fights, inadvertently 
projecting ethnic or tribal bias in their attempts to defend themselves. 
In addition, members of insurgent groups have exploited ethnic and tribal ties 
under the Pashtun code of Pushtunwali. The Afghanistan Country Study of 2001 states,  
The Pastun culture rests on Pustunwali, a legal and moral code that 
determines social order and responsibilities.  It contains sets of values 
pertaining to honor (namuz), solidarity (nang), hospitality, mutual support, 
shame, and revenge which determine social order and individual 
responsibility.  The defense of namuz, even unto death is obligatory for 
every Pashtun. (Afghanistan: A Country Study, 2001, pp. 105-106). 
The relevance of Pashtunwali exists in its detraction from the stability of the 
country.  Blood feuds serve to expand conflicts to include an ever-increasing number of 
associates and relatives while insurgents capitalize on ethnic and tribal ties to demand 
hospitality and sanctuary from the pursuit by coalition forces. 
The disunity fostered by ethnic and tribal divides will continue to split 
Afghanistan and engender instability until such a time that the population perceives their 
adequate political representation and efficacy in determining the course of the 
government.  However, this goal remains elusive due to the lack of governmental control 
at the local level, which has led to the resurgence of warlords and factional fighting for 
local power, inhibiting stabilization and skewing political loyalties.  A former Afghan 
army general and an ethnic Pashtun stated, “The warlords were finished, but now they are 
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being revived with American help. The Americans wanted to use them in the fight 
against terrorism, but they have failed to capture the Taliban or al Qaeda leaders, while 
alienating the populace by making the warlords stronger.” (Constable, 2003, p. A1). 
 
B. WARLORDS 
Warlords and local militia commanders represent an impediment to the successful 
unification and stabilization of Afghanistan by supplanting the authority of the central 
government with that of their own. Their actions propagate the drug trade, heighten 
ethnic tensions, and stifle legitimate economic development at the local level, while their 
private armies and military operations displace and factionalize the community, 
preventing the cooperation and stability necessary for the development of an economic 
infrastructure. The population, often trapped between competing factions vying for 
regional dominance, must contend with threats of extortion, forcible recruitment, fighting 
and the displacement of families, and the denial of access to land or water  (Waldman, 24 
September 2003). 
Warlords use their influence to extort the population through illegal tolls, taxes, 
and graft, demanding money for the use of public roads and for protection against rival 
factions and warlords. Private armies funded by the taxation of drug trafficking and 
production and other illicit actions such as roadside extortion and the illegal seizure and 
monopolization of businesses, stifle commerce and the development of a free-market 
economy outside the control of the warlord.  Warlords demand osher — an Islamic tax 
given as a portion of a crop from farmers and collect taxes meant for the central 
government (Waldman, 24 September 2003). They encourage the growth of poppies to 
expand the drug trade and the revenue collected from its taxation to increase their 
influence at the expense of the legitimacy of the central government. 
Rival warlords and military commanders continue to clash over control of 
territory that is allegedly part of a united Afghanistan. In an effort to secure the loyalty of 
provincial warlords to the central government, President Harmid Karzai appointed many 
warlords and militia commanders to positions within the government following the fall of 
the Taliban.  However, warlords, realizing the impotence of the central government 
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beyond the confines of Kabul, have continued to pursue personal agendas based on ethnic 
tensions and the desire for regional dominance regardless of their role in the new 
government.  In a clash in October 2003, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and 
ethnic Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostam’s forces engaged those of General Attah 
Mohammad in a battle employing tanks, mortars, and artillery outside the city of Mazar-
i-Sharif (Gall, 10 October 2003).  While this conflict ended in a successful negotiation 
between the two warlords, it is illustrative of the underlying motivations of the 
preponderance of warlords and militia commanders, who in their pursuit of local 
dominance, place little faith in the successful unification and control of the country by the 
central government. Recent legislation within Afghanistan has prohibited warlords (those 
with personal armies) from holding positions within the Afghan government.  However, 
while many warlords have superficially relinquished control of their militias, they retain 
control of sizeable forces within their respective provinces and continue to exert their 
regional dominance. 
Warlords and militia commanders are the embodiment of ethnic and tribal 
divides, their private armies, formed along these social fissures, perpetuate tribal and 
ethnic rivalry in their competition for the control of territory allegedly under the 
administration of a provincial governor and the central government.  Each attack involves 
a greater portion of the population in a downward spiral in which the death of a family 
member or friend must be avenged through blood vengeance demanded under tribal 
codes such as Pushtunwali. Forcible recruitment along ethnic and tribal lines further adds 
to the conflicts, swelling the ranks of the warlords’ militias and detracting from the 
ability of the community to develop an economic infrastructure.  In addition, the surplus 
of young males without craft or vocation other than basic military skills created by the 
demobilization of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) has generated a willing pool of 
volunteers to man the warlords’ armies. The lack of economic infrastructure created by 
the continual unrest has generated a self-reinforcing condition in that the continued 
fighting prevents the formation of a stable economic infrastructure resulting in fewer 
employment opportunities for young males driving them to seek a livelihood in the 
employ of a warlord or militia leader thereby perpetuating the cycle. Local and regional 
police forces are unable to contend with the armament and numbers of the warlords’ 
89 
militias and frequently succumb to bribery due to the inability of the government to 
provide adequate equipment and manning or even salary. (Dixon, 2003, p.1).  Despite 
attempts to unify competing ethnic and tribal factions under the common banner of the 
Afghan National Army, this entity has yet to exert itself at the local and regional levels 
beyond the provinces neighboring Kabul.  The lack of governmental control and 
pervasion of corruption within the government ranks has served only to heighten ethnic 
divides, allowing them to fester beyond the reach of the central government, detracting 
from plans to unify and stabilize the country.   
Despite the efforts of the central government and coalition forces, warlord 
conflicts referred to as “green on green” have continued to destabilize the rural areas of 
Afghanistan. The government, unable to fill the power vacuum created by the fall of the 
Taliban, faces a dilemma in which the absence of control fosters continuing conflict 
through local bids for power whereas the presence of a dominant warlord in the region 
can create stability and regional control, but entails the risk of questionable loyalty to the 
central government and the existence of a rival power base. This is evident in the case of 
Ishmael Kahn who has achieved a great deal of stability and control over the province of 
Herat.  However, Kahn’s personal army and independent links to Iran combined with 
report by the 3rd Special Forces Group describing him as “not pro-Karzai” detract from 
the legitimacy and control of the central government (Kandahar Interview 31 May 2003).  
Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (CJSOTF), states, Warlords are needed to maintain stability in their provinces to 
allow Kabul –the essential center of gravity—to continue building power.” (Celeski 
interview, 31 May 2003). However, warlords and provincial governors frequently play 
both sides to further their self-interests.   
90 
Further hindering stabilization efforts, the U.S. military has maintained its focus 
on the destruction of the military component of the insurgent forces and has chosen to 
take a “hands off approach” to green on green fighting (Interview 11 September 2003). 
Lt. General John R. Vines, commander of Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) in 
Afghanistan stated, “Militias are part of the existing reality, some are legitimate, and 
some are predators. We need to work aggressively to disestablish militias who are not 
legitimate, but the challenge is, if you disestablish a militia, who provides security? The 
vacuum can be filled by anarchy.” (Constable, 2003, p. 17). Despite this statement, U.S. 
forces are still instructed to avoid involvement in supporting Afghan government 
attempts to quell green on green conflicts, and unless provoked, do not initiate conflicts 
with local or regional warlords or militia commanders (Interview 11 September 2003). 
Lt. General Dan K. McNeill, former commander of the U.S. CJTF-180 stated, “We do 
not, in our lexicon, interject ourselves into disputes that we call green on green. Those are 
Afghan problems to solve.” (Kaufman, 2003, p. 16). Despite Lt General McNeill’s 
comments, the Afghan government has not yet attained sufficient strength to counter 
warlord infighting or eliminate those warlords who pose a threat to security and stability.  
In addition, recently formed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) rely on Afghan 
militias for security. Former Afghan General Rahim Wardak, highlights the problem 
presented by U.S. leadership’s desire to remain impartial to green on green fighting, 
stating, “Those local leaders almost always have enemies and rivals, and it's very easy to 
imagine how American personnel will get in the middle of their feuds.” (Kaufman, 2003, 
p. 16). Further compounding this problem, AMF acting under the auspices of the central 
government and employed by the coalition military as local guides have been accused of 
corruption and the abuse of local villagers similar to the circumstances involving the 
constabulary in the Philippines prior to the administration of Ramon Magsaysay. Brad 
Adams, Asia executive director for Human Rights Watch in an open letter to Bush on 
Sept. 19 wrote, “Violence and intimidation at the hands of soldiers, militia and police 
under the control of warlords have created a generalized sense of insecurity. Even gains 
in education for school-age girls are now at risk as many parents are afraid to send their 
daughters out of their homes to go to school.” (Watson, 2003, p. 1) Sultan Mohammed, 
Dai Chopan village elder stated, “These people are robbing us, torturing us and beating 
us. They are also taking innocent people to jail. They stand with the Americans, and 
when Americans leave an area, then the militias go by another route and rob the houses.” 
(Watson 2003, p. 1). Continued abuse of the population inflicted by local militias serving 
under the auspices of both the central government and coalition forces serves to further 
attrit the legitimacy of both, driving the population to seek resolution and authority from 
an alternative source. Despite the comments of Lt General Mc Neill, coalition forces have 
a stake in resolving this issue despite perceptions of this as an “Afghan problem to 
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solve.” The weakening of the popular perception of coalition legitimacy will allow 
warlords and insurgents to supplant the authority of the central government thereby 
impeding progress towards the successful unification of the country. 
The continued existence of warlords and regional powers outside the control of 
the central government demonstrates the inefficacy of the government to enforce its 
dictates beyond the reach of ISAF and coalition forces.  Additionally, government efforts 
to appease warlords through political and military appointments have failed to curtail bids 
for regional dominance.  Until such a time as the government can address the underlying 
issues of regional control and enforcement, secure the loyalty and compliance of 
regionally dominant warlords, and provide gainful employ or job skills for “demobilized” 
young males, the problem of regional instability will perpetuate as warlords continue to 
pursue regional dominance independent of the central government. 
 
C. OPIUM PRODUCTION 
Opium production is a problem that underlies the majority of the issues 
confronting the stabilization of Afghanistan.  It presents a dilemma for the central 
government in that the drug trade provides the necessary resources and funding for those 
elements that detract from unification, yet it alleviates the abject poverty of the rural 
Afghan farmer who must contend with a crippling climate as well as the high costs of 
labor and deflated agricultural market caused by the post-war influx of aid organizations 
and relief efforts. Local warlords and corrupt government officials have capitalized on 
the absence of central government authority at the local level to profit from the taxation 
of the production and trafficking of opium, rebuilding their armies and supplanting the 
authority of the central government. Opium production is a destabilizing factor that the 
central government and coalition forces must addresses before the stabilization of 
Afghanistan can occur.  
On 18 January 2002, Afghan President Harmid Karzai declared the production of 
opium to be illegal.  Despite this ban, poppy production has again flourished in 
Afghanistan facilitating the growth of insurgent movements, the rise of local 
powerbrokers, and the weakening of the rule of the central government. While the 
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Taliban ban on production in July 2000 had reduced the flow of opium from Afghanistan, 
the temporary decline in supply resulted in a spike in price of the drug on the world 
market thereby increasing the lure of its production to impoverished Afghan farmers. 
Nearly two decades of fighting that had destroyed Afghanistan’s agricultural 
infrastructure, several years of drought, and the absence of local authority created in the 
wake of the fall of the Taliban has led farmers back to the cultivation of poppy. Rural 
Afghans remain oblivious to the repercussions of perpetuating the drug trade, viewing it 
as a short-term solution to their immediate problems.  However, this short sightedness 
has blinded many to such long-term solutions as the resuscitation of the agricultural 
infrastructure, the development of job skills, and the creation of self-sustaining industry, 
which would eventually end widespread poverty and lead to the stabilization of the 
country.  
The lucrative market engendered by the Taliban ban on opium production coupled 
with the end of several years of drought has produced one of the largest poppy harvests to 
date reestablishing Afghanistan’s dominance as the world’s leading producer of opium 
(Tohid, 2003, p.6).  Poppy cultivation represents a more economically viable product for 
impoverished Afghan farmers who must contend with both the inflated costs of labor to 
harvest their crops as well as the limited resource of water in Afghanistan’s arid climate. 
The massive post-war influx of aid organizations and relief workers, oblivious to local 
economic norms and traditional labor costs, has resulted in the rise in the rate of basic 
labor leaving many farmers unable to afford to pay workers to harvest their traditional 
crops. In addition, the massive influx of food aid into rural areas has devalued the market 
on traditional agricultural produce. A report by the Non-Governmental Aid Organization 
(NGO) Christian Aid noted that the greatest cultivation of poppy occurred in the regions 
where U.N. workers have been distributing most of their food aid (Ibid). This trend 
suggests food aid has undermined efforts to spur the development of a legitimate 
agriculture-based local economy founded on the production of traditional foodstuffs.  
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The massive quantities of food aid introduced into rural areas has undermined the 
market on traditional produce such as wheat and enabled rural Afghanis to rely on food 
aid to survive, freeing them to pursue the production of the more economically viable 
cash crop of poppy.  This alarming fact comes on the advent of the U.N. decision to 
distribute food aid to over 6 million people in Afghanistan in 2003 (Ibid). In addition, the 
cultivation of poppy requires less water than agricultural produce such as wheat and can 
generate a harvest worth twelve times as much, providing little incentive for local farmers 
to accept central government and coalition crop substitution and subsidization plans that 
offer only $500 (U.S.) per acre (Manning, 13 October 2003). Susana Rico, Director of the 
United Nations’ World Food Program for Afghanistan, stated, “Even taking the average 
prices and yield of wheat and poppy, the returns to a hectare of land for the latter far 
outweigh that of wheat, by approximately 4,000 per cent.” (Nutt, 15 September 2003). In 
addition to the absence of a lucrative incentive for Afghan farmers to cease the 
cultivation of poppy, warlords and local government officials have encouraged opium 
production and trafficking to expand their influence and control despite the central 
government’s efforts to curtail the growing drug trade within its borders. 
Local and regional powerbrokers have exploited the lack of influence of the 
central government beyond the confines of Kabul to gain revenue from the taxation of the 
drug trade to fund their private armies and expand their personal influence. Warlords 
involved in the drug trade oppose the formation of a stable government capable of 
adversely affecting opium production.  These actions result in a centripetal effect that 
pulls power and legitimacy from the central government to those who have achieved 
regional dominance. Local warlords and governmental officials propagate this system 
through incentives in which the compliant population is rewarded through protection and 
increased economic rewards and activity fostered by the money generated through the 
production and trafficking of opium. Government officials in Kabul fear that the local 
influence achieved by these drug traffickers and warlords will adversely influence the 
elections scheduled for 2004 turning Afghanistan into a form of narco-mafia state.  
Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani views drug trafficking as a “threat to democracy” 
stating, “the liquid funds from drugs, in the absence of solid institutions, could corrupt 
voting practices and turn them into a nightmare instead of a realization of public will.” 
(Manning, August 2003).   
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While warlords and local political officials have relied on profits gained through 
the taxation of the poppy trade to fund their personal armies and extend their influence, 
terrorists have used profits from opium to fund their resurgence and activity. Antonio 
Maria Costa, executive director of the Vienna-based United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime relates, “The terrorists and traffickers are the same people.” (Gall, 2003). Further 
illustrating this point, in July 2003, Maj. General Franklin Hagenbeck, acting commander 
of coalition forces in Afghanistan stated, “[the] Taliban and its allies have regrouped in 
Pakistan and are recruiting fighters from madrassas in Quetta in a campaign funded by 
drug-trafficking,” (de Borchgrave, 2003, p. 15). Insurgent factions such as the Taliban 
and Hizib-i-Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG) have legitimized the production of opium, once 
prohibited under Muslim law, as a form of jihad against the Western world. Afghan anti-
narcotics official, Khaure Ghualm Zai, quoted a villager stating, “We have been 
approached by the Taliban clerics urging us to grow more poppy to destroy future 
generations in America and other Western countries” (Tohid, 24 July 2003). An opium 
smuggler and former Taliban member stated, “Immoral Western culture destroys the 
minds of our children, so it’s only just that we export opium and heroin to destroy 
Western youths.” (As cited in Manning, August 2003). Further complicating matters, 
Costa estimates that the revenue generated from poppy cultivation brought $1.2 billion to 
farmers and traders last year (2002), nearly equaling the amount of international aid and 
doubling the legitimate revenue gained by the central government (Gall, 2003, p. 5).  
With the amount of money generated through the illicit production of opium, government 
officials face grim prospects of defeating either regional warlords or national insurgent 
movements.  
Opium production exists as an underlying matter that buttresses the majority of 
impediments to the stabilization and unification of Afghanistan through a self-
propagating dilemma in which the government is caught between the need to alleviate 
local poverty and the impediments to stabilization thriving from the revenue generated by 
the drug trade. The allure of quick profits generated through the cultivation of poppy 
combined with the restrictive environment and excessive food aid have produced an 
Afghan farmer unwilling to return to the cultivation of traditional agriculture despite the 
dictates of the central government.  Warlords and local political officials have 
compounded this problem by encouraging the production of opium to further their 
personal gain and influence while insurgent groups have used profits from the production 
to fund their resurgence.  Further, insurgent groups have given opium production 
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religious legitimacy by claiming it as a weapon against the West.  While coalition and 
Afghan governmental forces have approached this problem through policies of 
eradication, substitution, and subsidization, they cannot match the benefits of the 
remunerative alternative provided by opium production.  Therefore, until the central 
government can extend its authority to the local level, provide a lucrative alternative or 
eliminate the incentives for the cultivation of poppy, and eliminate the corruption from 
within its ranks, it will be unable to halt the flow of money and resources to those 
elements which detract from Kabul’s efforts to unify Afghanistan.   
 
D. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
The central government of Afghanistan faces numerous problems preventing the 
successful stabilization and administration of the country.  Corruption, inefficiency, and 
political divides fueled by ethnic rivalries and personal interests are pandemic throughout 
the Karzai regime and have eroded popular support in the administration.  The absence of 
security and control at the local level coupled with the lack of tangible progress from 
popular viewpoint has resulted in a return to reliance on local powers for security and 
administration in the absence of a legitimate government alternative. In addition, U.S. 
efforts have failed to provide the necessary security to break the hold and influence of 
regional powers, allowing the continued attrition of governmental legitimacy.  Nathan 
Leites and Charles Wolf (1970) in Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on 
Insurgent Conflicts contend, “From A’s [the state’s] standpoint, effective politics requires 
the A demonstrate a growing capacity to govern—by adhering to and enforcing law and 
order; by maintaining discipline within and between its agencies; and by completing 
announced programs visibly and expeditiously. Demonstrating competence and acquiring 
a reputation for effective action constitute A’s political task” (p. 73). The lack of focus by 
the central government and coalition forces on the population has produced a shift of 
support from the central government to regional and local powers that cannot be 
remedied without a clear focus on reversing the popular perceptions of government 
inefficacy through demonstrated progress.   
Public support of the central government has dwindled as abuse by local militias 
and reports of governmental corruption, senior official infighting, and allegations of 
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conspiracy have filtered down to the village level from Kabul. Allegations of conspiracy 
surrounding the assassination of Vice President Abdul Haji Qadir in July of 2002, 
frequent ethnic clashes between powerful warlords within the government, and a reported 
split between Karzai and Defense Minister Fahim Kahn have eroded international as well 
as national faith in the Karzai regime.  Further compounding the problem, the Afghan 
National Army, once held as an organization to transcend the barriers of ethnic divide, 
has fallen into inefficacy through administrative delays and over bureaucratization that 
have stymied its utility (Bryant, interview, 11 September 2003). The popular perception 
of governmental inefficacy and lack of control is founded on the lack of progress on 
projects such as the national highway, the government’s inability to curtail rampant crime 
and banditry, and the prevalent extortion and graft imposed by domineering warlords. Dr. 
Dad Mohammed, an internist stated, “Americans are here for a good reason. But they 
have been here a year, and what have they done? They have brought people to power 
who have always been thieves.” (Kraul, 26 October 2003).  
The lack of sufficient capital represents a major impediment to the reconstruction 
and stabilization of Afghanistan. While financial inadequacy is not the root cause 
motivating the loss of popular support, it remains a significant factor detracting from the 
overall efficacy and legitimacy of the central government. Afghanistan lacks the natural 
resources and economic infrastructure necessary to fund its own reconstruction. Its 
industry and agriculture have been decimated by years of continual war and recent 
drought.  Afghans remain unable to resurrect local industry and legitimate agricultural 
pursuits due to the lack of security and stability resulting from the absence of control by 
the central government.  In addition, Afghanistan has received inadequate international 
monetary aid, receiving only $4.5 billion of the United Nations Development Program 
and World Bank’s estimates of the $10 billion over five years it would take to facilitate 
the reconstruction of the country (Margesson, 2002). Further complicating matters, 
allegations by Afghan Planning Minister, Mohamed Mohaqeq suggest the 
misappropriation of international aid funds by members of the Karzai regime diminishing 
both the effectiveness of international aid and the Afghan government (Afghan Minister 
Attacks Aid ‘Abuse’, 2002). A report by the Center of International Cooperation at New 
York University states “from the $5.2 billion pledged by the international donor 
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community in the early months of the recovery, to date [May 2003] only $947 million has 
been activated towards reconstruction activities on the ground in Afghanistan.” 
(Hamidzada, Rubin, & Stoddard, 2003, p. 11).  Instead, money is focused on immediate 
relief projects and relief organization infrastructure, detracting from projects that would 
contribute to the long-term stabilization of the country (Interview, 27 May 2003). 
Yet another problem impeding the government’s financial stability remains its 
inability to collect taxes or compel provincial warlords to relinquish monies they have 
collected under the pretext of governmental taxation. Colonel Celeski suggests that 
provincial warlords will not relinquish these funds until the government can provide a 
return on the money in terms of security, funding, and assistance (Celeski interview, 31 
May 2003).  However, this position creates a self-compounding dilemma in which the 
government cannot demonstrate efficacy or provide assistance without adequate funding 
which the warlords will not provide without the manifestation of governmental assistance 
and control.   
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The lack of financial resources has resulted in the inability of the government to 
fund those in its employment leaving many public officials susceptible to bribery or 
without the necessary equipment and supplies to effectively enforce the rulings of the 
central government. Many police and border guards have gone up to four months without 
salary, motivated only by the promise of a stable future. General Haji Abdul Khaliq of a 
southern anti-Taliban militia stated, “The Taliban rebels offer local people good salaries–
more than $100 a month--to fight, while Khaliq and his men are not being paid at all.” 
(Dixon, 2003, p. 1). Efforts to distribute government salaries have met with mid-level 
corruption by local and regional officials who frequently keep this money to fund local 
private militias or secure the loyalty of the local police (Kandahar Interview, 23 May 
2003). The absence of authority has allowed criminals and insurgents to exert their 
dominance and supplant the legitimate authority of the government with that of their own 
based on regional power. Zabul Police Chief, Mahammed Ayub stated, “The Taliban 
actually ruled like a government in Dai Chupan. People went to the Taliban with their 
problems, not [to] the government.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). Additionally, the lack of 
government progress on stated improvements has driven many Afghans back to their 
reliance on the Taliban.  Haji Abdul Khaliq, stated, “From what we can see they didn’t 
spend more than a dollar. There are no paved roads, no reconstruction of government 
buildings, no help for the people, and no government salaries.” (Dixon, 2003, p. 1).   
The ascendancy of local criminals and insurgents to legitimacy in the absence of 
governmental authority and control has facilitated their unimpeded operations evolving 
from cross-border raids on coalition forces to the establishment of parallel administrative 
structures over a population with no recourse but submission. While U.S. commanders 
boast that “the coalition enjoys freedom of movement” and that they “have the capability 
and tools to do actions at the time and place of our choosing,” U.S. efforts have done 
little to remedy local security concerns allowing insurgents to return after coalition forces 
have departed the area (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1).  The absence of security at the local level 
has allowed insurgents and local powerbrokers to maintain and expand their hold over the 
population, creating the reliance of the populace on the regional authority which detracts 
from the legitimacy and authority of the government while imperiling prospects for a 
free, open election in 2004.  
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The Afghan National Army (ANA), once believed to be the first step towards 
Afghan self-sufficiency, has fallen prey to the over bureaucratization that stymies many 
U.S. and coalition operations.  While the central government has dispatched the ANA to 
the areas surrounding Kabul in an attempt to enforce its dictates and foster stability, 
reports from members of 3rd Special Forces Group state that the ANA has become mired 
in bureaucracy, and unable to act without approval from several levels of the government 
and coalition forces (Interview, 11 September 2003).  This lack of operational flexibility 
and response has allowed bandits and insurgents to maintain the initiative and retain 
dominance over the countryside while the ANA waits in its compound for approval to 
act. Despite this impediment, the presence of the ANA has a psychological impact on the 
population in the areas surrounding their compounds.  The multi-ethnic composition of 
the force as well as the deterrence of insurgent activity in its immediate vicinity has 
restored some confidence in the central government.  However, this effect decreases 
exponentially with distance as the influence and security provided by the ANA 
compound extend only as far as they are allowed to operate without prior approval. The 
government faces many problems that detract from its ability to bring stability and 
control to the country; however, until such a time that emphasis is placed on securing the 
populace and developing the necessary infrastructure to foster long-term growth and 




Insurgency remains the most significant factor detracting from stability in 
Afghanistan.  While numerous problems confront the successful stabilization of the 
country, insurgents have capitalized on the lack of governmental security and control and 
exploited national and local issues to unite a diverse populace under the common banner 
of jihad in a religious struggle funded by the drug trade. Although there are numerous 
insurgent groups in the country, each acting in its own local context and playing upon 
that regions’ specific weaknesses and distance from the influence and security of Kabul, 
three groups stand out as the most significant and credible threats to the Karzai regime 
due to their support, organization, and capability (de Borchgrave, 2003, p. 15).  The 
Taliban, Hizib-i-Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG), and al Qaeda have formed a loose coalition 
sharing support and intelligence to facilitate greater operations and capability, 
significantly increasing their ability to wrest power from the Karzai regime and expel 
coalition forces from Afghanistan. (Baldauf and Tohid, 2003, p. 7).  
Pervasive social and economic issues combined with the absence of local security 
and control have facilitated the resurgence and growth of insurgent movements. The 
absence of local control and open borders have allowed these movements to exploit 
exogenous resources and utilize opium production and trafficking to fund their efforts 
while relying on the remote tribal areas of Pakistan as a refuge to organize and avoid 
coalition assaults. In addition, the groups have exploited the acephalous nature of Islam 
to employ it as a vehicle for their message, unifying diverse social elements and 
mobilizing them under a religious mandate. Insurgency in Afghanistan represents a direct 
impediment to the stabilization and reconstruction of the country. The growth of these 
movements, left unchecked, will result in the return to power of the Taliban regime 
creating a sanctuary for global terrorism and a threat to the global community that will 
resonate for years to come.  
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U.S. Army Field Manual 90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations defines Phase I –
Latent and incipient insurgency as ranging from  
Subversive activity that is only a potential threat, latent or incipient, to 
situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an 
organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or 
uncontrolled insurgency activity. (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 3-19). 
Additionally, FM 90-8 describes phase II –Guerrilla Warfare as 
Reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or 
external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of 
violence against the government.  (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 3-27). 
The insurgent movements in Afghanistan have evolved since the fall of the 
Taliban in December of 2001. Their efforts have shifted from the hit and run tactics 
characteristic of a Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency to successively larger and 
more organized cross-border raids targeting government institutions indicative of Phase 
II: Guerrilla warfare (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-7). Just as Mao Tse-tung traded space for time 
in China, Afghan insurgents have capitalized on the same principle, trading the control of 
Afghanistan for time, waiting for U.S. popular sentiment to wane and forces to pull out. 
“The mantra they use is that the Americans and the international community will leave 
someday, and we will come back.” (Rhode, 2003, p. 1).  U.S. and coalition leadership 
have misperceived this shift as the weakening of the movements. Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, 
commander of CJTF-180 asserted that the Taliban is showing “signs of desperation” by 
carrying out terrorist attacks against civilian targets (Constable, 2003, p.17).   
While overt regional trends in insurgent activity against coalition forces may be 
construed in terms of the decline of a movement, Field Manual (FM) 90-8 states, 
“depending on the lack of success of the movement, there may also be a reversion from 
Phase III to Phase II or even back to Phase I.” (p. 1-3). U.S. forces remain unable to 
locate or differentiate insurgent members from the local populace.  This inability stems 
from the lack of operational human intelligence (HUMINT) produced by overly 
aggressive force protection measures that have all but eliminated the interaction between 
U.S. forces and indigenous Afghans.  This cascading effect has allowed the insurgent 
groups to remain indistinguishable from the indigenous population and maintain the 
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initiative. Therefore, the lack of attacks on coalition forces by insurgents who retain the 
initiative can by no means be used as a metric for the overall decline of the movement. 
An alternative view would be to perceive this shift as a conscious effort to avoid waging 
a pitched battle against superior coalition forces in favor of achieving the maximum 
psychological effect by focusing on the vulnerable population thereby achieving victory 
from within as in Vietnam. 
Following the fall of Kandahar in December of 2001, many Taliban forces shifted 
from conventional warfare to Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency as defined by FM 
90-8, in order to regroup and reorganize. Zalmai Rassoul, Afghanistan's national security 
adviser stated, “When the Taliban was first defeated, they were on the run, but they have 
had time in Pakistan to get a rest and reorganize themselves. And now they are being 
incited and encouraged to come back.” (Haven, 24 September 2003). These movements 
have since progressed and in many cases resumed Phase II operations such as the mass 
unit cross-border raids that have targeted police outposts and border guard stations and 
the establishment of a parallel administration in the Zabul province. The insurgent 
movements operating in Afghanistan represent a flexible threat, able to adapt their 
strategy to coalition response.  Past experiences in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines 
have demonstrated that strategies based on pure attrition such as that employed in 
Afghanistan have led to failure.  However, efforts such as those undertaken by 
Magsaysay in the Philippines, aimed at severing the influence of the insurgent 
organization over the population and eliminating the movement’s underlying political 
cause have proved most effective.  The ongoing resurgence of insurgent movements and 
the corresponding increase in activity has evidenced the inadequacy of the current 
coalition strategy of attrition based on overwhelming mass, firepower, and reliance on 
advanced technology, demanding both a reassessment of the current threat as well as a 
revision of the current strategy.   
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In order to establish the context for a thorough analysis of U.S. strategy in 
Afghanistan, I will conduct an analysis of the three most prominent insurgent groups: the 
Taliban, Hizib-i-Islami/Gulbuddin, and al Qaeda, focusing primarily on the Taliban to 
limit the scope of the study. Additionally, I will approach these groups from a collective 
standpoint based on the knowledge of their collaboration and their common interest in the 
return of Taliban authority to Afghanistan that will produce a sanctuary for al Qaeda as 
well an opportunity for the return to power of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  Further, I will 
analyze only those actions pertaining to Afghanistan. In order to facilitate a 
comprehensive analysis of the current threat I will employ the Leites and Wolf systemic 
approach to dissect the broad category of Afghan insurgency into its component elements 
of inputs (resourcing), conversion mechanisms, and activity. 
 
1. Inputs 
Insurgent groups have extensively capitalized on the inability of U.S. and 
coalition forces to cross or operate within the borders of Pakistan and have used the 
uncontested border areas as a sanctuary for recruitment and organization. The freedom of 
movement engendered by the political and religious support of these cross-border areas 
has allowed groups to procure additional resources to facilitate a wider array of 
operations.  Vehicle dealers in the Quetta region say that the Taliban has purchased over 
900 motorcycles enabling a greater range of operating capability with unprecedented 
speed and flexibility (Rashid, 2003, p. 1).  In addition, the religious façade portrayed by 
Afghan insurgent groups has broadened their appeal with Islamic fundamentalists 
throughout the world, enabling the insurgents to draw funding and resources from a 
variety of exogenous sources. The porous border has facilitated the unimpeded operations 
of insurgent movements allowing them to conduct cross-border raids and recruitment 
with impunity. Zahir, a Pashtun tribesman and self-proclaimed Taliban recruiter living in 
Qila Abdullah, relates, “It’s no problem at all to cross back and forth.” A former 
Baluchistan provincial cabinet minister substantiates Zahir’s claim stating, “It is fair to 
say that at present no immigration control exists between the two countries. Since 
forever, Afghans have been crossing the border into Pakistan without passport or visa.” 
(Lancaster, 2003, p. 1). However, there is increasing indication that the Taliban have 
developed sufficient support within Afghanistan to limit their reliance on cross-border 
activity. General Nazar Mohammed Nikzad, head of crime investigation at the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior stated, “We have Afghan mullahs who are accepting the financial 
support of the Pakistanis and assisting them in undermining the Karzai government” 
(Kazem, 2003, p. 7).  A Taliban political worker in Baluchistan, Pakistan stated “[the 
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Taliban] used to hide in the borderlands, but now they have established good contacts 
with the tribal chiefs and warlords in Afghanistan, so they provide them with shelter 
now.” (Lancaster, 2003, p. 1). Khalid Pushtun of President Hamid Karzai's Kandahar 
office stated, “The Taliban were always in Afghanistan. They stayed in their houses, in 
their villages. They were just waiting for some kind of green light to start fighting the 
American and Afghan authorities.” (Ozernoy, 2003, p. 16).  Reports of a parallel Taliban 
administration and infrastructure within the province of Zabul substantiate these claims 
(Maykuth, 2003, p. 1).  Despite recent coalition success in dissolving the overt political 
structures and support of the insurgents in Zabul, the existence of these institutions is 
indicative of the continuing resurgence and success of the Taliban movement and their 
ability to garner support from the Afghan population. 
David Galula (1964) contends, “The insurgent cannot seriously embark on an 
insurgency unless he has a well-grounded cause with which to attract supporters among 
the population.” (p. 13).  In an article by the London Times a veteran Taliban fighter 
stated, “Our main purpose is to destabilize the US-backed regime and evict the foreign 
forces from Afghanistan.” (Hussain, 26 October 2003). Leites and Wolf (1970) state, “To 
obtain inputs from the local environment, R [the insurgents] relies on various persuasive 
as well as coercive (damage-threatening or damage-inflicting) techniques.” (p. 33). The 
Taliban have employed both inducements and coercion to obtain recruits for its cause. 
Their members frequent social gatherings such as weddings and services at mosques and 
madrassas citing the poor economic conditions, rampant crime, Islamic moral 
degradation, and the inability of the government to pay its civil servants to attract 
followers to its campaign. Galula (1964) postulates, “The insurgent, having no 
responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie cheat, exaggerate. He is 
not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does.” (p. 14). In 
the village of Girishk, two hours from Kandahar, Shir Ali, a member of the Taliban 
stated, “Everywhere there is insecurity and there is no reconstruction that's why people 
support us. The Taliban recruit by reminding people of the time when there was no 
murder, there were no attacks, and there was a real presence of Islam.” (Ozernoy, 2003, 
pp. 16-17).  Villagers, facing widespread poverty and a government unable to pay those 
in its employ, are offered up to $100 a month to join the Taliban against coalition forces 
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and the Karzai regime (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). A former provincial cabinet minister, 
speaking on the condition of anonymity stated, “They [the Taliban] are offering money 
and motorcycles to anyone who will go with them for 15 days up to three months.” (Ibid, 
p. 1). The Taliban have capitalized on local resistance to the government’s poppy 
eradication program by telling farmers that the government plans to destroy their harvest 
and their livelihood, thereby returning them to a life of poverty (Wolfe interview, 25 May 
2003).  In addition, Maj. General F.L. Hagenbeck, Commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain 
Division stated, “The Taliban and al-Qa'eda are offering monetary incentives to kill or 
capture a United States soldier in order to undermine the Afghan government. Militants 
are being offered between $5000 to $100,000 depending on the target.” (Rashid, 21 July 
2003).  The Taliban have exploited the cultural insensitivity and inadvertent killing of 
Afghan villagers by coalition forces to generate hostility among the population towards 
the coalition. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have adapted their strategy for 
recruitment and softened their approach to appeal to a wider array of prospective 
supporters. Zahir relates that the Taliban have offered several options to potential recruits 
stating, “There are different jobs. You can fight at the front line. You can cook. You can 
be a male nurse. You can give money. Everything is welcome because jihad has started.” 
(Lancaster, 2003, p. 1).  
In addition to material incentives, the Taliban have relied on religious motivators 
to induce or coerce followers to support their cause. Mawlawee Sahib Khalik Daad, head 
mullah of the Central Madrassa of Shah Joi District in Zabul Province, captured the 
Taliban sentiment in what he refers to as the “evils of the Western world in Afghanistan” 
stating, “Women in Ghazni city and Kabul are working in offices and walking around 
without proper cover; this is not how an Islamic country should be.” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). 
The Taliban have capitalized on deviations from traditional Muslim values to cast 
coalition forces as an invaders of Western corruption, in an effort to sway traditional 
Muslim sentiment. Additionally, insurgent groups have used the formal declaration of 
jihad to compel others to support their operations.  In an interview by the Washington 
Times, an Afghan villagers stated, “The Taliban come to our dwellings, beat us and tell us 
that the jihad against Americans is a religious obligation and we should join them in their 
fight and must not spy on Taliban fighters.” (de Borchgrave, 2003, p.15).  
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Insurgent groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda have exploited the socio-
religious organization generated by the unifying call to prayer and Friday service of Islam 
to serve as a vehicle for mobilization and unification of the various and frequently 
opposing social and ethnic groups under the call of jihad.  The insurgency has used the 
pre-existing social organization within local mosques to create an environment in which 
their message can be framed as a religious mandate and delivered by a civil-religious 
authority (the mullah) to a captive audience unopposed. Mosques and madrassas serve as 
a central points for the dissemination of information in a community comprised of a 
largely illiterate population with limited ties to the outside world. In addition, the use of 
religious and civic leadership (mullahs) provides the message and the movement with 
legitimacy through an institution that crosscuts both ethnic and social divides.  Michael 
Taylor in Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action explains the ability of the 
insurgency to capitalize on pre-existing social structures in a parallel example.  He states, 
“The peasants’ collective action was made possible in the first place by the pre-existing 
framework of village communities, which provided a foundation of long experience of 
reciprocity and acting together in the collective control of their agricultural and pastoral 
activities and of their common property and public facilities… This unity was further 
enhanced by a measure of communal self-government, exercised through the assembly of 
the community’s heads of households, which met in the church (parish and community 
usually coinciding) and was assisted by the local priest (Taylor, 1988, pp. 70-71).   
While Taylor refers to this unifying effect in terms of a western society it is 
perhaps more relevant to an Islamic community in which the call to prayer is more 
frequent, the tribal elders comprise the local authority or shura, and the status of the 
religious authority more elevated due to the dominance of Islam in all aspects of a 
Muslim’s life. To prevent the de-legitimization of their movement and message, the 
insurgents have employed terror tactics to quash any dissention from amongst the 
population and the religious leadership.  The Taliban have bombed several mosques and 
assassinated three Islamic clerics in the vicinity of Kandahar for statements 
delegitimizing the religious foundations of the Taliban jihad and for their advocacy of the 
Karzai government.  Maulavi Muhammad Haq Khattib, deputy head of the Kandahar 
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Cleric’s Council stated, “According to the villagers and local elders, they had no enemies. 
It was because of their support for the government.” (Gall, 2003, p. 3).  
The ability of the insurgent movements to utilize Islam to further their cause has 
facilitated exogenous as well as endogenous support in the form of manning, materiel, 
and financial resources throughout the global Muslim community. While the Taliban’s 
fight against perceived Western domination has remained largely confined to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, the insurgent movements have exploited the global ties of Islam to extend 
the fight beyond conventional conceptions of conflict to prey upon the indulgent 
weaknesses of Western society through the production and trafficking of opium.  
Insurgent groups have capitalized on the current boom in opium production and 
trafficking to fund their endeavors.  They have given the drug trade religious legitimacy 
as an extension of the jihad against the West.  Abdul Ghaus Rasoolzai, head of Eastern 
Afghanistan’s anti-narcotics department stated, “Al Qaeda is using drugs as a weapon 
against America and other Western countries.” (Tohid, 2003, p. 6). The insurgent 
movements’ connections to the drug trade have tied them into the economic interest of 
the local Afghan farmer as well as provided additional ties to global criminal and terrorist 
organizations facilitating a global network of support for a regional conflict that truly can 
be called the frontline in the war on terror. 
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The escalation of insurgent activity has shown that current techniques for 
obtaining resources have been highly effective in generating support for the resurgence 
and continued operations of all three movements.  While the continued escalation of 
insurgent activity is highly indicative of this success, the increasing influx of additional 
recruits to both Pakistani and Afghan madrassas further substantiates theories predicting 
the continued growth of these movements. “The chief of Shah Joi, Haji Zabeet, says he 
knows of at least 25 Taliban madrassahs and mosques operating in his district.” (Kazem, 
2003, p. 7). Hafiz Hameedullah, head of a madrassa in Chaman, Pakistan stated, “there is 
a constant stream of them [recruits]. It is hard to find accommodation for the 
newcomers.” (Cooper, Hussain, Jaffe, 6 October 2003). The report by Cooper et al. 
estimates more than 8,000 new students have enrolled in madrassas in the border areas 
alone (Ibid). Despite the existence of mosques and madrassas known to be part of the 
Taliban infrastructure, local leaders are unable to curtail their operations due to the 
perceived religious legitimacy of these institutions. Haji Zabeet, stated, “It would be 
sacrilegious to remove a mullah or shut down any mosque, even if it is a Taliban mosque. 
The public would rise against me.” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Continued coverage of insurgent 
operations by the global media continues to reinforce the draw of these movements to 
both hard-line Muslim extremists as well as idealistic young Muslims throughout the 
world. Madrassas throughout the Middle East have served as the focal points for the 
insurgent movements, providing fertile ground for recruiting, ideological training, 
indoctrination, and military instruction, thereby serving not only as a source of inputs, but 
as a conversion mechanism as well.  
 
2. Conversion Mechanisms 
Madrassas serve as the most significant mechanism for the conversion of 
resources into operations in the Afghanistan conflict due to their pre-existing 
organization and religious legitimacy.  The relative security produced by their location 
and alleged ties to regional governmental support within Pakistan have allowed their 
unimpeded operations producing an increase in insurgent activity. Madrassas serve as 
focal points within the insurgent movement providing recruits, materiel, and financing as 
well as ideological indoctrination and military training. In addition, political and religious 
support in cross-border areas such as Quetta, Pakistan have enabled increased 
coordination and planning for future operations among members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, 
and HIG facilitating greater cooperation and expanded operational capability. Ahmed 
Rashid, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia correspondent for the London Daily 
Telegraph and author of the book Taliban wrote, “According to President Karzai, the 
headquarters for Taliban planning is the Shaldara madrassa in Quetta run by Maulana 
Nur Mohammed, who is a JUI [Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam religious party] member of 
parliament.” (Rashid, 2003, p. 1).  Insurgent movements continue to flourish within the 
protected cross-border tribal regions, thriving on the protection fostered by the political 
and religious support of hardline Muslims within the political institutions of Pakistan. 
Maulana Abdul Qadir, the deputy to Nur Mohammed, said, “We are proud that the 
Taliban are made and helped here. Our job is to make sure that the whole Pakistani nation 
supports the Taliban.” (Ibid, p. 1).  Maulana Hafiz Hussain Sharodi, Baluchistan's 
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information minister, stated, “Only the Taliban can constitute the real government in 
Afghanistan,” confirming reports of support for the ousted Taliban regime within the 
political institutions of Pakistan (Ibid, p. 1).   
The movements have expanded their operations from the tribal borderlands of 
Pakistan into Afghanistan and have established formal administrative and logistical 
infrastructure to facilitate their continued growth and operations. Gen. Nazar Mohammed 
Nikzad, head of crime investigation at the Afghan Ministry of Interior stated, “We have 
Afghan mullahs who are accepting the financial support of the Pakistanis and assisting 
them in undermining the Karzai government.” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Insurgent groups 
have established administrative and logistical infrastructure within Afghanistan, filling 
the void left by the fall of the Taliban regime or supplanting the ineffective, hastily 
implemented institutions of the Karzai regime to facilitate their operations. FM 90-8 lists 
one of the activities characteristic of Phase II guerrilla warfare as the establishment of an 
insurgent government in insurgent dominated areas.  Zabul Police Chief Mohammed 
Ayub stated, “The Taliban ruled like a government in Dai Chupan.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 
1). In the article containing comments by Mohammed Ayub, Andrew Maykuth, staff 
writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer, wrote, “In villages such as Dai Chupan, in northern 
Zabul, the Taliban built bakeries to feed their forces and held town hall meetings to 
denounce Karzai and his administration” (Ibid, p. 1). Additionally, information received 
from military members within Afghanistan indicate that the Taliban have used mobile 
training teams composed of international terrorists to provide training for its new recruits 
throughout the country (Deh Rawod Interview, 26 May 2003). As the Taliban and other 
insurgent organization continue to gather support and organize their forces in relative 
security, their operations have expanded and evolved from hit-and-run terrorist tactics 




Field Manual 90-8 lists six goals that insurgents seek to achieve through their 
actions: (1.) Support the overall goal of the insurgent movement, (2.) Gain support for the 
insurgent movement, (3.) Increase the population’s vulnerability, (4.) Lessen government 
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control, (5.) Provide psychological victories, and (6.) Tie up government resources. (FM 
90-8, 1986, p. 2-1). To accomplish these goals FM 90-8 states, “These tactics in the early 
phases can be divided into terrorism and harassment.” (Ibid, p. 2-5). The insurgents in 
Afghanistan have maintained an operational flexibility in their pursuit of these aims.  
They have exploited the absence of government control to influence a vulnerable 
population, utilizing poor social and economic conditions and religious propaganda to 
further attrit government legitimacy and control thereby advancing their cause. They have 
adapted their tactics to counter a strategically stagnant opposition that continues to fail to 
perceive the insurgent’s intent, thereby surrendering the initiative. The insurgents in 
Afghanistan have tailored their strategy to counter the overwhelming strength of coalition 
forces.  Their actions have shifted from the hit-and-run tactics characteristic of Phase I 
insurgency to the organized mass assaults and raids on numerically inferior government 
forces characteristic of Phase II guerrilla warfare as defined by FM 90-8.   
Insurgent operations in early January of 2002 consisted of terrorism and 
harassment tactics such as the highly inaccurate time-launched rocket attacks, improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), mines, and small ambushes of coalition troops (refer to Figure 
1). While many of the standoff attacks were highly ineffective and served merely as 
harassment, the attacks served to heighten U.S. security posture and increase force 
protection measures, limiting contact between coalition forces and local Afghans, thereby 
inhibiting coalition efforts to gather essential intelligence. Additionally, intelligence 
sources within Afghanistan suggest that insurgents had exploited the poverty of local 
Afghans by paying them to set up many of these remote detonated attacks. Lieutenant 
Colonel Douglas Lefforge of CJTF-180 in Bagram, Afghanistan stated, “Afghan 
civilians...have told coalition forces that they have been 'approached' by Taliban to launch 
rockets at coalition targets in exchange for money.” (Agence France Presse, 6 August 
2003).  
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Throughout 2002 and into 2003, insurgent attacks continued to evolve, increasing 
in frequency while expanding and becoming more organized in their execution.  
Insurgent actions have developed into complex operations aimed at achieving the 
maximum psychological impact on the population and the international community 
through the integration of terrorism, information operations, and coercion. Their actions 
have consisted of the assassination of local and provincial politicians, religious 
leadership, and aid organization workers as well as massed, cross-border raids on 
government facilities and forces.  They have exploited their success through an 
information operations campaign designed to intimidate local Afghans and demonstrate 
the inability of the Karzai regime to guarantee security or fulfill many of its pre-election 
promises for improvement. On 1 September 2003, insurgents killed six workers that were 
part of a crew rebuilding the road from Kabul to Kandahar to prevent its completion 
(Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). Captain Tim Wolfe, Intelligence officer for 2nd Battalion, 3rd 
Special Forces Group operating out of Kandahar Air Base stated, “The Taliban are 
targeting U.N. workers, NGOs, and friendly Afghans to show that nothing has changed to 
better their lives.” (Wolfe interview, 25 May 2003).  
On 10 September 2003, insurgents killed four Danish aid workers on the road 
from Kandahar to Kabul raising the total number of aid workers killed during 2003 to 
seven, forcing many aid agencies to withdraw their support from regions in need of 
assistance. In response to the latest attacks Sten Andreasen, program coordinator for the 
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, (DACAAR) stated, “Because this fits 
into a pattern that we have seen lately, unfortunately, we now will have to reconsider the 
security situation. As an immediate consequence we must stop working in the eastern part 
of the country.” (Khan, 26 October 2003).  Taliban efforts have created a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in which information operations used to proclaim the lack of progress under the 
Karzai regime are reinforced by action to ensure the projects remain incomplete.  In 
addition, Wolfe relates that the insurgents have engaged in an intimidation campaign 
designed to deter Afghans from accepting help from aid agencies and coalition forces by 
seizing supplies, destroying projects such as schools, threatening those who benefited, 
and warning others not to cooperate (Wolfe interview, 26 May 2003). Insurgent groups 
have posted “wanted” posters of coalition forces, utilized night letters to convey threats 
and warnings, and utilized murder to coerce Afghans to comply with their dictates and 
cease support of coalition forces.  
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In addition to overt physical violence, insurgents have exploited the dependence 
of coalition forces on local Afghans to gain intelligence on coalition, NGO, and 
government operations.  Members of 3rd Special Forces Group, operating out of a 
firebase near Deh Rawod, suggest that criminals and insurgents have used workers and 
interpreters employed by the coalition and NGO’s to gather intelligence.  The lack of 
language capability and local knowledge on the part of coalition forces represents a major 
impediment to both legitimacy and security and creates a c vulnerability that has been 
exploited by the insurgents allowing them to retain the initiative. 
The continued evolution of insurgent tactics fostered by the inability of the 
government to exercise control over the countryside has enabled the insurgents to 
establish a latent foothold within Afghanistan and directly attrit the legitimacy of the 
Karzai regime unopposed. U.S. forces, in their relentless pursuit of victory through 
attrition, have ignored the lessons of Vietnam, allowing the insurgents unimpeded access 
to the true source of victory –the control of the population. The conflict in Afghanistan 
will continue its slow progress toward an insurgent victory until such a time that the 
underlying problems plaguing Afghanistan are mitigated or resolved. 
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Afghanistan faces many problems that impede its stabilization and unification.  
The government and population remain split along ethnic and tribal lines, unable to 
perceive the benefits of integration. Warlord infighting has divided the government and 
detracted from its legitimacy and control of the population allowing opium production 
and trafficking to flourish throughout the countryside.  Widespread poverty and the 
mismanagement of aid programs have pushed rural Afghans back to the short-term 
solution of poppy production facilitating the resurgence of criminal warlords and 
insurgents.  Insurgents have capitalized on the lack of government control and worsening 
political and economic conditions as motivation to unite diverse members of the 
population under a religious mandate. While many of these factors existed during the rule 
of the Taliban and did not produce insurgency, the current insurgent movements have 
capitalized on these issues, and through a campaign of propaganda have attributed their 
causation to the presence of coalition forces and the Karzai regime. Current coalition 
efforts to eliminate the insurgent influence through a strategy of attrition have proved 
ineffective, and through the careless application of force, have resulted in the alienation 
of the populace, furthering the insurgent’s cause. History has shown that the true end 
state of war is to attain control of the population, yet it appears that the U.S. military has 
chosen to ignore this lesson once again.  Afghanistan will continue as a country divided, 
until such a time that the proper focus is given to the resolution of the underlying factors, 

















































CHAPTER IV  
Some have said that the strategy of attrition was not a strategy at all but 
actually reflected the absence of one.  The sheer weight of American 
materiel and resources seemed sufficient to the military leadership to wear 
down the North Vietnamese and their VC allies; thus, strategy was not 
necessary.  All that was needed was the sufficient application of 
firepower.  It had worked against the Japanese and the Germans in World 
War II and against the Chinese in Korea. It would be tried again in 
Vietnam.  (Krepinevich, 1986, p.165).   
Andrew Krepinevich’s statement taken from The Army and Vietnam that once 
held true in Vietnam seems more relevant today when applied to the situation in 
Afghanistan.  The coalition has relied on its overwhelming mass and superiority of 
firepower and technology to supplant a comprehensive and unified strategy for 
Afghanistan. In addition, differing perceptions on the nature and status of the conflict 
have resulted in an overall disjointed effort among government and military organizations 
producing redundancy and neglect of the fundamental aspects of counterinsurgency. 
While efforts at a unified approach to reconstruction began in mid 2003 with the 
introduction of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), this effort has yet to be 
applied as part of a systematic approach that expands upon its success, condemning it to 
irrelevance despite its isolated benefit.  The military effort in Afghanistan remains 
disjointed and unfocused, dominated by a partial strategy that addresses a single aspect of 
the spectrum of counterinsurgency, resulting in a slow defeat from within as the 
insurgents expand their hold over an increasingly frustrated population. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. strategy in Afghanistan through a 
counterinsurgency framework using the systemic approach developed by Nathan Leites 
and Charles Wolf.  I will accomplish this task by categorizing U.S. and coalition actions 
into the four aspects of counterinsurgency described in the systemic approach: Input 
Denial, Counter-Conversion, Counterforce, and Strengthening the State. Additionally, I 
will compare stated coalition objectives to the actions and responses observed in the 
country by military members, civilians, political officials, and the press. I will reinforce 
this analysis with counterinsurgency theory and U.S. doctrine to identify inconsistencies 
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leading to failure. I will utilize these findings to establish the context for conclusions and 
recommendations, which will be presented in Chapter V.  
 
A. ANALYSIS 
On 20 March 2002, George Tenet, director of the CIA, warned the Armed 
Services Committee of the impending shift in strategy by Taliban and al Qaeda forces 
operating within Afghanistan: “You’re entering into another phase here that actually is 
more difficult, because you’re probably looking at smaller units who intend to operate 
against you in a classic insurgency format.” (Evans, 30 October 2003). However, less 
than three weeks earlier, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced, “[We] have 
concluded we're at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a 
period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country 
today is permissive, it's secure.”(Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan, 1 May 
2003).  Differing perceptions on the nature of the threat as well as the phase of conflict 
have come to characterize the thinking among senior leaders in the U.S. government.  
These differing perceptions have created disjointed policies that cascade downward into 
conflicting and overlapping efforts stemming from the overall lack of a single unified and 
comprehensive plan for Afghanistan. As a result, government agencies have pursued 
individual agendas independent of the operations of other forces operating in the same 
theater.  The absence of a comprehensive plan is no more evident than in military 
operations in which the sole pursuit has been the counterforce aspect of 
counterinsurgency dominated by the strategy of attrition.  
This singular focus on the attrition of enemy forces has inhibited the successful 
conduct of operations in Afghanistan in three ways.  First, the successful use of force has 
been constrained by the lack of intelligence.  Force is utilized as a reflexive action rather 
than a proactive measure or as a deterrence allowing the insurgents to retain the initiative. 
Sun Tzu highlights the danger in the reliance on a reflexive strategy in response to an 
enemy that cannot be located except by their choosing stating, “If I am able to determine 
the enemy’s disposition, while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate 
and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to 
attack a fraction of his.” (As cited in Taber, 2002, p. 155). The Taliban have capitalized 
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on this lesson by targeting smaller government outposts and forces as well as undefended 
aid workers to achieve maximum psychological impact on the population and the 
international community. Secondly, this singular, reflexive pursuit of the insurgents 
reinforced by its relatively minor successes has dominated the focus of coalition 
commanders, preventing the systematic application of forces and effort and making 
commanders oblivious to other aspects of counterinsurgency.  Leites and Wolf (1970) 
contend, “A capability to prevent R [the insurgents]—that is a deterrence capability—
requires a highly developed intelligence system, enlarged and improved paramilitary and 
police forces, and expanded engineering and medical units for civic action in remote 
areas, rather than conventionally armed and trained military units with heavy firepower 
and armor.” (p. 74). The lack of focus on the security of the population produced by this 
pursuit has allowed the insurgents to retain their hold over the population, detracting from 
the coalition’s ability to move and operate freely among the population as well as gather 
the intelligence essential to the overall success of operations.  Finally, the focus on 
attrition, the lack of security, and the overriding force protection concerns have severed 
the link between coalition forces and the indigenous population, eliminating the most 
valuable source of operational intelligence (the population) and inhibiting the ability of 
the coalition to locate and destroy the insurgents.  David Galula (1964) states, 
“Intelligence is the principle source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence comes 
from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not 
feel safe until the insurgent’s power has been broken.” (p. 72).  
The continued efforts of coalition forces to procure information on the insurgents 
from an unwilling or incapable population has resulted in a growing resentment and 
alienation stemming from the cultural insensitivity, mistakes, and the duplication of effort 
of coalition forces. In a letter of protest to the United Nations’ mission in Afghanistan, 
the villagers of Lejay wrote, “The Americans searched our province. They did not find 
Mullah Omar, they did not find Osama bin Laden, and they did not find any Taliban. 
They arrested old men, drivers, and shopkeepers, and they injured women and children.” 
(Gall, 2003, p. A1). The building resentment of the Afghan populace, reinforced by 
mounting civilian casualties and cultural insensibility has shifted the Afghan popular 
perception of the coalition from that of a liberator to one of an invader.  
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The lack of unity of effort among government agencies further compounds this 
problem. Competing actions among government and military organizations in the 
strategy of attrition have fostered a lack of cooperation among agencies operating within 
Afghanistan resulting in a lack of intelligence sharing and conflicting actions further 
diminishing the capability of the coalition to achieve its ends. The duplication of effort 
has resulted in additional burden placed on the population of Afghanistan as wave after 
wave of coalition forces from different units and organizations invade their villages and 
towns in pursuit of the same objectives. Finally, reconstruction actions remain 
independent of military operations creating a fundamental disconnect between aid and 
security that allows insurgents to capitalize on relief efforts that occur in areas the 
insurgents control. Additionally, relief and reconstruction operations are conducted in a 
distributed manner without regard for capitalizing on previous success, producing 
limited, isolated effects. Coalition operations in Afghanistan are characterized by the lack 
of a unified effort, a disproportionate focus on the counterforce aspect of 
counterinsurgency, and neglect of local security and control.  These defining 
characteristics have stymied coalition efforts in what can only be referred to as an 
operational quagmire that will eventually lead to the collapse of the Afghan government 
through the relentless attrition of stability, control, and legitimacy by insurgent forces. 
 
1. Input Denial 
In a memo dated 16 October 2003 to senior members of the Department of 
Defense, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote:  
Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war 
on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more 
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are 
recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion 
a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is 
putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a 
great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is 
against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions. How 
do we stop those who are financing the radical madrassa schools? 
(Rumsfeld, 16 October 2003 ). 
118 
While the United States Government has done much to curtail the financing, 
recruitment, and support of insurgents and terrorists in Islamic nations, the questions 
posed by the Secretary of Defense are indicative of the absence of policy regarding the 
input denial and counter-conversion aspects of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Despite 
the lack of an overarching policy and an associated military strategy, the compilation of 
those individual programs that have the effect of denying the insurgent access to recruits 
and resources will be analyzed as aspects of input denial.  The intent of this analysis is 
not to construe these tactics as part of an overall strategy, but rather to evaluate their 
effectiveness in the context of Afghanistan.  
Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “Reducing R’s [the insurgent’s] access to inputs 
requires the interdiction of external sources by border surveillance, barriers, or coercive 
measures applied directly against the external source of supply, and the interdiction of 
internal sources by control of domestic resources and population. (p. 78).  Insurgent 
movements in Afghanistan rely upon both endogenous as well as exogenous sources of 
support, creating a difficult impediment to counterinsurgency efforts which must retain 
focus both on within as well as outside the country. While known sources of support 
remain active within the borders of Pakistan, political constraints have eliminated the 
direct targeting of these exogenous mechanisms by coalition forces allowing the 
insurgents to continue gathering recruits and supplies as well as maintaining a sanctuary 
for the conversion of resources and organization of efforts.  
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Pakistani operations aimed at eliminating support within the tribal areas of 
Pakistan have done little to curb the flow of resources into Afghanistan and have 
produced further resentment of the West within the tribal leadership. Haji Malik Mirza 
Alam Khan, the chief of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe located in the cross border tribal 
region of Pakistan claimed in response to Pakistani commando raids into tribal lands in 
October of 2003, “It is a conspiracy against the tribesmen by the US, because it wants to 
control the tribal areas as it does Afghanistan.” (Tohid, 20 October 2003). In addition, 
operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to locate al Qaeda High Value 
Tartgets (HVTs) in Pakistan have contributed to the growing anti-Western sentiment in 
the region.  An unnamed Western diplomat stated in a report by Time magazine, “You get 
these hotshot CIA guys who come in on a six-month rotation, and they want to tear up 
everything—mosques, villages—to get bin Laden. Well, the Pakistani army has to live 
with the fallout. “ (Calbresi and McGuirk, 2003, p. 34). The resentment among the 
Waziri tribes generated by the numerous incursions into their tribal areas has the potential 
for producing further polarization resulting in an increase in the support of cross border 
Afghan insurgent operations.   
a. Border Security 
Coalition efforts to curtail cross border activity are impeded by 
increasingly restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) prohibiting coalition forces from 
pursuing or engaging insurgents once they have crossed the border.  Additionally, reports 
of U.S. forces receiving fire from Pakistani border guards in support of fleeing insurgents 
as well as the capture of three Pakistani Army officers on a Taliban cross border raid 
have led coalition officials to question the loyalty of many of Pakistan’s lower echelon 
forces (Calbresi and McGuirk, 2003, p. 34). Coalition efforts on the Afghan side of the 
border have proven equally ineffective in stemming the flow of insurgent forces and 
supplies.  While several firebases have been established at high volume crossing points to 
support extensive patrolling of the border, the rugged terrain along 2,430 kilometers of 
porous mountain border conceal an immeasurable number of traditional tribal access 
points into Afghanistan allowing insurgent forces to continue their operations unseen and 
unimpeded (Afghanistan: A Country Study, 2001, p. 208). Despite the coalition’s 
possession of surveillance aircraft, the pursuit of HVT’s has dominated the majority of 
aircraft and the entire inventory of manned and unmanned aerial surveillance assets 
further impeding the interdiction capability of coalition forces. Exogenous support 
represents a significant portion of the insurgents’ capability to sustain and increase their 
operations; however, the insurgent movements have developed an extensive 
infrastructure within Afghanistan to facilitate an endogenous source for continued 
operations. 
b. Counternarcotics Operations 
Opium production provides insurgent forces with an endogenous resource 
used to obtain exogenous funding through the international drug trade. The U.S. 
Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau 
(INL) in a joint endeavor with the U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP) has taken the 
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lead on counter-narcotics within Afghanistan.  Ranjeet Singh, INL program officer for 
narcotics within Afghanistan related that the Department of State has spent an estimated 
$60 million in 2003 on counter narcotics efforts within the country (Singh interview, 3 
November 2003). This money has been divided among programs for police training, 
interdiction, and developmental assistance. The program seeks to offer alternatives for 
the cultivation of poppies through developmental assistance, and to enforce the mandates 
of the central government through the development of a police and drug interdiction 
force.  Developmental assistance programs consist of crop substitution, irrigation 
projects, vocational training, and schooling.  The crop substitution program has provided 
flexible alternatives to poppy cultivation by offering local communities projects and 
programs that address local and immediate needs (Ibid).  Program coordinators have 
focused on substituting agriforestry to replace poppy crops for the difficulty in removing 
this type of agriculture to replant poppies.  However, this requires an enormous up-front 
investment in the preparation of harvest-ready agriforestry in numerous locations to 
minimize transitional difficulties.  
Irrigation projects to facilitate the transition to a more water intensive crop 
and road improvement programs to aid in the delivery of the harvest to local markets 
have supplemented the substitution program to address the economic and environmental 
resource disparities between poppies and traditional agricultural foodstuffs. Vocational 
training and cash for work programs have focused on providing skills and equipment 
suited to the development of an agricultural infrastructure.  Cotton gins, canning 
factories, and wheat mills serve to reinforce the reliance on traditional agriculture as well 
as providing employment and job skills training for local inhabitants.  Singh relates that 
schooling has eliminated child labor as cheap resource for harvesting the poppy crop. 
Despite these efforts, little is done to follow up on these programs to ensure compliance.  
The INL has relied on NGO reporting and local law enforcement to ensure established 
programs continue as originally intended and to prevent the replanting of poppies. 
However, recent insurgent activity has eliminated much of the NGO presence throughout 
the country and the Karzai administration remains unable to adequately pay its civil 
servants, leaving many susceptible to bribery by drug traffickers and insurgents.  While 
this program is not flawless, it represents a valid effort at curbing opium production by 
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mitigating its underlying incentives.  However, until adequate local security and control 
are established, the program will remain unable to counter the influence of local 
powerbrokers in their attempts to sustain opium production and trafficking for their 
monetary gain.  
c. Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) 
On 22 October 2003, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
launched its New Beginnings program in the province of Konduz as part of an effort to 
implement Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). The program seeks 
to address the underlying causes behind local instability by removing weapons and 
providing vocational training as alternative to continued service in local militias, thereby 
undermining warlord’s and local powerbroker’s continued usurpation of governmental 
authority. The program exchanges weapons for an identification card, which entitles its 
bearer to “$200, a change of civilian clothes, a box of food, and vocational training and 
employment counseling in such fields as land mine clearance, road construction and 
factory work” (Constable, 2003, p. 1).  While the program’s implementation represents a 
step in the right direction, it is confronted with many obstacles impeding its success. 
Hastily verified identities and incomplete background checks have allowed many 
criminals and past human rights violators to infiltrate the program.  The absence of 
accurate identification has allowed many exploit the program by exchanging multiple 
weapons. Further, the program coordinators were faced with obsolete or unusable 
weapons and last minute haggling over money or jobs offered (Constable, 2003, p. 1).  
Sergei Illarionov, the chief U.N. political adviser for the program in Konduz stated, 
“Everyone knows this is a pilot project, and everyone is testing it. Our main concern is 
that people with bad backgrounds, criminals and human rights abusers, don't get 
included. But there have been so many delays; everything is happening at the last minute. 
We don't really have time to verify, but we can't delay the launching any further.” 
(Constable, 2003, p. 1). 
In addition to the local problems encountered during implementation, 
program coordinators are concerned with the potential for its implementation throughout 
the country. Afghans living in provinces with security conditions worse than Konduz will 
have little incentive to turn in the weapons that remain their only form of self defense in 
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the absence of government forces or police. Stability and security must be attained in the 
areas targeted by this program prior to its implementation to eliminate the need for self-
defense and fill the power vacuum created by the demobilization of local militias.  
Additionally, paying jobs must be immediately available to provide an alternative income 
and prevent the return of the Afghan men to their former employment.  Sidiq Chakari, a 
senior aide in Jamiat-i-Islami, the dominant political party in the Northern Alliance 
warned, “Before we even think about disarming, the government needs to find jobs for 
people. If you make all those freedom fighters disarm by force, they may escape to the 
mountains and join the [Taliban] opposition to take revenge. Premature disarmament 
could be very dangerous.” (Constable, 2003, p. 19).  A report by the United Nations 
Development Program in September 2003 stated,  
The main obstacles to DDR stem from the weak commitment of local 
commanders to the new central government, animosity among armed 
groups, and a lack of public confidence in the availability of productive 
and sustainable alternatives to soldiering. Many in the Afghan population 
view the Ministry of Defense as representing one political faction, and the 
Ministry currently lacks a civilian mechanism for administration and 
budget management. Armed groups are unlikely to hand in their weapons 
until the Ministry demonstrates greater political and ethnic representation 
of Afghan society. The need to address the fundamental problems 
associated with the operation of warlords-rather than disarming only their 
lower-level troops-presents a complicated political challenge for the 
Government. A related risk is the potential for DDR to leave a security 
vacuum. At present, neither the Afghan National Army nor the National 
Police have the capacity to fulfill security needs in the provinces. 
(Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, 5 November 2003). 
On 13 October 2003, the United Nations voted unanimously to expand the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the confines of Kabul to “pave the 
way for the increased security in Afghanistan upon which nearly everything else is 
dependent.” (Associated Press, 2003, p. A17). While this move will not resolve the 
majority of security issues confronting the country, it has the potential for creating the 
necessary stability required to implement the DDR program in the areas where ISAF 
assumes control.  The program represents an excellent single tactic to develop stability; 
however, in order to facilitate the success of this concept, it is necessary to integrate this 
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program with initiatives designed to establish and sustain local security, economic 
development and growth, and governmental control under an integrated and 
comprehensive plan.  
The inability of coalition forces to curtail cross border insurgent 
operations or impact infrastructure within Pakistan has allowed the remnants of the 
Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup and gather further support in the refuge provided by the 
Pakistani tribal lands.  The ability of the insurgents to operate with impunity has 
facilitated the expansion of their actions and the establishment of infrastructure within 
Afghanistan, increasing both the range and scale of insurgent capability. Additionally, the 
inability of coalition and international forces to provide adequate incentives or sufficient 
risk to curtail the opium trade has detracted from the legitimacy and control of the central 
government by providing warlords and insurgents the necessary financing to sustain and 
expand their operations. While programs such as the United Nations’ New Beginnings 
directly target some of the underlying issues generating instability, they remain discrete 
tactics, unable to expand upon their progress due to the lack of an overall plan that would 
allocate the resources necessary to capitalize on this success. Until such a time that 
International aid and assistance efforts are integrated with coalition military operations, 
the effects of such programs will remain isolated and irrelevant to the overall stability of 
the country due to their limited impact. 
2. Conversion Mechanism Destruction 
Leites and Wolf (1970) define counter conversion as those processes “to reduce 
R’s [the insurgent’s] efficiency in converting acquired inputs into the outputs of the 
insurgent system.” (p.79).  Additionally they postulate, “To this end, A [the state] can use 
various measures to reduce the productivity of R’s resources, as well as to force R to 
divert resources from producing offensive operations to more defensive, protective 
activities.” (p. 79). The difficulty posed by the situation in Afghanistan lies in the fact 
that coalition forces are prohibited from conducting operations within the borders of 
Pakistan where the majority of insurgents are recruited and trained in madrassas which 
serve as the insurgent’s primary conversion mechanism. While some operations targeting 
these mechanisms may exist under the auspices of the CIA, these operations are beyond 
the security classification of this thesis. Additionally, due to the perceived religious 
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legitimacy of these institutions throughout the Middle East, both Pakistani and Afghan 
governments remain unwilling or unable to act upon this overt recruitment and support 
due to fears of generating popular perception of religious persecution thereby rallying 
further support to the insurgent cause.  
Efforts to reform madrassas by Pakistani President Musharraf that began in 
January of 2002 have shown some progress. Pakistani Education Minister Zubaida Jalal 
stated, the government already has registered and “mainstreamed” some 1,200 madrassas 
in less than two years, with a $100 million, three-year program on target to bring in 
another 8,000 schools (Sands, 2003, p. 18). The effort seeks to “ensure that students in 
the schools get a balanced curriculum including math, science and computer studies, that 
questionable funding sources are cut off, and that there is local oversight and regulation 
on a continuing basis.” (Sands, 2003, p. 18). The program represents an effective tool to 
combat the recruitment and conversion of insurgent resources into operations by 
eliminating one of the movements’ primary sources of indoctrination.  This program 
requires massive oversight and represents only a fraction of the 1.5 million students in 
15,000 to 20,000 madrassas across the country of which, only half are registered with the 
Islamic educational foundations (Sands, 2003, p. 18).     
a. Amnesty 
One of the most efficient methods for diverting the insurgent’s focus from 
operations is to attract defectors from within its ranks through programs such as amnesty, 
psychological operations, and rewards.  Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “Another way 
of impairing R’s efficiency, at once diverting resources and directly lowering 
productivity, is to attract defectors from R. If defectors can be attracted from (especially) 
the middle and higher levels in R’s organization, the effects in reducing morale, 
increasing internal conflicts, and increasing R’s anxiety and precautions against 
penetration of its system can be a major impairment to R’s production processes.” (p. 80).   
In October 2003, the Afghan government aided by coalition leadership 
initiated a strategy to induce the surrender and cooperation of “moderate Taliban.”   The 
central government has sought to induce defection through offers of participation in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the upcoming elections of 2004. Khalid Pushtun, a 
spokesman for Kandahar Governor Yusuf Pashtun stated, “We are in favor of negotiating 
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with moderate Taliban. We will try to encourage them to participate in the elections. 
They are citizens of Afghanistan, and we have similar rights that all Afghan people 
have.” (Watson, 2003, p. A3). The government’s strategy began with the release of 
former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakel to allow him to pursue talks 
with other Taliban officials with the intent of utilizing a former high-ranking member of 
the insurgents to induce the surrender and cooperation of middle and lower echelon 
forces (Watson, 2003, p. A3). Haroon Amin, the spokesman for the Afghan Embassy in 
Washington stated, “We want to make those who are neutral our friends and those who 
are our enemies neutral. If Afghanistan is not to be a breeding ground for terrorism again, 
we have to use the energies, the abilities, of anyone we can.” (Iqbal and Waterman, 6 
November 2003).  The government sought to separate Taliban moderates from extremists 
for the purpose of the reintegration of moderates back into Afghan society and to produce 
a rift within the Taliban organization. Foreign Ministry spokesman Omar Samad stated, 
“It is definitely not an attempt to talk to the Taliban as we have known them, as a militant 
terrorist group. There are no attempts to talk to people who have been involved in the 
past with terrorism, or alleged major violations in this country, and those who are still 
waging war.” (Watson, 2003, p. A3). 
In addition to addressing the Taliban, the majority of which are ethnic 
Pashtuns, Karzai has sought to lessen the rift that has developed between his 
administration and ethnic Pashtuns living in Central Afghanistan. Karzai has extended an 
invitation to the leader of the Pashtun separatist movement, the Awami National Party, 
Wallikhan Abdul Ghafar Khan to Kabul to curtail the ethnic Pashtun support of the 
Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Iqbal and Waterman, 6 November 2003).  While 
the effects of this effort will not be known during the writing of this thesis, this program 
has the potential to succeed by addressing the underlying grievance of ethnic Pashtuns 
and causing a rift within the Taliban organization between moderates and extremists. 
b. Rewards 
A rewards program, which was used effectively in Malaya to induce 
surrender and defection among the insurgents as well as provide incentive for the 
elimination of insurgents from among the population, has proved largely ineffective in 
Afghanistan. Indigenous Afghans have exploited the program to achieve their own ends 
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by providing false “intelligence” on their ethnic or tribal rivals in an attempt to procure 
the reward and utilize coalition assets to eliminate their enemies. Additionally, the 
insurgents exploit the program by spreading disinformation. The largest impediments to 
the successful implementation of this program lie in the lack of local security, the 
religious nature of the insurgent organization, and the family and tribal ties of the 
members of the organizations to the population that are reinforced by tribal codes such as 
Pushtunwali. The lack of local security prevents the population from revealing 
information out of fear of the repercussions from the insurgents who retain dominance 
after coalition forces leave the area. Additionally, the religious aspect of the insurgency 
coupled with the family ties of the insurgents to the populace reinforced by a cultural 
code demanding solidarity and mutual support mitigate the perceived benefit of the 
reward. 
c. Psychological and Information Operations 
David Galula (1964) observes, “The counterinsurgent is tied to his 
responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged 
on what he does, not on what he says.” (p. 14).  While what Galula states is true, it is 
imperative that the government informs the population of its successes to demonstrate to 
the population that “[it] has the will, the means, and the ability to win. (Galula, 1964, p. 
79).  According to Maj. Matt Karres of the U.S. Army 3rd Special Forces Group, there is 
no coherent information operations plan or counter-information operations plan enacted 
at the local level to relay the progress made by the central government or to counter the 
claims of the insurgents as to the corruption and lack of progress of the Karzai regime 
(Personal correspondence, 1 November 2003).  Due to the lack of information operations, 
insurgents convey their propaganda unopposed allowing them to dominate the beliefs of a 
population that is isolated from the rest of the world.  Maj. Mohammed Issaq, 
commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) unit in Qalat stated, “If we had a radio 
station in this province, we can tell people what the government is doing for them. As it 
is now, the Taliban can get the word out and tell people whatever it likes.” (Maykuth, 
2003, p. 1).  
The inability of coalition forces to directly attack the insurgent’s 
mechanisms for the conversion of resources into activity has severely impaired the 
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coalition’s ability the reduce insurgent operations.  However, the lack of a coherent 
integrated plan within Afghanistan has facilitated the unimpeded operations of the 
insurgents within the country. While the government’s amnesty program represents an 
excellent effort to cause divide within the Taliban organization and undermine its ethnic 
support, the lack of security and information operations has allowed the insurgent to 
influence the beliefs and actions of the population, weakening the central government’s 
tenuous hold over the country. 
3. Counterforce 
Galula (1964) contends, “The destruction of the guerrilla forces in the selected 
area is, obviously, highly desirable, and this is what the counterinsurgent must strive for. 
One thing must be clear, however: This operation is not an end in itself, for guerrillas, 
like the heads of the legendary hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all 
destroyed at the same time.” (p. 107).  The primary characteristic of coalition 
counterforce efforts is the redundancy of effort applied to the strategy of attrition 
resulting from the lack of a coherent plan.  The primary and overriding facet of the CJTF-
180 mission statement that permeates all subordinate units is “to kill, capture, or deny 
sanctuary for al Qaeda, Taliban, or anti-Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan 
groups.” (Personal correspondence, 8 August 2003). This single focus, driven by 
commanders seeking to demonstrate tangible efficacy through body counts, captured 
equipment, and the elimination or capture of High Value Targets (HVTs) has produced 
competing and many times conflicting efforts rather than integrated and complementary 
operations between units within the same command structure.  Additionally, this singular 
focus is maintained at the expense of all other aspects of counterinsurgency, producing 
disjointed and unsupported civil operations and creating vulnerability in the population 
through the lack of local security.  Leites and Wolf (1970) postulate, “A capability to 
prevent R [the insurgents]—that is a deterrence capability—requires a highly developed 
intelligence system, enlarged and improved paramilitary and police forces, and expanded 
engineering and medical units for civic action in remote areas, rather than conventionally 
armed and trained military units with heavy firepower and armor.” (p. 74). 
U.S. Army Field Manual 90-8 states, “Combat commanders deploying to conduct 
Counterguerrilla operations should understand… that neutralization of the guerrilla is 
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only one-third of the COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy.  Balanced development of the 
country and mobilization of the populace against the insurgents must occur 
simultaneously for the insurgency to be defeated.” (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-13). 
Additionally, FM 90-8 lists synchronization as one of the four operational concepts for 
Air Land battle stating, “In the Counterguerrilla environment, it encompasses the 
effective, coordinated use of available combat power and its interface with noncombat 
operations.” (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-20).  Galula (1964) states, “It is not enough for the 
government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to 
enter into alliances, or to break them: politics becomes an active instrument of operation.  
And so, intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they 
cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with 
regard to its political effects, and vice versa.” [Emphasis in the original] (p. 9).  
According to reports from members of the 3rd Special Forces Group operating in 
Afghanistan, there is a fundamental disconnection between aid programs and military 
operations.  Despite the lack of intelligence cooperation with the military forces by the 
villagers, military commanders remain unable to stop the flow of aid and benefits to the 
villagers as a form of carrot and stick approach (Interview, Deh Rawod, 27 May 2003). 
This inability produces a disconnect between the villagers’ perceptions of the military 
and Civil Affairs and aid groups and demonstrates that despite the lack of assistance and 
continued attacks on Western personnel the benefits will continue. A Civil Affairs officer 
operating out of a firebase near the city of Deh Rawod stated, “People feel no obligation 
to the U.S. for CA projects.  If a CA team is hit with a mine, the villagers will not give up 
the names [of the attackers] or intelligence.  Even if we stop work in the village this has 
little to no impact on the villagers because they [the villagers] do not feel security comes 
from the U.S. but from local warlords.” (Interview, Deh Rawod, 26 May 2003).  
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The absence of local security results from a combination of factors stemming 
from the singular focus of the coalition on the attrition of insurgent forces and the 
overwhelming oversight and control demanded by the CJTF-180 headquarters.  
Increasingly restrictive force protection measures and the over-bureaucratization of 
operations have impaired the flexibility of coalition operations. FM 90-8 states, “To 
preserve the initiative, subordinates act independently within the context of the overall 
plan. The overall attitude of the Army is one of action, not reaction, to the enemy’s 
initiatives.” (FM 90-8, 2003, p. 1-20). Reports from members of 3rd Special Forces Group 
in Afghanistan indicate that U.S. forces must obtain approval before conducting 
operations outside of six kilometers from their firebases (Interview, Deh Rawod, 26 May 
2003).  Additionally, all “named” operations (all those other than routine travel) require 
approval from the CJTF-180 headquarters, which may take up to 48 hours (Interview, 
Deh Rawod, 26 May 2003). Special Forces members in Afghanistan describe the CJTF-
180 planning and approval process as “too slow and too large for all operations” and 
contend “the formal planning process demanded for all operations diminishes 
responsiveness to the point of inefficacy.” (Ibid). The net effect of these restrictions in to 
impede the flexibility and response of local units, thereby surrendering the initiative to 
local insurgents. The lack of responsiveness of coalition forces has allowed insurgents to 
conduct operations unimpeded, thereby diminishing security and control by the central 
government. 
The absence of local security coupled with the lack of contact between coalition 
forces and the population driven by over-zealous force protection measures has 
diminished the ability of the coalition to obtain operational intelligence.  Force protection 
measures have limited the contact between coalition forces and the population, restricting 
coalition forces to movement through an area or to the conduct sweeps en masse, 
seriously impeding coalition efforts to gather vital information necessary to locate and 
destroy insurgent forces.  The use of sweeps by coalition forces, uneducated in local 
customs and cultural sensibilities and wearing heavy body armor has produced the 
alienation of the local populace fostering mistrust, creating a further impediment to 
intelligence collection. Additionally, interviews with several Military Intelligence 
Officers serving in Afghanistan reveal that that there exists no integrated intelligence 
collection plan or matrix to divide intelligence requirements among the collection 
agencies, further convoluting efforts to collect vital intelligence.  An intelligence officer 
operating out of Kandahar Air Base stated, “CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force) has no intelligence collection plan and does not pass down 
requirements resulting in insufficiently developed intelligence for certain operations such 
as no name or picture of the target.” (Interview, Kandahar, 25 May 2003).   
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The inability of coalition forces to provide local security has directly affected its 
ability to conduct counterforce operations.  The lack of local security reinforces coalition 
commanders’ requirements for increased force protection measures, severing the link 
between the population and forces in the field. Additionally, the lack of local security 
prohibits the population from providing intelligence out of the fear of retribution by the 
insurgent forces that retain control over the area after coalition forces have departed. The 
coalition’s lack of focus on the population has resulted in a downward spiral of 
operations producing diminishing returns. The continued single focus of military 
counterforce operations as an independent, autonomous strategy separate from social, 
political, and economic reconstruction efforts has led to the gradual attrition of 
government control and legitimacy and will eventually contribute to the usurpation of 
power by the insurgents as in Vietnam, unless strategic reforms are initiated. 
4. Strengthening the State 
The objective of strengthening the state is to increase both the state’s and the 
population’s capacity to absorb physical and political actions by the insurgents.  This 
entails both active and passive-defensive measures as well as political action and reform.  
Leites and Wolf (1970) state, “Its passive-defensive aspects include such measure as 
building village fortifications (“hardening”), and relocating villagers so that they are less 
accessible to R (evacuation). Its active-defensive aspects involve creating or 
strengthening local paramilitary and police units with increased capacity to provide local 
defense against small unit actions by R.” (p. 36).  While the physical aspects of 
counterinsurgency seek to physically separate the insurgent from the population, the 
political aspect of this facet of counterinsurgency seeks to strengthen or restore the faith 
of the population in the capability of the government to rule and undermine the 
propaganda of the insurgents through demonstrated progress or reform.  Leites and Wolf 
(1970) contend, “In the realm of political action, such capacity requires (1) A’s adherence 
to law and order in contrast to R, and (2) its demonstrated ability to complete announced 
programs, thereby certifying that it should govern because it is governing. “ (p. 37).  
While the majority of actions undertaken by the coalition have focused on the pursuit and 
destruction of insurgent forces, the government and coalition have instituted several 
programs and reforms characteristic of this aspect of counterinsurgency. The 
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development of a new constitution designed to provide for the stable leadership of the 
country seeks to mitigate ethnic and religious tensions through the elimination of political 
parties based on military, ethnic, or religious groups.  
The mandated ethnic balance imposed on the ANA seeks to diminish fears of the 
ethnic domination of the military while increasing the security of the countryside and 
restoring government control.  The decision in October 2003 to expand the International 
Security Augmentation Force (ISAF) as a temporary stopgap to counter the security 
vacuum caused by delays in the training and deployment of the ANA will begin to 
reverse the attrition of government legitimacy and control through the establishment of 
local security and law and order. Finally, the international Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) represent the first attempt by the coalition at an integrated effort 
combining security and relief to sever the hold of the insurgent forces while 
demonstrating the capability of the government to effectively meet the needs of its 
people.  Despite the promise of these programs, they represent individual efforts not part 
of an integrated plan capable of expanding on success.  The fundamental failure that 
coalition and international leadership continue to fail to perceive is the lack integration of 
effort caused by the absence of a unified command structure.  Until efforts are 
coordinated and focused upon the long-term security and benefit of the population, they 
will continue to be individual tactics producing isolated success.  
a. Reform 
Possibly the most fundamental lesson to be taken from the analysis of the 
Huk Rebellion in the Philippines is the effectiveness of social and political reform in 
diminishing the ability of the insurgents to influence the population.  The draft of the 
Afghan constitution, which was unveiled in November 2003, seeks to achieve these ends 
through guidelines designed to mitigate religious and ethnic tensions, eliminate 
corruption, and sever the ties between political authority and military power in its 
members thereby detracting from insurgent claims of the corruption and bias of the 
central government.  The draft constitution, which was based on the 1964 Afghan 
constitution, creates an Islamic republic with representative political structures that 
directly parallel those of the United States. Under the constitution, the government would 
be headed by a popularly elected president, a National Assembly, with an upper and 
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lower house, and an independent judiciary. However, the government will also include a 
prime minister directly appointed by the president to avoid the problem of creating two 
powerful positions that could spark rivalry. The lower house will be popularly elected to 
ensure maximum political enfranchisement of the population while the upper house will 
be partially appointed by the president. The president will be the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces and will have the ability to appoint cabinet members pending the 
approval of the lower house.  
The constitution seeks to mitigate ethnic tensions and eliminate the 
participation of local warlords by prohibiting political parties based solely on ethnicity, 
language, region or religion (Watson, 2003, p. A3). This article is reinforced by 
legislation adopted in mid-2003 prohibiting those with private militias from holding 
office. The constitution seeks to eliminate corruption through a system of checks and 
balances by which a president may be removed by a two-thirds majority vote by both the 
lower house and a traditional grand council or loya jirga (Ibid). Finally, the draft seeks to 
mitigate the religious underpinnings of the insurgent movement by recognizing Islam as 
the national religion stating, “The religion of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam.” 
(Ibid). Additionally, the constitutional convention added, “No law can be contrary to 
Islam,” however, the constitution does guarantee followers of other religions the freedom 
“to perform their religious ceremonies within the limits of the provisions of law,” and 
does not advocate a specific Islamic sect or school of thought (Ibid). 
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The process for developing the constitution sought to achieve the 
maximum political enfranchisement of the population through questionnaires distributed 
throughout the country to solicit the input of a wide variety of the diverse groups that 
comprise the Afghan population on what should be included in the document (Afghans to 
Have an Islamic Republic, 3 November 2003). In December 2003, a 500-member loya 
jirga will debate on and potentially ratify the draft of the constitution.  While the 
government has undertaken much effort to address many of the issues underlying 
insurgent claims of governmental inefficacy and corruption, these efforts overlook 
several issues still impeding the restoration of government legitimacy. Many religious 
fundamentalists oppose the constitution as a document that takes precedence over the 
shiria or Islamic law as defined by the Koran. Mawlawee Sahib Khalik Daad, head 
mullah of the Central Madrassah of Shah Joi District in Zabul Province stated, “I support 
any Islamic group that works against an Afghan government that doesn't fully embrace 
sharia [Islamic law].” (Kazem, 2003, p. 7). Additionally, many local social and economic 
issues still plague the country, which Afghans have sought to alleviate through the drug 
trade and reliance on local warlords and powerbrokers. Maj. Mohammed Issaq, 
commander of the ANA unit in Qalat stated, “The province needs lots of things. We need 
to get a lot more trained police in here. We need to get humanitarian organizations in 
here. The base and root of all problems in Zabul is poverty.” (Maykuth, 2003, p. 1). 
The Philippine counterinsurgency example demonstrated the ability of 
social, political, and economic reform to break the ideological grip of the insurgents over 
the population through demonstrated progress.  The key to the success of these programs 
lay in their ability to address the local and immediate issues confronting the population 
such as security, justice, and the alleviation of poverty. A peasant leader in the Huk 
movement noted of Magsaysay’s programs, “All the reforms that were promised and 
partially implemented, even though small and showcase in nature were encouraging for 
the people. Many people believed the government; they believed Magsaysay.” (Kirkvliet, 
1977, p. 238). While the efforts of the central government in Afghanistan are forming the 
basis for a stable representative government, little is being accomplished at the local level 
in terms of demonstrated progress. Insurgents have exploited the rampant crime and 
unfinished projects such as the highway from Kabul to Kandahar to highlight the lack of 
efficacy and progress under the Karzai regime.  Member of 3rd Special Forces Group 
frequently hear villagers state, “At least I was safe under the Taliban.” (Interview, 
Kandahar, 24 May 2003). In order to produce results comparable to those obtained by 
Magsaysay, the Afghan government must begin at the local level through programs that 
produce tangible and immediate results; however, this cannot be accomplished until 
adequate security is maintained to separate the insurgents physically from the population.  
b. Security 
The inability of the central government to extend its control over the 
majority of Afghanistan stems directly from its inability to enforce its dictates beyond the 
threshold of Kabul and the protection of the United Nations’ International Security 
Augmentation Force (ISAF).  This absence of control results from the government’s 
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inability to sufficiently pay its civil law enforcement and develop sufficient military 
power to counter that of insurgents, warlords, and local powerbrokers. Traditionally, the 
police represent the primary means by which the government exercises its authority 
internally, however, during the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in a country 
without an established infrastructure, the military assumes this role. However, the ANA 
has fallen severely behind schedule due to unexpected delays and political problems. As 
of September 2003, reports varied between six and seven thousand forces trained, and 
while the ANA began its first operations in January, the army is still drastically short of 
the estimated 70,000 it will require to secure the country. Further, reports of ethnic bias in 
the selection of officers by the Defense Minister and ethnic Tajik Fahim Kahn have 
slowed the process of developing an ethnically balanced force.  An unnamed military 
officer in Kabul stated in a story by the Washington Times, “People do not want to send 
their sons to be servants of a faction. To have a national army, you have to have a 
national defense ministry. Without real political reforms and power-sharing at the top, 
nothing else can move.” (Constable, 2003, p. 17).   
Despite these impediments, reports from members of the 3rd Special 
Forces Group in Afghanistan indicate that the first few operations of the ANA achieved 
some success in diminishing the amount of criminal and insurgent activity.  Further, 
operations were conducted in accordance with the “oil spot” principle that left ANA units 
behind in hostile areas to serve as a stabilizing force (Karres interview, 1 November 
2003). The presence of the ethnically integrated ANA has had a positive psychological 
effect on the population facilitating limited cooperation in the regions occupied by the 
ANA.  However, the area of coverage of the few ANA units remains too small to affect 
the widespread security necessary to produce permanent stability throughout the country.  
Maj. Karres of the 3rd Special Forces Group contends, “the populace knows they will 
have to fend for themselves against the enemy once the government forces leave.” 
(Karres interview, 1 November 2003). Additionally, ANA operations, while facilitating 
independent civil relief actions by aid organizations in the area the ANA occupies, 
remain autonomous of large-scale planned relief and reconstruction efforts. 
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In light of the limited ANA forces, the United Nations voted to expand the 
role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the confines of Kabul 
in October of 2003.  The U.S. Department of State defined the purpose of the expansion: 
To support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the 
maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its 
environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the 
United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in 
particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a 
secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance 
of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement. (U.N. Authorizes 
Expansion of Security Force Beyond Kabul, 9 November 2003).  
The expansion of ISAF will further contribute to the stabilization of the 
country in the areas it occupies; however, it too is constrained by limited manpower and 
will only provide security and stabilization in the limited areas occupied by its forces.  
In an effort to remedy the absence of security resulting from limited 
military forces, the United Nations Development Program has undertaken an initiative to 
train and equip additional police members for deployment throughout the country.  
Currently, the existing police force is plagued by manpower and equipment shortages as 
well as being underpaid.  This leaves them unable to enforce government rulings against 
better armed and equipped criminals and insurgents who offer money that many civil 
servants need to feed their families. Insurgent attacks throughout the summer of 2003 
have directly targeted police and border guards using overwhelming force to achieve 
victories with maximum psychological impact on the rural Afghanis by demonstrating 
the inability of the government to protect them from insurgent attacks. Further 
compounding this problem, many local militias used in lieu of police forces have abused 
their authority and committed numerous transgressions against local villagers. A United 
Nations report published in September 2003 highlights these issues, 
When the Afghan Interim Authority came to office, police in the Kabul 
region came immediately back into operation with their salaries covered 
by donors through the UNDP-managed Afghan Interim Authority Fund 
(AIAF). Outside of Kabul, however, the police remain barely operational. 
Those who are present often have loyalties to local commanders and 
operate in a manner that violates international norms and human rights. In 
the absence of an effective national police force to ensure law and order 
during the elections and other democratic exercises, Afghanistan’s entire 
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nation-building process will be jeopardized. (National Civil Police and the 
Law and Order trust Fund of Afghanistan, 9 November 2003). 
The United Nations program entitled the Law and Order Trust Fund of 
Afghanistan in conjunction with police advisors provided by the government of Germany 
seeks to re-establish the civil police force through a five phase, prioritized program.  The 
programs aims, in order of priority, are to provide police salaries, allowances, and 
benefits; procure non-lethal police equipment; rehabilitate police facilities, train and 
rebuild the capacity of police; and rebuild police institutions (Ibid). Further, the report 
states, “In coordination with the German government, we are implementing a $26 million 
police and justice program that includes equipment and training for the Afghan police, 
and the establishment of an identification card system and a communications network for 
the police. We are in the process of planning, with our German colleagues, an expansion 
of police training in the provinces.” (Ibid). However, as of September 2003, the program, 
due to insufficient funding, has been unable to successfully fulfill its first objective of 
providing salaries, paying police in only 28 of 32 of Afghanistan’s provinces (Ibid).  
The establishment of security at the local level represents a vital first step 
in the stabilization of Afghanistan by demonstrating the ability of the government to 
effectively govern the nation in the eyes of the population.  The absence of security has 
allowed criminals and insurgents to influence and control the population through 
intimidation and coercion. Insurgents and local powers have gradually supplanted the 
authority of the government due to its inability to enforce its dictates and provide 
protection for its constituency. Therefore, the security of the population must take 
precedence over the majority of actions undertaken by the government in order to provide 
a stable foundation for the reconstruction of the country.  
c. Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) represent the first truly 
integrated program implemented by the coalition in Afghanistan.  The program combines 
security with civil action to facilitate reconstruction in a secure environment.  The PRTs 
have three purposes: “To provide a safe environment for humanitarian activities; 
exchange information between the central government, the Army, and non-governmental 
organizations; and help the Afghan government project its presence outside of Kabul.” 
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(Wagner, 1 November 2003).  U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert P. Finn said, 
“There are ongoing security problems. We want to provide a safe platform for other 
peacetime activities.” (Ibid).  The program has addressed the concerns of non-
governmental aid organizations (NGOs) that have been increasingly targeted throughout 
2003 by insurgent forces seeking to demonstrate to the population the lack of government 
progress. The teams are comprised of a joint civil-military effort of 50-100 military and 
civilian personnel tasked to provide relief and facilitate economic development in areas 
with ongoing security problems through projects such as building schools, repairing 
damaged bridges, establishing medical clinics, or digging water wells. As of September 
2003, PRTs have been established in the Afghan cities of Kunduz, Bamian, and Gardez; 
however, U.S. leadership hopes to have eight teams in place by the end of 2003. (Brown 
and Thompson, 1 November 2003). News reports in the latter half of 2003 indicate that 
the teams have had some success and fostered renewed faith in the Karzai regime and 
coalition forces. Muhammed Dalili, governor of the Paktia Province said, “The suspicion 
between the local people and the central government has lessened because of the 
coalition PRT. They see that the central government is working to reconstruct their 
country, and because of the security forces, there is now a sense of security here among 
the people.” (Wagner, 1 November 2003). 
Despite the limited success of this initiative, the overall effort faces 
several issues impeding its effectiveness.  NGOs have expressed opposition to this 
program stating PRTs blur the line between the military and civil relief and aid projects 
resulting in increased targeting of the NGO aid workers. Denis McClean, a spokesman 
for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, protested, “We don't believe 
that military forces should have any part in the delivery of humanitarian aid, or be 
involved in it -- unless in very extreme and difficult circumstances. And we feel that 
when people see soldiers throwing aid out the back of a truck and providing humanitarian 
assistance, it blurs the lines of distinction between humanitarian aid workers and the 
military.” (Synovitz, 1 November 2003). Additionally, a State Department representative 
related that the teams maintain “storefronts” in numerous towns, but do not provide 
permanent security. (Phone interview, 25 October 2003).  Provincial reconstruction teams 
operate over a wide area containing several villages and towns, the lack of permanent 
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security allows criminals, warlords and insurgents to reclaim areas once the PRTs have 
moved, allowing them to reap the rewards of the PRTs’ efforts. Galula (1964) contends, 
“Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted 
and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the 
population.” (p. 79). Galula (1964) also postulates, “The operations needed to relieve the 
population from the insurgent’s threat and convince it that the counterinsurgent will 
ultimately win are necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration. They require a 
large concentration of efforts, resources, and personnel. This means that the efforts 
cannot be diluted all over the country but must be applied successively area by area.” (p. 
79). While initial efforts have capitalized on the relative security of the cities and 
provinces in which they operate, attempts to expand these effort into less secure areas 
will result in the insurgents exploiting or mitigating the benefits provided by the PRTs. 
The establishment of PRTs represents the first step in the development of 
integrated effort to facilitate reconstruction at the local level.  However, the lack of a 
comprehensive plan consistent with the “oil spot” principle has resulted in insufficient 
coalition resources to provide permanent security over the entire area of coverage while 
the dispersion of effort has impeded the ability of the coalition to expand upon the local 
success of the individual teams. The plan requires further integration with efforts to train 
and equip local law enforcement that can gradually supplant coalition security forces, 
thereby allowing the PRT to create stability and security that will remain after the PRT 
has moved to the next area without fear of the original area returning to the control of 
criminals and insurgents. Until such efforts are consolidated and focused by a 
comprehensive plan to systematically expand security and stability and integrated with 
other programs to foster permanent security, the effects of the PRTs will remain limited 
and local. 
5. Other Impediments to Counterinsurgency 
While the Leites and Wolf systemic approach provides a comprehensive analysis 
of the strategy associated with counterinsurgency, several other aspects of organization 
and administration are fundamental to the overall success of counterinsurgency 
operations. Unity of command, coordination of action, and the development of 
intelligence are essential components of a successful counterinsurgency strategy.  This 
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section will analyze several of these factors absent from coalition operations that have 
directly contributed to the success of past counterinsurgency operations. 
a. Continuity 
The lack of continuity by coalition forces produced by short operational 
tours, the lack of overlap between rotating forces, and the inability of the coalition to 
reassign Special Forces and intelligence operatives to previously assigned areas has 
resulted in the duplication of effort and the inability to produce indigenous intelligence 
networks.  Short operational tours in a protracted unconventional war such as in 
Afghanistan coupled with the lack of specific country training have diminished the ability 
of Special Forces to integrate with and exploit indigenous forces.  Units rotating in and 
out of the field enjoy little if any overlap, frequently leaving on the same aircraft that 
carried in their replacements (Interview, Kandahar, 23 May 2003).  These rapid 
replacements were conducted at the detriment of passing low-level source contacts and 
the introductions of new team members to local authorities, thereby severing the local ties 
necessary for the cultivation of trusted intelligence sources (interview, Kandahar, 23 May 
2003). Additionally, when teams rotate back to Afghanistan, they frequently are assigned 
to other areas requiring the team to seek out new sources, eliminating the success the 
team had produced in their last area of responsibility.  Anthropologist, Dr. Anna Simons 
of the Naval Postgraduate School contends what is perhaps equally important as 
establishing experience through extended tours is the credibility established by forces in 
fulfilling promises to return after making an initial successful impact on local leadership.  
(Simons interview, 29 October 2003). The lack of continuity in a protracted 
unconventional war such as in Afghanistan has further diminished the ability of the 
coalition to gather vital intelligence on the location and operations of the insurgent forces, 
allowing them to retain the initiative and inhibit coalition efforts. 
b. Lack of Regional Training 
The lack of cultural training, regional knowledge, and language skills by 
members of the coalition remains a major impediment to efforts in Afghanistan.  The lack 
of language skills has created vulnerability within coalition forces by allowing the 
insurgents to obtain vital information on operations and coalition informers from the 
interpreters assigned to coalition units. The inability to speak one of the local languages 
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also represents an impediment to understanding and communication preventing units 
from creating essential ties with local villagers and receiving vital intelligence. 
Additionally, the use of local militias implicated in human rights violations and the abuse 
of villagers as guides has diminished the legitimacy and the popular perception of 
coalition forces as liberators and defenders. The ignorance coalition forces of cultural 
knowledge and sensibilities has generated alienation and resentment among the 
population.  Frequent large-scale sweeps conducted without regard for traditional 
customs accompanied by searches of homes and women, erroneous imprisonment, and 
the disrespect of tribal elders has incensed the population decreasing their willingness to 
assist coalition forces in their pursuit of insurgents and HVTs.  Additionally, the lack of 
knowledge regarding strict tribal codes such as Pusthunwali has generated additional 
recruits for insurgent forces through blood vengeance enacted following accidental 
civilian casualties by coalition forces.  
c. Unity of Effort 
Two key facets of counterinsurgency operations in Malaya that directly 
contributed to its success were unity of command and unity of effort.  These concepts 
ensured the integration of effort towards the common objective of returning the control 
and loyalty of the population back to the central government. U.S., coalition, and 
international civil and military efforts remain divided in overall command and execution, 
leading to the implementation of aspects of counterinsurgency out of context and without 
the required support.  Efforts remain distributed and ineffective due to the absence of a 
comprehensive plan fostered by multiple command structures and sources of authority. 
These distributed actions have precluded expanding operations beyond local success and 
have resulted in areas reverting to the control of warlords and insurgents following the 
departure of coalition or government forces. Additionally, the focus of coalition forces at 
all echelons on the elimination of insurgent forces through a strategy of conventional 
military attrition has led to the absence of local security and the severe impairment of 
coalition attempts to gather intelligence on insurgent forces.  The duplication of effort 
resulting from the competition for increased body counts or equipment capture by the 
coalition has allowed insurgent groups to flourish in the uncontested cities and villages 
left undefended by reactionary coalition commanders, who consider static defense an 
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impediment to locating and destroying insurgent forces. Additionally, the absence of 
local security and lack of integration with other governmental and NGO elements 
operating within the country has impaired and in some cases negated their efforts at 
relief, alienating and diminishing the trust of the population in the central government. 
The solution to this problem lies in the consolidation of authority in a single command 
structure to facilitate the full integration of all operations to ensure the application of the 
full spectrum of counterinsurgency. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
The lack of focus on the security and stabilization of the countryside produced by 
the singular pursuit of the strategy of attrition of insurgent combat forces and leadership 
has created conflicting and redundant military efforts and the neglect of other aspects of a 
viable counterinsurgency strategy. The dearth of security has severed coalition links to 
operational intelligence by leaving the population and reconstruction efforts vulnerable to 
insurgent operations. The insurgents have capitalized on this vulnerability by targeting 
relief workers and projects, as well as government authority figures in an effort to impede 
stabilization and progress resulting in the loss of legitimacy of the government in the eyes 
of the population.  Insurgent propaganda continues to attrit popular confidence in the 
government reinforced by the lack of local progress while the absence of a counter-
information operations campaign has allowed the insurgents to continue their 
misinformation uncontested. The authority and organization demonstrated by insurgents 
and local powerbrokers in the absence of government control have resulted in the shift of 
reliance of the population from the government to local powers. Despite several 
successful programs and tactics, the overall coalition effort represents a collection of 
discrete tactics competing for limited resources, scattered by the absence of an overall 
plan, and in many cases conflicting. Until such efforts are unified under a comprehensive 
and focused plan, disjointed tactics will continue to produce limited and isolated results 





Following the analysis of three cases of counterinsurgency and the study of the 
tactics utilized by both civil and military organizations that produced both success and 
failure, I concluded that while each insurgency operates in a unique context it is bounded 
by several universal concepts that may be exploited to form a general framework of 
counterinsurgency.  Several discrete tactics may be adopted from previous 
counterinsurgencies to produce similar effects; however, these tactics require significant 
modification and integration into a larger strategy to prove effective.  Discrete tactics 
applied out of the context from which they originally produced success will generate 
limited and isolated results or outright failure, as did the strategic hamlet program under 
Operation SUNRISE in Vietnam.  Larry Cable (1986) contends, “There are seeming 
universals in insurgent war also: intelligence, the eschewing of area denial and high-
lethality weapons, the centrality of non-military measures, unity of command among 
others. But it is most important that the universals be modified to fit the requirements of 
the local situation rather than the local situation be interpretively manipulated to fit the 
requirements of the universals.” (p. 281).  While the study of these three cases illustrated 
the danger in attempting to transfer counterinsurgency strategy and tactics from one case 
to another, the cases highlighted three major themes common to both successful cases 
that when absent from the third (Vietnam) produced failure.  These themes are unity of 
command; unity of effort; and a focus on the separation of the insurgent from the 
population.   
Successful counterinsurgency strategies blur the lines of the Leites and Wolf 
categorization in that these strategies represent the unification of effort and the 
combination of social, economic, psychological, and military efforts to alleviate or 
mitigate the underlying causes that provide the insurgent movement with its raison 
d’etre.  International civil and coalition military efforts in Afghanistan remain a 
collection of competing and unfocused efforts that suffer from the absence of a 
comprehensive plan for counterinsurgency.  Reconstruction and counterguerrilla 
operations are divided along boundaries formed by the perception of separate civil and 
military jurisdictions that prevent the integration of effort in a conflict that covers the 
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entire gamut of the internal elements comprising the state (social, political, economic, 
and military).  In the realm of counterinsurgency, each aspect is complementary and 
dependent, requiring the others to gain and maintain success over the insurgent forces.  
Military efforts may clear an area but cannot break the ideological grip of the insurgents 
on the population, while civil efforts may win the hearts and minds of the population but 
cannot sever the insurgent’s physical controls.  David Galula (1964) contends,  
It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how 
much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them: 
politics becomes an active instrument of operation.  And so intricate is the 
interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be 
tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed 
with regard to its political effects, and vice versa. [Emphasis in the 
original] (p. 9).  
The overarching issue confounding efforts in Afghanistan is the lack of a single, 
unified command structure that integrates civil and military efforts under a systematic 
and comprehensive plan.  Unity of command is essential for the coordination and 
integration of the efforts necessary to produce a comprehensive strategy to attain the 
separation of the insurgents from the population, the establishment of security, and the 
restoration of control by the government. Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “The aim of 
successful tactics in insurgent conflicts is counterproduction: to impair the ability of R 
[the insurgents] to produce and reproduce forces while “hardening” the structure of 
government authority so that it can withstand R’s attacks and permit the essential 
counterproduction effort to gain momentum.” (p. 154).  Success must be pursued through 
a simultaneous effort that institutes reform and institutional change at the government 
level while creating security and stability at the local level through permanent security, 
social and political reform, and economic relief and development.  Efforts must be 
systematic and expand upon success.  Large projects must focus on long term 
reconstruction such as economic development and the creation of agricultural 
infrastructure rather than short-term relief efforts that merely distribute food. 
It is necessary to realize that military operations alone cannot effectively end an 
insurgency.  Counterinsurgency involves a concerted effort of social, economic, and 
political reform that begins at the grassroots level by focusing on the needs of the 
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population. U.S. Army Field Manual 33-5 Psychological Operations (circa 1962) 
captures a truth of counterinsurgency in the statement,  
No tactical counterinsurgency can be effective without concurrent major 
nation building programs.  The causes for unrest must be in the process of 
reduction for the successful counterinsurgency operation.  This implies 
extensive political, economic, and social reform…  Counterinsurgency 
operations of the American military cannot be considered as separate from 
political aspects.  (As cited in Cable, 1986, p. 150).  
In an effort to produce a general framework for counterinsurgency applicable to 
the situation in Afghanistan, I will employ the Leites and Wolf systemic approach to 
systematically create an operational strategy based on the modification of past programs 
analyzed in the cases of Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippine Insurrection.  Following the 
introduction of each tactic, I will explain its applicability to the situation in Afghanistan 
as well as a strategy for its employment and integration into the larger framework. I will 
conclude by presenting the strategy as a whole and provide further recommendations for 
the successful stabilization and security of the country 
 
A. INPUT DENIAL 
After a thorough analysis of three cases of counterinsurgency in Chapter II, it 
became evident that a successful counterinsurgency must focus on the separation of the 
insurgent from the population both physically and ideologically.  Leites and Wolf (1970) 
contend, “The organization of R [the insurgents], and its interface with the population, is 
the crucial target for A’s [the state’s] military and political efforts—not R’s forces 
themselves, or the transient territorial base from which R operates.” (p. 154).  The state 
must reprioritize its efforts to focus on the control of the population as an end rather than 
the destruction of insurgent forces.   
By necessity, the security of the population and their separation from the 
influence of the insurgent movement must be the first priority in any strategy of 
counterinsurgency.  Galula proposes a generic framework to achieve success at the local 
level that the government may expand upon to diminish the control of the insurgents over 
the population.  Galula (1964) proposes, 
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In a selected area 
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of 
armed insurgents. 
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in 
strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the 
population lives. 
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut 
off its links with the guerrillas. 
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations. 
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the 
softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize 
self-defense units. 
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement 
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. 
Order having been re-established in the area, the process may be repeated 
elsewhere. (p. 80).  
While Galula’s theory provides a rough framework for the requirements to 
eliminate the insurgent from the midst of the people, it serves only as a generic guideline 
and requires extensive modification for effective application to a traditionalist Muslim 
society bounded by both tribal and religious customs that have the force of law.   
Phases 1 through 3 of Galula’s plan concern the deployment of government forces 
into a region to establish security and physically separate the insurgents from the 
population through the institution of law and order.  The government may implement this 
stage with little to no modification utilizing the ANA or coalition forces.  The military 
unit deployed to the area must focus on a clear and hold operation in which forces 
deployed to the area live among the population. Galula (1964) contends, “The unit must 
be deployed where the population actually lives and not on positions deemed to possess a 
military value. A military unit can spend an entire war in so-called strategic positions 
without contributing anything to the insurgent’s defeat.” (p. 111).  The government forces 
must supplement this defensive role with mobile patrols to deny the insurgents in the area 
freedom of movement.  Daily contact and personal knowledge of the population are 
essential to the success of the operation; however, it is imperative that the government 
forces display cultural sensibility, adhere to the laws they enforce, and minimize the use 
of violence to avoid antagonizing the population and to establish their legitimacy. 
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However, these forces must enact strict population controls such as those utilized in the 
Malaya to separate the remaining insurgents from the population.  These controls take the 
form of registration and identification cards; Demobilization, Disarmament, and 
Reintegration (DDR); movement controls; and curfews implemented and enforced by the 
security forces that reside in the community.  The government must integrate these 
controls with an information operations campaign designed around a carrot and stick 
approach that rewards compliance with the lessening of restrictions while non-
compliance results in a tightening of the restrictions.  Leites and Wolf (1970) contend, “A 
[the state] must protect the population, identify desired behavior and reward it by 
effective programs; and withhold such programs in areas that have failed to perform in 
desirable ways.” (p. 154).  
The fourth phase of Galula’s framework requires extensive modification in its 
application to the situation in Afghanistan due to the religious nature of the insurgent’s 
political organizations.  Afghan insurgents have utilized religious institutions such as 
mosques and madrassas to convey their political message through religious leadership to 
instill their cause with legitimacy.  Local and national leaders remain apprehensive with 
regard to shutting down these known sources of insurgent recruitment and organization 
due to the perception of religious persecution by the population and world Islamic 
communities.  However, state and local leaders have done little to support pro-
government religious leadership resulting in the assassination of many pro-state Islamic 
clerics and mullahs by the insurgents.  While the government cannot shut down a 
religious institution, it may be possible to replace a pro-insurgent religious leader with a 
pro-state leader by arresting the insurgent and instating the pro-state leader in his stead 
while providing the necessary security to defend him from insurgent reprisals.  Dr. Glenn 
Robinson of the Naval Postgraduate School states, “Everywhere in the Muslim world 
over the past 50 years, clergy (‘ulama) have become civil servants, which is a sharp break 
with Islamic history. Generally, governments have been pretty successful at appointing 
clergy who won’t cause trouble, but not always.” (Personal correspondence, 14 
November 2003).  
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 The fifth phase involves the establishment of an indigenous administration that 
will eventually replace that of the military to provide the community with a method to 
implement local change through political enfranchisement without resorting to social 
upheaval.  This aspect requires modification in smaller villages and towns due to the 
tribal custom of the shura or council of elders, which serves as the overall legal and 
political authority for smaller settlements in Afghanistan.  However, in larger areas with 
modern political structures and formal institutions, the Galula approach may be applied 
with minimal modification as the situation dictates.  In smaller communities, government 
forces may utilize various techniques to secure the loyalty of members of the local shura 
such as offers of economic development, formal political positions, and material 
incentives.  
The sixth phase of the Galula framework requires testing the capabilities of the 
appointed officials to determine their credibility, loyalty, and capability as leaders of the 
community.  This unique aspect must be approached on a case-by-case basis and as the 
situation dictates.  The seventh phase of the Galula model involves political education 
and indoctrination.  This step involves psychological operations aimed at the population 
to convince it that the only through the government will they achieve improved social and 
economic conditions leading to individual benefit.  However, this program requires 
legitimization through both demonstrated progress and the advocacy of a trusted source.  
In the initial stages, due to the absence of demonstrated progress of government 
programs, the government can achieve this through the advocacy of pro-state religious 
leaders operating in existing socio-religious organizations such as madrassas and 
mosques.  
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The eighth and final phase of the Galula framework requires winning over or 
suppressing the remnants of the insurgent organization in the community.  This effort 
requires intensive psychological operations targeting the loyalty of the lower echelon of 
the insurgent organization as well as the development of an extensive network for the 
collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) to discern the insurgents from the 
population.  The foundation for this stage begins during the first three stages in which the 
government forces provide static defense of the population and provide the population 
protection from insurgent repercussions for their cooperation.  The security, law, and 
order produced by the stationing of the ANA among the population, provided the 
soldiers’ conduct is in accordance with that law and order, will engender the trust and 
security necessary to produce a compliant population willing to provide the necessary 
intelligence to separate the insurgents from the population.  In addition, population 
control measures will facilitate identifying the insurgents through their violation of the 
established procedures.  Despite the increased security facilitating the separation of the 
insurgents, the government must target those members of the insurgency that operate 
outside of the populated areas as well as the mechanism used to convert resources into 
insurgent operations and militants. 
 
B. CONVERSION MECHANISM DESTRUCTION 
The primary mechanisms through which Afghan insurgent movements convert 
resources into operations and fighters are socio-religious organizations such as mosques 
and madrassas that operate both within and outside of the boundaries and control of the 
Afghan government and coalition forces.  While neither the Afghan government nor 
those states containing these institutions are capable or willing to shut down these 
organizations due to their perceived religious legitimacy among the world Muslim 
community, these governments may replace the pro-insurgent leadership of these 
institutions with pro-state religious leadership to counter the insurgent war of ideas.   
In addition to directly combating the conversion mechanism of the movement, 
Leites and Wolf advocate the use of psychological operations to induce surrender and 
defection within the organization, thereby impeding further insurgent activity by 
refocusing the movement on internal security. Leites and Wolf (1970) propose,  
Effective programs for attracting defectors (for example, the Economic 
Development Corps (EDCOR), in the Philippines, and though less 
successful, the Chieu Hoi [“open arms”] program in Vietnam) involve 
both military pressures and civil inducements: making the life of the 
guerrilla appear short or hard to bear, and making the option to defect an 
attractive alternative in terms of employment, income, or status. (p. 80)  
To achieve this end the government must combine sufficient incentive with 
intolerable military pressure on the insurgent organization.  Programs that offer amnesty 
as well as economic opportunity and stability through job skills training and employment 
would serve as an effective inducement for lower level insurgent members, while the 
political participation program reportedly offered by the Karzai administration to 
149 
members of the former Taliban regime could provide sufficient incentive to inspire 
defection within the insurgent ranks or serve to disrupt operations through questions of 
loyalty to the movement.  Despite the attempts of the government to achieve a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict, there will always exist those members of the insurgent 
organization possessing extreme dedication who are unwilling to surrender or negotiate.  
The only alternative for these members is eradication by the government forces.  
 
C. COUNTERFORCE 
While government forces maintain security, law, and order within the populated 
regions, the military must continue to patrol the countryside to curtail the freedom of 
movement of the insurgent forces.  Once the government has effectively cut off the 
internal sources of the insurgent’s input, the military and police forces must maintain 
pressure on the insurgents through aggressive counterforce operations to raise the cost of 
continued operations above the threshold that the insurgent membership is willing or is 
able to afford.  Government forces accomplish this through small unit patrolling and 
ambushes, and reconnaissance based on intelligence procured from the population within 
the secured areas.  Small units retain the flexibility and stealth necessary to obtain the 
initiative over the insurgent forces that the movement of large groups of government 
forces cannot attain due to their required support and sheer size.  However, a quick 
reaction force (QRF) must be readily available to respond to the latest intelligence and 
reinforce government patrols operating against the insurgents to prevent the insurgents 
from attaining a victory, which they can exploit to detract from the confidence of the 
population in the government.  While isolating the population from the insurgents and 
targeting their forces and their ability to regenerate those forces will produce a great deal 
of success, the state must institute reforms and demonstrate its ability to effectively 






D. STRENGTHENING THE STATE 
The state must strengthen both itself and the population against the effects of the 
insurgent’s actions and propaganda by severing the insurgent’s physical and ideological 
hold over the population through local security and reforms that address those issues 
confronting the populace from which the insurgents derive their cause.  In Afghanistan, 
warlords, corruption, crime, ethnic divides, and poverty manifest these issues.  The 
government and its agents must eliminate or mitigate these problems through social, 
political, and economic reforms that simultaneously begin at the local and the state level.  
Chalmers Johnson (1982) contends,  
The crucial question is whether or not the nondeviant actors—persons 
managing their disequilibrium-induced tensions in some private manner—
continue to believe in the willingness and competence of the elite to 
resynchronize the system.  In order to maintain widespread confidence, an 
elite must do two things: perceive that the system is diequilibriated, and 
take the appropriate steps to restore equilibrium (p. 95).  
Local reforms must identify and address the immediate and local concerns of the 
populace in an effort to alleviate social disequilibrium and demonstrate the efficacy and 
success of the central government through immediate improvements and benefits in the 
lives of the population.  Reforms at the state level address broader issues such as 
corruption, economic stability, and equal representation and are designed to improve 
conditions countrywide and sustain the improvements began at the local level. 
At the local level, the government must address pressing issues such as poverty, 
crime, and unemployment, which in Afghanistan lead many unskilled males into the 
service of criminals, warlords, or insurgents further contributing to the instability of the 
area in a repetitive, compounding cycle.  Self-sustaining long-term solutions rather than 
short-term relief efforts are essential to the elimination of the social and economic issues 
underlying much of the unrest in Afghanistan.  The creation of job skill programs and 
industrial or agricultural infrastructure to sustain employment will provide alternatives to 
participation in these groups and contribute to the long-term stability of the area by 
expanding the role of the community to create economically interdependent networks of 
stability. Additionally, the establishment of immediate medical care facilities available to 
the population, especially in an area such as Afghanistan in which gun wounds and 
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landmines are an everyday occurrence, instills the population with a sense of 
indebtedness and responsibility to the government forces facilitating continued loyalty.  
The intent of this argument is neither to diminish the utility of immediate aid nor to 
suggest stopping the distribution of aid where it is truly needed; however, it does suggest 
that greater effect is achieved with those projects that produce long-term benefits. 
Immediate benefits and short-term projects may be employed to induce compliance or as 
a reward for cooperation with government forces.  Despite the utility of these concepts in 
obtaining the loyalty of the population, local aid and reform are ineffective without 
integrated security.  Both the Marine Combined Action Platoon program (CAP) and the 
U.S. Army’s Civilian Irregular Defense Force (CIDG) in Vietnam integrated security 
with aid to achieve the effective pacification of an area while the strategic hamlet 
program failed in part due to the absence of adequate security.  Without the integration of 
security into relief and reform programs, insurgents are able to capitalize on the same 
benefits enjoyed by the population.  Despite the benefit of local aid and reform, the 
government must integrate local programs into a larger effort of reform to capitalize on 
and reinforce initial success. 
 At the state level, reforms must address the underlying issues generating social 
disequilibrium. The proposed Afghan constitution confronts many of the issues causing 
division within Afghanistan.  Ethnic schisms underlie both the majority of warlord in-
fighting and Pashtun political unrest, providing additional recruits for the Pashtun-
dominated Taliban and contributing to the overall instability of the country.  The 
constitution seeks to eliminate these concerns through a representative democracy that 
forbids political representation based on ethnic, religious, or military groups and prohibits 
elected officials from maintaining personal militias.  Despite the intent of the 
constitutional convention, the proposed document is insufficient to remedy the problems 
confronting the unification of the country.  Corruption and ethnic bias still remain key 
concerns of the population and serve to bolster insurgent claims of the inadequacy of the 
current regime.  The corruption and bias of local political officials has weakened the 
popular perception of the legitimacy of the Karzai administration.  The government must 
attain the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the population through efficient and 
unbiased operations within the confines of its laws to produce tangible success in order to 
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deny the insurgents a source of propaganda.  The government requires sufficient 
oversight and controls through a system of checks and balances to maintain the efficient 
and legal operation of its agencies at all levels.  In addition, the state must provide an 
avenue other than armed conflict for the population to air their grievances and resolve 
their disputes.  This requires a formal system of justice and a program to ensure the 
maximum political enfranchisement of the population at all levels of organization and 
administration.  Overall, the government requires balance and a system to maintain a 
social equilibrium within the tolerances of the majority of the diverse ethnic and religious 
groups that compose Afghanistan.  
After a thorough analysis of the discrete programs applied in Afghanistan, I 
derived that the common fault among these programs is their lack of integration and 
mutually supporting effort.  The integration and systematic application of these programs 
combined with local reforms has the potential to produce a mutually reinforcing effect as 
a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy leading to the security and stabilization of 
the country.  The integration of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
(DDR) program, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), poppy eradication, and police 
training, combined with the deployment of the Afghan National Army in a coordinated 
and systematic effort would achieve both reform and security at the local level 
simultaneously.  This combined effort would foster long-term stability and self-reliance 
through economic development, job training, and the creation of a local police force that 
would gradually replace the ANA as local security and law enforcement.  The programs 
offered under both DDR and poppy eradication promote the development of local 
industry and provide job skills training that can capitalize on the agricultural or industrial 
infrastructure established by the poppy eradication program.  The law and order 
engendered under the static defense of the ANA, and eventually the local police, will 
facilitate the success of disarmament by mitigating the need for weapons of self defense 
and weaken if not eliminate the warlords’ private militias.  The eventual elimination of 
poppy farming combined with the permanent restoration of law and order will further 
inhibit the ability of warlords to generate revenue through illegal taxation, while the job 
skills and legitimate employment of the men in the community will inhibit the ability of 
the warlords to regenerate their armies.  
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In order for the government to expand upon its success, it must shift the 
responsibility of protecting the community from the military back to the civilian 
population.  The integration of police training and DDR implementation into the overall 
strategy will facilitate this transition.  As the police are trained and order is restored 
below the military horizon of armed organization, police may gradually assume 
responsibility for the security of their native area.  Despite the gradual replacement of the 
military as local security, the military remains responsible for regional security to 
respond to insurgent or criminal threats that are beyond the capability of the local police 
forces.  Additionally, to ensure the continued service of the civilian police force and 
avoid the problems of embezzlement currently plaguing local Afghan administrations, the 
central government should pay civil servants directly through a payment officer without 
intermediaries or ties to the local area or its members.  
In addition to providing security within the country, it is essential that the 
government adequately secure its borders.  The government must increase its surveillance 
and patrolling of the border areas that have facilitated the unimpeded operations of 
insurgent forces.  While no country openly supports the Afghan insurgency, the porous 
borders of Afghanistan and uncontested tribal areas of neighboring Pakistan have allowed 
trans-national Islamic fundamentalist insurgents to serve as an exogenous source for both 
personnel and materiel. Until sufficient ANA forces can be adequately trained, coalition 
efforts must encompass increased border vigilance to deny the insurgent resources and 
access to the conversion mechanisms that are beyond the control of the Afghan 
government. 
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The goal of this strategy is to produce security and stability at the local level that 
the government may expand upon as part of a comprehensive strategy consistent with the 
oil spot principle. Through a simple cost-benefit analogy the goal of this program 
becomes readily apparent.  The objective of this program is to raise the cost of operation 
for the guerrilla and the potential recruit for participation in guerrilla operations beyond 
what they are willing or able to pay, while rewarding compliance with the government’s 
dictates and producing incentives for surrender.  Carrying this business analogy further, 
the government must advertise its success through psychological operations. Cable 
(1986) states in reference to the Philippine Huk Insurrection, “Image building was 
important as nation building in order to convince the residents that a nation was in fact 
being built courtesy of a determined, dedicated, and responsive central government.” (pp. 
62-63).  This program, directed at both the insurgents and the population, would rely on 
testimonials, pictures, and leaflets distributed throughout the country to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the government, thereby generating a willingness to cooperate in the 
population and a desire to surrender and reintegrate among the lower echelons of the 
insurgents.  Additionally, the government may employ amnesty programs, such as the 
reported political integration program instituted by Karzai in November 2003 to induce 
the surrender of middle and upper level insurgents, thereby targeting the entire insurgent 
organization with psychological operations.  
Afghanistan faces a myriad of issues impeding its stabilization and security.  The 
vacuum of security created after the fall of the Taliban has allowed many of these issues 
to resurface and spread. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious divides fuel this instability, 
giving rise to warlords and powerbrokers seeking local dominance and corrupting the 
fragile nascent political processes in the central government with bias.  Opium production 
has facilitated the resurgence of criminals, warlords, and insurgents, providing them with 
a source of income that ties them into the interests of the population by providing short-
term relief to the long-term problems underlying the widespread poverty in Afghanistan 
through the economic draw of poppy cultivation.  Insufficient international aid has 
limited the ability of the government to secure the countryside.  This problem is further 
compounded by the inability of the government to generate sufficient funding from 
within its borders due to the refusal of provincial warlords to relinquish the revenue 
generated by taxation from within their provinces.  Inadequate funding and the 
governments’ lack of control have prevented it from paying its workers or funding its 
operations other than immediate relief further diminishing its control as government 
workers leave their jobs or are corrupted by bribery.  The government remains unable to 
enforce its dictates due to the absence of a sufficient military or police force and the 
reluctance of coalition forces to become involved in intra-Afghan fighting.  The absence 
of control and reform has allowed poverty, crime, corruption, and violence have spread 
throughout the country, creating a fertile ground for anti-government movements. 
Insurgents have capitalized on the lack of governmental control and the social issues 
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pandemic throughout Afghanistan to revive and spread their organizations.  They have 
developed infrastructure both within and outside of Afghanistan to support their 
operations.  International civil and military efforts are divided and there exists no 
comprehensive strategy to eliminate the insurgents from the country or address the issues 
underlying their cause.  Military leadership, having failed to perceive a shift in tactics of 
their opposition from conventional warfare to insurgent operations, have focused solely 
on the destruction of insurgent forces, eliminating the ability of the coalition to procure 
the intelligence necessary to locate the insurgent forces.  Despite the diminishing returns 
of the strategy of attrition, coalition military efforts continue to focus upon this single 
aspect of counterinsurgency while parochial perceptions of the separation of civil and 
military efforts have prevented their integration into a comprehensive strategy.  The 
disunity fostered by separate command structures and competing efforts has produced 
discrete counterinsurgency and relief tactics that produce limited and isolated results.  
The inability of the government and international forces to capitalize on the limited 
success of these programs and adapt their tactics to a changing environment has locked 
Afghanistan in an operational quagmire that remains unable to progress beyond limited 
and local success and grand designs for the future. 
 Overall, the discrete tactics and programs applied in Afghanistan have the 
potential to form a valid strategy for counterinsurgency if the government and the 
coalition can integrate civil and military efforts under a unified plan that focuses on the 
population and its separation from the insurgents in a systematic manner.  Separation 
entails both ideological and physical relief from the insurgent influence instituted through 
reform and security.  Psychological operations and demonstrated success are required to 
foster in the population the belief that the government will defeat the insurgents and that 
this will result in be the overall betterment of the life of the individual Afghan. Larry 
Cable (1986) contends that this is necessary “to convince the peasants that their most 
basic need, to be secure and safe in their own persons, homes and fields was best met by 
the government forces and the peasants’ best course of action was to cooperate with the 
security personnel in achieving this goal.” (p. 63).  The government requires religious 
legitimacy to counter that of the insurgents and must capitalize upon the support of pro-
state religious leadership operating through pre-existing socio-religious institutions to 
156 
secure its hold over the population. Finally, government and international efforts at 
counterinsurgency must expand their purview from the pursuit of insurgent forces and 
immediate relief to encompass the entire spectrum of counterinsurgency and focus on 
long-term solutions to the problems underlying the current conditions.  The government 
must interdict inputs, eliminate conversion mechanisms, develop intelligence networks, 
and strengthen the state in addition to the destroying insurgent forces.  While the fight for 
Afghanistan is not yet lost, it remains locked in an operational quagmire that will 
gradually frustrate international support through lack of progress.  Unconventional 
warfare is a protracted process that cannot be measured through body counts or the 
amount of land conquered.  Its success is determined by the intangible support of the 
indigenous population and their perception of the legitimate rule of the government.  
Until civil and military efforts are integrated and focused on the control of the population 
rather than the attrition of insurgent forces, the Afghan government and the coalition will 
remain unable to demonstrate the progress necessary for continued international support 
leading to the inevitable withdrawal of international forces and an insurgent victory.  The 
coalition must adapt its methods to suit the conflict rather than attempting to force the 
situation to conform to its methods. It must correctly perceive Afghanistan as an 
unconventional conflict requiring the integration of civil and military efforts focused on 
the long-term stabilization of the region rather than the pursuit of a strategy of attrition, 
lest we repeat the mistakes of the past.  As Henry Kissinger once said referring to 
Vietnam, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one.  We sought 
physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion.  In the process, 
we lost sight of one of the most critical maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if 
he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” (Kissinger, 1969, p. 
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